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VARIATIONS IN QUALITY OUTCOMES AMONG HOSPITALS 
IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF HEALTH SYSTEMS, 1995 - 2000 
By Askar S. Chukrnaitov, M.D., Ph.D. 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2005 
Director: Gloria J. Bazzoli, Ph.D. 
Professor, Department of Health Administration 
Although prior research has found differences in costs and financial performance 
across different types of hospital systems, there has been no systematic study of 
variations in patient quality of care or safety indicators across different systems. Our 
study examines whether five main types of health systems - centralized (CHS), 
centralized physiciadinsurance (CPIHS), moderately centralized (MCHS), decentralized 
(DHS), and independent (IHS) - as well as other hospital characteristics are associated 
with differences in quality of patient care. 
Data were assembled for 6 years (1995 - 2000) from multiple sources. We used 4 
AHRQ risk adjusted inpatient quality indicators (IQIs) and 5 risk-adjusted patient safety 
indicators (PSIs) as dependent variables. Random effects models were used in the 
analysis. 
It was found that the IQI and PSI models have different patterns. In the IQI 
models, CHS hospitals have lower AMI, CHF, Stroke, and Pneumonia mortality rates 
than hospitals in other system types. The PSI models did not indicate any systems' 
effects on adverse event rates. It was also found that system hospitals' compliance with 
the JCAHO performance area indicator for availability of patient specific information 
was associated with lower rates of CHF, Stroke, Pneumonia, and Infection due to medical 
care. 
The findings suggest that centralization of hospital structures may improve 
internal clinical processes by enhancing coordination of activities, communication 
between providers, timely adjustments of processes of care delivery and structures to 
external pressures. A lack of systems' effect on adverse events may be explained by a 
newness of the patient safety issues for hospitals and possible changes in reporting 
patterns of medical errors after the Institute of Medicine report of 1999. A system 
hospitals' compliance with the JCAHO performance area indicator may indicate 
improvements in information and clinical record systems. 
Hospital systems hold much potential for hospitals in improving patient quality of 
care and safety because they provide a laboratory for studying the health care process and 
sharing lessons across multiple institutions. Based on our findings, we recommend that 
future studies use a combination of IQIs and PSIs when examining institutional quality of 
care because both provide different and complementary information. 
CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
The Study Problem 
This study will examine how the organizational structures of hospital systems 
may affect quality of inpatient care. Contingency theory will be used to develop a 
conceptual framework and hypotheses: To test these hypotheses, panel data will be used 
on all general, acute hospitals in eleven states available for the 1995 - 2000 period 
combined from seven well-established data sets. Findings from panel fixed effects or 
random effects analyses will be compared with findings from cross-sectional three stage 
estimation models to avoid some data limitations and increase internal validity of the 
current study. 
According to the Centers for ~ e d i c a r e  and Medicaid Services (CMS) actuaries 
report, the United States spent an estimated $1.5 trillion on health care in 2003, or 14.9 
percent of a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $1 0.9 trillion; it is also projected that 
$3.36 trillion, or 18.4 percent of a GDP of $1 8.24, the U.S. will spent by 201 3 
(Reinhardt, et al. 2004). Hospital inpatient spending increased at a rate of 4.1 percent in 
2000, 8.7 percent in 2001, and 6.5 percent in 2003, down from 8.4 percent in 2002 
(Strunk and Ginsburg, 2004). This new trend shows "a dramatic departure from the 
trend in 1994-1998, when hospital inpatient spending was actually declining year to year 
by as much as 5.3 percent (Strunk, Ginsburg and Gabel, 2001)." 
Costs in the U.S. in comparison with other industrialized countries are believed 
to be driven by higher than projected per capita spending on health care, the wider 
distribution of compensation for health services, the highly fragmented health financing 
system, the higher capacity of health systems (i.e., technologies and professionals), 
administrative complexity and costs, and unwillingness to ration health care (Reinhardt, 
et al. 2004). High health expenditures generally and for hospital care, however, do not 
assure high standards of quality of care, which are defined as the degree to which health 
services for individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired health 
outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge (Schuster et al. 1998). 
The World Health Organization Report (2000) evaluated the performance of the health 
care systems of the world, and the U.S. was ranked only 37th overall in 2000. The 
Institute of Medicine report (2000) has also revealed that between 44,000 and 98,000 
inpatient deaths appeared due to preventable errors, occurring every year in the U.S. 
hospitals. 
Efforts to address problems in health care must take into account the changing 
provider landscape in the U.S.A. In the mid-1990's, which is a timeframe relevant to 
this study, one of the suggested ways to improve quality of care, while containing health 
care costs, was to create integrated delivery systems (IDS) that consist of hospitals, 
physicians, other providers and auxiliary services, and possibly insurance products 
(Shortell, 1996). Clinical integration of IDS'S processes was believed to help achieve 
the better quality at the lower costs due to more effective coordination of services in 
effective manner, shared incentives, standardization of care, improved continuity of care, 
and other factors (Shortell, 1996). Shortell et al. (2000) also mentioned that centralized 
health systems (CHS) may achieve clinical integration and better quality of care because 
CHS have common ownership and shared incentives, which allow them to communicate 
policies across and coordinate activities of sub-units in a unified manner. 
During the mid-1990s (i.e., the timeframe for this study), a transformation of 
freestanding health providers into health systems was primarily stimulated by external 
forces, such as managed care, competition, reimbursement regulations (Lesser and 
Ginsburg, 2000, Kohn, 2000, Lake et al. 2003, Bazzoli et al., 1999). For example, the 
absolute number of health systems rose from 295 (2,836 affiliated hospitals) in 1994 to 
365 systems (3,221 affiliated hospitals) in 1998 (Bazzoli et al., 2001). 
Bazzoli et al. (1999), using cluster analyses, classified 90 percent of health 
system into five well-defined categories: centralized health system (CHS), centralized 
physicianlinsurance health systems (CPIHS), moderately centralized health systems 
(MCHS), decentralized health systems (DHS), and independent hospital systems (IHS). 
Prior research has found differences in costs across these system types (Bazzoli et al., 
2000). Centralization of health systems may facilitate clinical integration of processes 
among system members due to diffusion of management and clinical information 
systems, quality and care management processes, which may results in differences in 
outcomes (Shortell et al., 2000). It is believed that this taxonomy could assist in 
advancing research on integration and outcomes in health care (Alexander et al., 1996). 
However, there is only limited research on how structural integration of hospitals 
in systems may affect quality outcomes. Empirical studies demonstrate mixed results on 
how different organizational arrangements of health providers affect quality of care. 
Effects of clinical integration on hospital quality performance have also mixed results. 
Since no studies were performed on quality of care provided by different types of health 
systems, the current research is intended to compare quality outcomes in hospitals 
affiliated with various system types. 
Purpose of the Study 
Structural and process elements necessary for delivering high quality care will be 
assessed. Structural differences among hospital-led health systems may yield 
differences in care provision, resulting in differences in quality outcomes. Types of 
ownership, centralization of authority, and differentiation of services in health systems 
may result in different approaches to care delivery in various types of health systems. 
Internal processes of service delivery, in turn, may be associated with quality outcomes 
varying by system types. Therefore, structural and process characteristics of hospitals in 
different types of health systems may be associated with certain quality outcomes for 
these organizational arrangements, and differences in quality o~ltcomes may occur 
between these types of health systems. 
Research Questions 
This research questions are as follows: 
1. What types of health systems and their member hospitals are associated with the 
best quality outcomes, produced by hospitals in those systems? 
2. What types of health systems and their member hospitals are associated with the 
worst quality outcomes, produced by hospitals in those systems? 
3. Are there differences in care delivery processes associated with positive or 
negative quality outcomes in hospitals in various types of health systems? 
Theoretical Framework 
Contingency theory will be used in developing a conceptual framework for this 
study. Contingency theory states that there is no best way to organize that is highly 
effective for all organizations (Galbreith, 1973). Different environments present 
different challenges and opportunities for organizations (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1 967) proposed a conceptual perspective where organizations 
may restructure through differentiation and integration strategies in response to their 
environments. Thompson (1967) introduced a notion of task interdependence that can 
be used to predict the structural features of organizations. Environments (i.e., external 
conditions), organizational size, task interdependence, technology (i.e., internal 
conditions) were called contingency factors (Donaldson, 1995 and 200 1 ; Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Galbreith, 1973). External and internal contingency 
factors moderate organizational change of its structure in adapting to the environment 
and for improving organizational effectiveness and performance (Child, 1972; 
Donaldson, 1995). Contingency factors determine which organizational structural 
characteristics produce the highest levels of organizational performance, as there must 
be a good "fit" between environment conditions and the organizational structure 
designed to deal with that environment (Donaldson, 200 1). Changes in contingency 
factors may possibly lead to changes in the organizational structures and processes 
through appropriate decision-making by capable organizational management (Figure 1). 
Figure 1 : Schematic Depiction of Theoretical Constructs 
Contingency theory provides plausible "scenarios" for evaluating hospital 
strategic responses to the dynamics of the health care environment in the 1995 - 2000 
period. This conceptual model will theoretically identify strategies that may affect 
hospital structures and processes. This conceptual model will set up a structure- 
process-performance link for empirical evaluation. A set of testable hypotheses will be 
developed. 
Conceptual Model and Propositions 
The U.S. health care environment may be characterized as complex and dynamic 
(Kohn, 2000; Gaynor and Haas-Wilsion, 1999; Lake et al., 2003). Environmental 
forces, such as managed care, competition, reimbursement reforms (e.g., the BBA), and 
others, stimulated massive consolidation in the health care industry in the mid-1 990s 
(Bazzoli et al., 1999, Gaynor and Haas-Wilsion, 1999, Lesser and Ginsburg, 2000, 
Dranove et al., 2002). Environmental and task uncertainty make organization 
performance unpredictable (Thompson, 1967). As the environmental dynamism and 
task uncertainty increase, health care organizations may change their structures to regain 
the fit with the changed environment in order to improve their quality. Contingency 
theory proposes two or possibly three scenarios of hospital systems responses to their 
external environment and internal contingency conditions. 
Contingency 
Factors 
t t 
, Structure Performance 
- 
Process - 
According to the first scenario, external forces stimulate consolidation of health 
providers, which, in turn, increases interdependence (i.e., connectedness) among these 
providers (Donaldson, 2001). In this situation, leadership of integrated health care 
providers may view task interdependence as a leading or dominant contingency factor. 
Health systems may start using integration strategy to better align their structures in 
accordance with requirements of task interdependence. 
A greater centralization of structures may allow managing effectively increasing 
connectedness of organizations in the systems. Contingency theory implies that as task 
interdependence and centralization increase, differentiation and divisionalization 
decrease, because organizational services, products, and tasks become related and 
require more integration and coordination at the systems' level and less delegation of 
authority to the hospital's level (Donaldson, 200 1). Centralization of authority at the 
health system's level would allow the system leadership to better process information for 
making effective decisions and coordinating activities among sub-units in response to 
changing environments (Savage et al., 1997). Effective coordination of reciprocal 
interdependences may improve provision of care along the continuum and stimulate 
clinical integration of the system's sub-units. Centralization of health systems may also 
stimulate diffusion of administrative and care management practices within their systems 
(Shortell et al., 2000). 
As a result, a hypothesis that better quality outcomes would be observed in more 
centralized health systems in comparison with more decentralized health systems will be 
proposed. 
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According to the second (contrasting) scenario, as consolidation among health 
providers has picked up in response to the dynamic environment in the mid-1990s, 
organizational size of health systems increased (Bazzoli 1999/2000). Child (1 975) 
stated that organizational size defines the structure, and therefore, leadership may view a 
large size as a main contingency factor and need to manage it by restructuring. 
Health system's leadership may use differentiation and divisionalization strategy 
to fit organizational size with their structures when organizational services, products, 
tasks are maintained at the hospital level and unrelated with each other at the system 
level (Thompson, 1967, Donaldson, 2001). As a result, a large health system to 
decentralize and rely more on indirect means of control over organizational processes, 
such as specialization (i.e., division of labor), formalization (i.e., pre-specified roles and 
relationships), and worker autonomy (i.e. technical competency of personnel) (Child, 
1972; Scott, 2003). 
Specialization, due to routinization of tasks, and formalization of care delivery 
may improve clinical processes and accountability of personnel at the hospital level, 
thus, reducing system errors and mistakes. Increased physician decision-making 
authority and clinical autonomy in decentralized health systems improve physician- 
hospital relationships when hospitals rely more on professionals to improve their 
performance (Alexander et al., 2001), which may result in better quality outcomes. 
Thus, decentralization of health systems may improve adjustments of hospitals 
with contingency factors at the local submarkets by increasing service availability and 
accessibility through differentiation strategy, stimulating specialization in hospital 
services and physician clinical autonomy in the local submarkets as indirect means of 
control. In contrast to the first scenario, a hypothesis that better quality outcomes would 
be observed in more decentralized health systems in comparison with more centralized 
will be suggested. 
The interplay of both scenarios provides that moderately centralized health 
systems can potentially become quality champions in comparison with other system 
types, because they may have found the "right" organizational structure and strategic 
balance between centralization and differentiation of their structures and services. On 
the other hand, independent health systems are hypothesized to have the worst quality 
outcomes in comparison with other system types, because their structures may be 
characterized as neither centralized nor differentiated. 
Scope and Approach 
Data are assembled for 6 years (1995 - 2000) from multiple sources: 1) Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project 
State Inpatient Database (HCUP SID) provides patient clinical and non-clinical 
information, including main quality indicators; 2) Joint Commission for Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) performance area scores, assessing organizational 
dimensions of the quality of inpatient care (these data are available for 2 at most years 
for each study hospital), provide data on internal clinical processes and integration; 3) 
American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Surveys provide data on hospital 
characteristics; 4) Area Resource File (ARF) provides market and socioeconomic 
variables at the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) and county levels; 5) HMO 
Interstudy provides information on the number of HMOs and HMO penetration; 6) the 
1995-2000 Medicare Case Mix Index Files provide data on hospital case-mix; and 7) the 
1993-2000 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Medicare cost report 
data, which provide detailed hospital financial information. 
A combination of panel and cross-sectional designs is proposed. The unit of 
analysis for this study is a hospital. Dependent variables are patient quality outcomes. 
Risk adjusted Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQIs) and Patient Safety Indicators (PSIS) are 
used. The exogenous constructs are presented by four sets of variables: (I) clinical 
integration; (2) hospital organizational characteristics, including the main explanatory 
variable - hospital affiliation with different types of health systems; (3) market 
characteristics; and (4) patient characteristics. 
Through descriptive analysis, comparing hospitals in the empirical sample with 
hospitals in the nationwide sample, external validity and generalizability of findings will 
be assessed. In order to evaluate effects of structural designs of hospital systems on 
quality outcomes, performances of several models will be analyzed and compared: (I) 
panel models, estimated by fixed effects or random effects, assuming strict exogeneity; 
(2) cross-sectional three stage estimation models for separate years of 1997 and 2000; 
and (3) simplified models may be used if measures of clinical integration are weak. 
Using a combination of panel and cross-sectional models may help in accounting for 
possible feedback effects, avoiding data limitation, and reassuring internal validity of 
findings. The panel, cross-sectional three stage estimation, and simplified models for 
this study are defined and presented below. 
Description of the Models 
1) General Fixed Effects or Random Effects Model - Panel Study: 
q, = d l  +S,CI,, +S,S,, + d 4 X , ,  +d ,M, ,  +d ,< ,  +S,Time, +p, + E , ,  
2) Three Stage Estimation Models - Cross-sectional Study: 
a) Multinomial Logit Model (first-stage) for Estimating Predicted Probabilities 
for Health Systems: 
Y sys = a, + a, X ,  + a, M ,  + a, P, + t9, IVHS + E 
b) Negative Binoniial Model (second-stage) for Estimating Predicted Sums of 
Scores for Internal Clinical Processes and Integration by System Types: 
YCL = PO + PIXI + P2M2 + P3P3 + P4i)SY.$ + t92IVCI + & 
c) OLS (third-stage) Regression with Predicted Values of Internal Clinical 
Processes and Integration by System Type: 
Y = S o  + S , j , ,  + d , X ,  + S 3 M 3  +S4P4 + E  
3) Simplified Model: 
Y =8, +d2 j sy5  + & X ,  + 4 M 4  +&P, + E  
Significance of the Study 
This study differs from the previous empirical work on hospital systems and 
quality of care in several ways: the conceptual model presents two or possibly three 
scenarios on how structural variation in levels of centralization and differentiation 
between different types of health systems and their processes of care delivery may 
influence quality performances; HCUP SID quality and patient safety indicators are used 
as quality signals; JCAHO variables are proposed as measures of clinical integration; 
and extensive data sources and rigorous methodology may provide generalizable and 
reliable findings for this study. 
Contingency theory is used in developing a contrasting andlor complementary set 
of hypotheses. The taxonomy of health systems is applied in assessing how different 
hospital structures may affect quality outcomes (Bazzoli et al., 1999). It has already 
been found that financial performance varies among hospitals in these types of health 
systems (Bazzoli et al., 2000). Therefore, it is expected that hospital structural 
characteristics may influence patient quality outcomes. 
A combination of risk-adjusted Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQIs) and Patient 
Safety Indicators (PSIs) is proposed as dependent variables that has not been previously 
used in the panel data analyses in studying hospital structural characteristics and quality 
of care. Romano et al. (2003) in a descriptive study found that quality outcomes 
measured by 7 IQIs and PSIs got worse, outcomes for 10 IQIs and PSIs improved, and 
outcomes for 2 PSI and IQI remained unchanged from 1995 to 2000. Thus, there is 
variation in PSIs and IQIs over time; however, how much of this variation can be 
explained by hospitals' affiliation with different types of health systems still remains 
unanswered. This research will attempt to provide answers on which health system type 
may be the best or the worst quality performer. It is proposed to assess whether the 
JCAHO performance area scores can be used as measures of internal clinical processes 
and integration in hospitals in different types of health systems. Identification of clinical 
process measures may be beneficial for the future research, which will use a structure- 
process-outcome framework. This study will be useful to health policymakers, hospital 
managers, and health services research community. Public (e.g., governments) and 
private (e.g., employers, health plans) would like to know if some types of systems 
produce better quality, so they can: a) get better hospital value when making purchasing 
decisions, weighing quality differences against cots; b) give hospital systems direct or 
indirect incentives to adopt such a structures. Similarly, hospital managers would find 
such information very useful for structural and process improvements. This study may 
contribute to a general knowledge on how hospital integration affects quality of care, 
which may facilitate further research efforts in this direction. Additional research may 
be needed to further pin point structural and procedural technical elements necessary for 
delivering high quality care. 
Summary of Remaining Chapters 
This chapter briefly overviews structural and clinical integration and quality of 
care, introduces theoretical and conceptual models, the purpose and significance of the 
proposed study. It also describes the forthcoming chapters: Chapter 2 reviews literature 
on quality of care and different types of structural integration that occurred the 1990s 
and the 2000s. Horizontal, physician-hospital, and vertical integration in the health care 
industry and their conceptual and empirical causes and effects will be described. A 
proposition of that Integrated Deliver Systems (IDS) are more likely achieve clinical 
integration, and therefore, reduce costs and improve quality outcomes will be reviewed. 
A discussion how external and internal forces and hospital structural characteristics may 
affect inpatient quality will be provided. This review will also reveal gaps in the 
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existing empirical literature on quality of care and hospitals in IDS. Chapter 3 provides 
an overview of the mechanistic-organic approach to organization theory (Burns and 
Stalker, 1961), which became a conceptual basis for contingency theory. Contingency 
theory helps in developing several conceptual scenarios on health system structure 
effects on quality outcomes. A set of contrasting and/or complementary hypotheses is 
developed. 
Chapter 4 describes the methodology used in this study. Panel and cross- 
sectional approaches to study designs are suggested. Multiple data sources, variables 
and measures, analytical models are discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 presents the empirical results of the current study. Descriptive 
statistics and results of fixed effects and three stage estimation models are presented. 
Performances of the models are compared. 
Chapter 6 summarizes the empirical results, providing findings and conclusions. 
Limitations of the current study are discussed, and recommendations are suggested for 
the future research. 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
This literature review describes the status of quality of care and structural 
integration that occurred among hospitals and health care organizations during the 1990s 
and 2000s, which is a timeframe relevant to the current study. Horizontal, physician- 
hospital, and vertical integration in the hospital industry is reviewed in greater detail. A 
proposition that integrated delivery systems (IDS) are more likely than free standing 
hospitals to improve quality is discussed. Existing empirical research on how different 
types of integration affect hospital quality of care is also provided. 
Secondly, the studies on external (i.e., managed care, competition, regulation) and 
internal (i.e., decision-making, organizational culture and others) forces that may have 
direct influence on integration and quality of care are reviewed. A description how 
hospital structural characteristics may affect inpatient quality is available in this literature 
review. 
Thirdly, different taxonomies of health systems are presented in order to select 
one classification that can make this research more effective in terms of studying quality 
of care provided in hospitals that belong to different types of health systems. This review 
also reveals gaps in the existing empirical literature on hospitals and IDS structures and 
quality of care. 
Quality in General Terms 
According to the Institute of Medicine definition (2001), quality is "the degree to 
which health services for individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired 
health outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge." 
Good quality of care maximizes patient welfare, reflects excellence in the 
provision of medical care in a timely and continuous manner, with good communication, 
shared decision making, and cultural sensitivity (Donabedian, 1980, Laffel and 
Blumenthal, 1989 and Schuster et al. 1998). Poor quality is characterized by providing 
too much care (e.g., unnecessary medical services, tests, medications that can harm 
patients due to side effects or associated risks); too little care (a failure to provide 
necessary and needed medical care); or the wrong care (e.g., clinician-induced 
complications) (Schuster et al. 1998). 
Donabedian (1 980) proposed a structure-process-outcome approach for studying 
quality of care. "Structural quality evaluates health system characteristics, process 
quality assesses interactions between clinicians and patients, and outcomes offer evidence 
about changes in patients' health status" (p. 5 18, Schuster et al. 1998). 
Stiles and Mick (1 994) proposed a typology of quality dimensions presented 
below that was influenced by the Donabedian's work (Tablel). Even though all 
dimensions of quality are important for measuring quality outcomes, literature reviews 
indicated that there are more studies available on technical process quality (Schuster et al. 
1998). Technical process quality is characterized by whether provided clinical care is 
appropriate and necessary. The care is appropriate when the expected health benefits 
Table 1 : The Typology of Quality Dimensions 
Technical 
Structure 
Equipment available 
Staffing (numbers, 
qualifications, 
expertise) 
Training programs 
Teaching affiliation 
Size, volume, 
ownership 
Governing board 
Process 
Accuracy of 
diagnosis 
Appropriateness of 
treatment 
Treatment skillfully 
applied 
Treatment plans, 
sequencing 
Practice guidelines 
Interpersonal 
Amenities 
New technology's 
impact on roles and 
role relationships 
Building design, 
signage 
Presence of chaplains, 
patient advocates, 
social workers, 
translators, ethics 
committee 
Cleanliness 
Presence of 
conveniences 
Ease of access, parking 
Collegiality 
Nature of 
communication 
Honest, 
forthcoming 
treatment of 
patients and 
families 
Sensitivity and 
compassion in 
patient flow 
Short waiting 
periods I Appearance of staff 
(p. 3 13, Stiles and Mick, 1994) 
Increments and 
decrements in health or 
functional status 
Palliation 
Frequency, distribution 
of adverse incidents 
Malpractice 
Donations (time, 
bequests) 
Patient satisfaction 
Enlotional, spiritual 
peace 
Family satisfaction 
Referrals 
Compliance 
Returns for future care 
Malpractice 
 onz zit ions (time, 
bequests) 
Patient satisfaction 
Family satisfaction 
Referrals 
Donations (time, 
bequests) 
exceed health risks. The care is necessary if there is a reasonable chance that a patient 
would benefit from this care or it is improper not to provide the care. 
Quality indictors are developed to measure technical process quality. Quality 
indicators are based on professional standards of care and allow a comparison of 
performance of health providers between each other and over time (Schuster et al. 1998). 
Quality indicators are constantly used to identify those structural and process 
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characteristics of health providers that have the most influential effects on quality of care. 
Structural integration among health providers may affect quality of care. Thus, in the 
following sections, a review of literature on various aspects and effects of integration in 
the health care industry, including its effects on quality of care, is provided. 
Integration in General Terms 
Webster's dictionary (1990) defines integration as: "the act or process or an 
instance of forming, coordinating, or blending activities into a functioning or unified 
whole." "Integration is the extent to which functions and activities are appropriately 
coordinated across operating units that are parts of a system's delivery of care so as to 
maximize the value of services to patients (Giles et al., 1997, p. 230)." Functional . 
integration, physician system integration, and eventually clinical integration are believed 
to be the key elements in creating the integrated organization (Shortell et al., 1996). 
Shortell et al. (1996) defined functional integration as "the extent to which key 
support functions such as financial management, human resources, information systems, 
strategic planning, and total quality management are coordinated across the operating 
units.. . .Physician-system integration is defined as the extent to which physicians are 
economically linked to the system, use its facilities and services, and are active 
participants in planning, management, and governance.. ... Clinical integration is defined 
as the extent to which patients care services are coordinated across people, functions, 
activities, processes, and operating units so as to maximize the value of services 
delivered" (p. 30). Clinical integration is achieved when a health care organization is 
able to horizontally and vertically integrate their structures and processes. Clinically 
integrated organized delivery systems may improve quality of care and reduce costs 
(Shortell et al., 1996). 
Horizontal Integration 
Horizontal integration is defined as the "combination of several organizations 
whose outputs are substitutes from the perspective of consumer demand" (p. 41 9, Snail 
and Robinsion, 1998). Horizontally integrated firms offer "similar (substitute) or 
compatible (complement) products" and "horizontal markets are comprised of 
conventional competitors (firms that offer similar goods and services to the same set of 
potential customers)" (p. 179, Robinson, 2001). Horizontal integration is also defined as 
"coordination of activities at the same stage of delivery of care" (Shortell et al., 1996). 
Horizontal integration takes place when two or more hospitals combine their structures 
(Dowling, 1995). There are two types of horizontal integrations in the hospital sector: (I) 
merger (one of the organizations retains its name and legal status) or consolidation (a new 
organization is formed from melding together a few separate organizations) and (2) 
multihospital systems (Mick et al., 1993). 
Horizontal integration through merger started in the mid 1960s (Dowling, 1995). 
There were only 74 hospital mergers in the 1983-1988 period; 190 mergers occurred 
between 1989 and 1996 (Bazzoli et al., 2002). According to Sinay and Campbell (2002), 
278 single hospitals merged or were consolidated from 1986 and 1992. Hospital mergers 
continued through the mid-1990s and slowed in the late 1990s. There were 3 1 mergers in 
1998 and 22 hospital mergers in 1999. A seventeen percent increase in the merger 
activity was noted in 2000, which was the first increase in two years. 
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Once two or more hospitals merge, but maintain their separate identity, they 
become a part of local or regional multihospital system. Multihospital systems are 
defined as a system of "two or more acute care hospitals that are owned, leased, 
sponsored, or managed by a single corporate entity" (p. 100, Mick et al, 1993, 
Zuckerman, 1979). According to the American Hospital Association (AHA) definition, 
health systems are entities that owned andfor managed by health care provider facilities 
or health-related subsidiaries. Some demographic information on multihospital systems 
is presented below. 
Bazzoli et al. (2004) reported that 56.2 percent of U.S. hospitals belonged to a 
health network or system; by 2000, this increased to 72.1 percent. Ermann and Gabel 
(1985) described the growth in multihospital systems and the number of hospitals 
affiliated with systems in their review of literature: there were 202 systems (1,405 
affiliated hospitals) in 1975,267 systems (1,796 affiliated hospitals) in 1980,256 systems 
(1,924 affiliated hospitals) in 1982 identified in the AHA data sets. The number of health 
systems has increased from 295 (2,836 affiliated hospitals) in 1994 to 365 systems (3,221 
affiliated hospitals) in 1998 (Bazzoli et al., 200 1 and 2002). 
Luke et al. (1995) studied local hospital systems (LHS) formation. They noted 
that the percentage of urban acute care general hospitals that were members of urban 
clusters (i.e., hospitals having one or more system partners in the same metropolitan area) 
grew from 19 to 28 percent from 1982 to 1989. The geographic dispersion of health 
systems was mainly limited to one geographic area, i.e. Metropolitan Statistical Area: "in 
1990, 56.5 percent of systems owned hospitals [located] in just one MSA and this 
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increased to 63.9 percent of systems in 2001 (Bazzoli, 2005)" Mergers and formation of 
multihospital systems have been extensively studied in the recent years. Conceptually 
and empirically grounded reasoning of horizontal integration was proposed by the 
number of researchers, which is going to be discussed in the following sections. 
Causes of Horizontal Integration 
Organization and economic theory perspectives were mainly used to describe pros 
and cons of horizontal integration in the health care industry. Organization theory 
suggests that organizations may get involved in horizontal integration in order to.increase 
or improve: (1) organizational size, (2) chances of organizational survival, (3) access to 
resources, (4) market and political powers, (5) performance and outcomes, (6) reduce 
competition in local markets (Shortell et al., 1996, Mick et al., 1993, Morrisey and 
Alexander 1 987). 
Economic theory suggests that organizations may get involved in horizontal 
integration in order to experience: (1) economies of scale and/ or scope, (2) economies of 
management, purchasing, and marketing, (3) easier access to capital and manpower, (4) 
reduction in competitive pressures, (5) increased purchasing and bargaining powers 
(Bogue et al., 1995, Robinson 2001, Bazzoli et al., 2002). 
It is obvious that many conceptual causes proposed by either theory are 
compatible and suggesting the same consequence: horizontal integration in health care 
should improve the end results, i.e. organizational performance and quality of care. 
Whether it is true or not can be learned from the empirical research findings. 
Horizontally integrated hospitals are believed to be systematically different from 
independent hospitals and, therefore, a comparison of these two forms is difficult (Snail 
and Robinson 1998). A discussion of empirical studies on determinants of horizontal 
integration that involved multivariate techniques and/or longitudinal data to reduce 
potential limitation of cross-sectional designs is provided below. However, there are only 
a few articles that used rigorous statistical techniques and panel data. 
Bogue et al. (1995) studied 74 hospitals that merged between 1983 and 1988. 
They found that the acquiring hospitals were more likely to be large, general community, 
non-profit hospitals, with higher occupancy rates and lower Medicaid revenues than 
hospitals with which they merged. The Bogue's et al. (1995) longitudinal study 
compared hospital characteristics before and after a merger and whether merged hospitals 
retained or dropped acute care services. They identified three main reasons for merger: 
consolidation of services, improving market positioning, and gaining financial and 
operating stability. 
Bazzoli et al. (2002) replicated the Bouge's study using newer data in order to 
compare their findings. Bazzoli's et al. study supported the earlier findings, i.e. merged 
hospitals tended to consolidate duplicating departments and programs, to reduce clinical 
(mainly nursing), non-clinical, and administrative FTEs, and to strengthen their financial 
position. However, urban hospitals in the later period (1989-1996) were less frequent in 
reducing excess capacity and closing duplicating facilities and services than hospitals in 
the earlier period (1983-1988). 
Alexander and Morrisey (1 988a) researched hospitals that joined with 
multihospital systems in the 1980s and found that weak hospitals merged with stronger 
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hospitals to improve their market positioning. Alexander and Morrisey (1988b) also 
identified that hospitals' non-teaching status, low bed size, low occupancy rate and profit 
margin may increase their chances of being acquired in the 1980s. Brooks and Jones 
(1 997) found that hospitals merged to gain opportunities in their unique local 
environments in the 1983-1 992 period. Brooks and Jones (1 997) also found that greater 
financial differences and closer geographic proximity between merging hospitals may 
result in greater benefits of their merger. However, Bazzoli et al. (2003) studied 1,016 
urban hospitals in the later period of 1994 and 1998 and found that financially strong 
hospitals were more likely to join hospital systems as a defense strategy to managed care 
in the 1990s. 
Luke et al. (1995) found that local health system formation was positively 
associated with the number of hospitals in the markets, the number of doctors per capita, 
and the percentage of the population enrolled in HMOs. Chernew et al. (1 995) also 
found that a ten percent increase in HMO market shares lead to a four percent reduction 
in the number of hospitals and a five percent reduction in beds in 1982-1 987, suggesting 
that consolidation and integration of providers possibly happen for efficiency reasons and 
for gaining market power. Thus, motivations for hospital horizontal integration were 
different for hospitals in the 1980s and the 1990s. Horizontal integration in the hospital 
sector may have been motivated by multiple factors: 
(1) To increase market and political power, reducing competition in their markets; 
(2) To carry out organizational change: consolidation of duplicating services and 
departments, reducing excess capacity and personnel; 
(3) To improve hospitals' financial and operating positioning; 
(4) Mergers between unequal hospitals were prevalent in the 1980s and managed 
care may have stimulated integration of strong providers in the 1990s. 
Effects of Horizontal Integration 
The following literatures look at horizontal integration's effects on quality of care 
and hospital financial performances. Only one study was identified that examined the 
effects of hospital mergers on quality of care. Ho and Hamilton (2000) looked at hospital 
mergers and acquisitions in California between 1992 and 1995 in terms of quality 
measures from 1 to 3 years before or after mergers. Measures of quality were inpatient 
mortality from heart attacks and strokes, 90-day readmission rates for heart attack 
patients, and early discharge of newborns (Ho and Hamilton, 2000). A self-selection 
problem of hospitals that chose to merge was controlled by the Heckman's selection 
technique. Controlling for patient, organizational, and market characteristics, Ho and 
Hamilton (2000) did not find differences in inpatient mortality before and after mergers 
and acquisitions, although the associated standard errors were large. Readmission rates 
and early discharge of newborns increased in some cases during the 1-3 year period after 
mergers. 
Newhouse et al. (2003) recreated variables for integration within Maryland (MD) 
hospitals and differentiation across MD hospital systems and networks using a 
methodology developed by Bazzoli et al. (1999). They used these variables as the key 
explanatory variables in a retrospective cross-sectional study of integration and 
differentiation effects on readmission, in-hospital mortality, length of stay and costs. 
They found no integration effects on outcomes; a higher likelihood of readmission was 
found as the level of community service differentiation increased. However, several 
limitations may be noted: 1) this study was limited to only one state; 2) the Bazzoli's et 
al. methodology was only partially applied leaving out physician and insurance products; 
3) Newhouse's et al. (2003) measures of integration as the number of services at the 
hospital level and of differentiation as the number of services available within the 
hospital, system, network, community may be correlated. 
The effects of horizontal integration on hospitals financial and operational 
performance were contradictory. On one hand, Connor et al. (1997) longitudinally 
compared costs and prices for 3,500 hospitals (122 mergers) in merging and non-merging 
categories between the 1986 to 1994 period in selected markets. They found that mergers 
were financially beneficial for consumers, providing average price reduction of 7.1 
percent; and cost growth was 7.2 percent lower for hospitals in merging category. Spang 
et al. (2001) also studied the impact of mergers on hospital costs and prices for the 1989 
to 1997 period. Spang et al. (2001) found that cost growth for merging hospitals was 
10.1 percent lower than that of non-merging hospitals; price growth for merging hospitals 
was 7.9 percentage points less than it was for non-merging hospitals. 
Menke (1997) found that system hospitals had two hundred - two hundred fifty 
dollars lower average and marginal costs per stay than independent hospitals. Hospital 
systems also reached economies of scope between inpatient and outpatient services, 
reducing mean costs by eleven percent for system and three percent for independent 
hospital (Menke, 1997). 
On the other hand, Dranove and Shanley (1995) examined two reasons for the 
formation of horizontally merged local multihospital systems: cost reduction and 
reputation. Integrated hospitals may eliminate duplicating services and reduce 
administrative costs. Searching costs for consumers who look for higher quality of care 
may also decrease in integrated provider markets. Dranove and Shanley (1995) found 
that cost reduction was not a factor, but system hospitals enjoyed reputation benefits over 
non-system hospitals. Horizontal integration of hospitals may affect their pricing policy. 
Dranove et al. (2004) found that consolidation enabled hospitals to increase prices in 
three of the four markets studied. Earlier Dranove et al. (1 996) concluded that 
horizontally merged hospitals did not generate production efficiency and did not limit 
duplication of expensive technologies, but system hospitals were able to raise price 
margins in comparison with non-system hospitals. 
Clement et al. (1997) found that 2,500 urban hospitals that were members of 
strategic hospital alliances (SHAs) had higher net revenues per adjusted discharge than 
non-SHA hospitals in 1995, but their cash flow and operating expenses were not 
different. In another study, price increases were larger for region and national hospital 
systems (Young et al., 2000). Finally, Bazzoli et al. (2004), in reviewing literature on 
organizational change over two decades, concluded that horizontal integration among 
hospitals yields higher revenue or profit levels for consolidating hospitals versus 
independent hospitals. 
However, possible price and cost effects of hospital mergers may decrease over 
time (Nauenberg et al., 1999, Spang et al. 2001). It is also unclear whether multihospital 
systems can gain substantial economies of scale. Hospitals with the 200400 bed range 
were the most likely ones to achieve economies of scale; but many consolidated hospitals 
exceeded this range (Snail and Robinson, 1998). 
Dranove and Shanley (1995) found that system hospitals were not better than non- 
system hospitals in exploiting economies of scale in managing service offerings and 
administrative costs. Dranove (1 998) also stated that economies of scale were exhausted 
in hospitals with over 10,000 discharges annually; therefore, larger, merged hospitals and 
multihospital systems would have no or small efficiency gains. In summary: 
(1) There is limited research on quality effects of horizontal integration. Only 
one study identified that there were very limited effects of mergers on quality 
outcomes; 
(2) Empirical studies demonstrate mixed results of horizontal integration on 
hospital operational performance, i.e. hospital costs; 
(3) Many empirical studies suggest that consolidating hospitals (merged and 
joined into multihospital systems) had higher price or profit levels than non- 
consolidating, but these effects may decrease over time; 
(4) There are mixed findings on whether horizontally integrated hospitals would 
gain economies of scope andlor scale; 
(5) More empirical work is necessary for assessing quality outcomes in different 
types of health systems and hospitals. 
Horizontal integration has been a prevalent phenomenon in the hospital industry 
during the last decades. Effects of horizontal integration are mixed and the most 
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literatures are dated. However, Bazzoli et al. (2004) suggested that studies on outcomes 
of horizontal integration are only measuring short-term effects (at most 3 years after a 
merger) of hospital consolidation, but not long-term effects. Thus, empirical studies that 
look at long-term effects of hospital integration are necessary to consider. 
According to Shortell et al. (1 996), health providers need to achieve physician- 
system integration before reaching clinical integration and resulting in cost reduction and 
improvement in quality of care. Therefore, a discussion of empirical literature on 
physician-hospital integration and vertical integration in the health care industry that took 
place in the recent time is important. 
Physician-Hospital Integration 
Robinson (200 1) stated that physician-hospital integration differs from vertical 
integration of hospitals with other organizations, because some relationships between 
physicians and hospitals may be complementary, not vertical, in nature. These two 
parties "rarely sell or buy from each other.. . .they combine their services in a 
complementary fashion to create a single product that is sold to the patient and insurer" 
(p. 18 1, Robinson, 2001). 
Physician-hospital integration increased through the mid 1990s, but has since 
experienced a steady decline. "In 1994,58.5 percent of health systems had contractual 
arrangements with physicians and this declined to 3 1.8 percent by 200 1. The percentage 
of systems that owned physician practices declined from 29.1 percent to 18.2 percent .... 
around 20 percent of hospitals systems owned HMOs in the 1994 to 1998 period and this 
declined to 16 percent by 2001" (Bazzoli, 2005). In this sub-section, studies that looked 
at structures of physician+n-ganization arrangements (POA), causes and effects of 
physician-hospital integration are reviewed. 
Structural Organization of Physician-Hospital Arrangements 
A variety of organizational models have been developed to link physicians and 
hospitals. American Hospital Association's Annual Survey of Hospitals describes them 
as follows: Group Practice Without Walls (GPWW) is a loosely coupled formation aimed 
at decreasing administrative expenses; and physicians remain independent. Independent 
Practice Association (IPA) is a legal entity that assists solo physicians and those in 
smaller practices to obtain managed care contracts. Physician-Hospital Organization 
(PHO) is a joint venture that assists physicians to obtaining managed care contracts; it 
may also own or operate a primary care clinic. Management Service Organization 
(MSO) is owned by a hospital or a physician organization and contracts with physicians 
to provide administrative services and management. Medical Foundation (MF) is a 
hospital subsidiary that acquires all physical assets of medical group practices; physicians 
sign a professional services agreement with the subsidiary corporation. Integrated Salary 
Model (ISM) is a hospital that employs physicians. Integrated Health Organization 
(IHO) owns one or more medical group practices and owns or joint ventures with an 
HMO. 
Several researchers identified prevalence of Physician-Organization 
Arrangements (POAs) in different years. Morrisey et al. (1996) used 1993 Prospective 
Payment Assessment (ProPAC) data on 1,495 hospitals and reported that 23.3 percent of 
hospitals participated in at least in one form of physician-organization arrangements; 64 
percent had a physician-hospital organization (PHO), 32.6 percent - a management 
service organization (MSO), 15.5 percent - a medical foundation (MF), and 1 1.2 percent - 
an integrated healthcare organization (IHO). 
Dynan et al. (1998) studied 573 hospitals in a later period and found that the 
prevalence of POAs was as follows: 60.5 percent of PHOs, 38.3 percent MSOs, 3 1.7 
percent ISMS, 22.1 percent MFs, 20.3 percent of IPAs, 10.4 percent IHOs, 9.5 percent of 
GPWW. According to the AHA, which may followed a greater number of hospitals, 27.6 
percent of hospitals had PHOs in 1994, which increased to 33.2 percent in 1996, and then 
declined to 26.4 percent by 2000 (Bazzoli et al., 2004 ). The similar patterns of 
fluctuation in prevalence were discovered for other types of POAs (Bazzoli et al., 2001). 
Burns and Thorpe (1 993) suggested that physician-hospital arrangements develop 
from one model to the next. Cave (1995) lined up different POA models on dimensions 
of cost-efficient delivery of services and sustainability over the long run. GPWW model 
was on one extreme, i.e. low cost-efficient delivery of care and not sustainable in the long 
run. Efficiency and sustainability were increasing as: PHO- MSO- MF--+ Staff 
models; and Equity model was on another extreme, i.e. high cost efficiency and 
sustainability. Cave (1995) suggested that IDS would benefit from having staff- and 
equity-based systems because these systems would provide operational stability, a strong 
primary care physician base, efficient delivery of medical care, and geographic 
accessibility under capitation payment. One governance structure in staff- and equity- 
based systems and strong physician bonds with these systems would also stimulate 
efficiency and sustainability. However, Burns and Thorpe (1 993) and Cave (1 995) 
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suggestions were driven by theory and observations, not based on empirical findings, and 
were considered as rough typologies. Later studies by Alexander et al., (1996) and 
Dynan et al., (1998) did not find support for gradual staging from less to more integrated 
physician-hospital arrangements in response to managed care. Casalino and Robinson 
(2003) in their case study of four hospital systems noticed that systems chose to develop 
or maintain their affiliations with physicians even while the U.S. health industry is 
moving from tight to loose managed care. 
Causes and Effects of Physician-Hospital Integration 
The determinants of physician-hospital integration have rarely been studied. 
Empirical studies that demonstrate how hospital structure, environment, and strategy may 
stimulate physician-hospital integration are discussed below. 
Certain physician characteristics may affect physician-organization integration. 
Burns et al. (2001) identified that older physicians were more likely to align with a 
system, possibly due to fewer available alternatives at the later stage of their careers. 
Tenure duration was associated with physician intent to continue working with a system 
and to admit patients to that system; and tenure was inversely related to physician's 
affective commitment to the hospital system. Bums et al. (2001) suggested that over time 
physicians "may come to resent their ties to a system even though they report being more 
likely to stay with the system and admit patients to its facilities" (p. 1-5). Physician 
leadership in POAs' governance and decision-making was a positive factor in integrating 
physicians and hospital systems (Burns et al., 2001; Coddington et al. 2000; Gillies et al. 
200 1). Financial stimuli may also result in better physician-organization alignment. 
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Burns et al. (2001) at a physician and Alexander et al. (2001) at a physician organization 
level of analyses found that physician financial incentives, i.e. salary and stipend, and 
practice management support services resulted in greater alignment between physicians 
and hospital systems. The Alexander's et al. (2001) study also found that the individual 
physician risk assumption related to managed care contracts was negatively related to 
physician-system integration; but the group risk assumption exerted positive relationships 
with alignment. Joint risk-sharing arrangements had positive effects on physician- 
hospital integration (Burns, Morrisey, et al. 1998; Dynan, Bazzoli, et al. 1998). Mixed 
results were also found on physician competition effects on their integration with 
hospitals (Alexander et al., 1986; Gillies et al., 2001). 
Hospitals structural characteristics, such as size (200-300+ beds), location in 
urban areas, affiliation with regionally based health systems, non-for-profit and teaching 
status were associated with physician-hospital integration (Morrisey et al. 1996, 
Alexander et al. 1996). Hospitals located in environments with higher managed care 
penetration (>15%) were more likely to integrate with physicians (Morrisey et al. 1996). 
A greater hospital competition was also associated with physician-hospital integration, 
i.e. hospitals were twice as likely to form POAs if a competing hospital also formed 
POAs (Alexander et al. 1996). However, there were mixed findings on whether hospitals 
received any financial benefits from forming POAs. On one hand, Mark et al. (1998) 
found that hospitals with POAs had higher costs and lower total margins when compared 
with hospitals without POAs. On the other hand, Goes and Zhan (1995) found hospital 
costs were lower for integrated physician-hospital organizations. Bazzoli et al. (2004) 
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concluded that hospitals were shedding there POAs since 1996, suggesting that "these 
organizations may not have returned the value for which hospitals had hoped (p. 3 18)." 
Managed care effects on physician-hospital integration were described as complex and 
different from its effects on integrative processes in the hospital industry (Morrisey et al. 
1996, Burns et al. 2000). 
On one hand, Morrisey et al. (1996) found that more extensive processes of 
physician-hospital integration, such as employing physicians and buying practices and 
entering into joint ventures and network, were not associated with HMO penetration. 
Burns et al. (2000) studied the effects of HMO market structure, measured as HMO 
penetration and the number of HMO in a market, on formation of physician-organization 
arrangements (POAs). The researchers found that a formation of hospital-physician 
alliances was induced by the number of HMOs in the market rather than by HMO 
penetration. 
Threshold effects were identified: the number of HMOs exceeding four in the 
local market lead to a substantial increase in POAs formation; however, when the market 
consisted of one or two dominant HMOs, POAs' formation may be the lowest, i.e. 
discouraged by concentrated HMO markets. These f?ndings raised doubts that HMO 
penetration triggered physician-hospital integration (Burns and Thorpe, 1995, Shortell et 
al., 1996). 
Bazzoli, Dynan, et al. (2000) also found that global capitation of physician- 
hospital arrangements had more significant effects on their integration than managed care 
penetration. Global capitation motivated physicians and hospitais to integrate their 
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administrative, management services and computer linkages, promote physician financial 
risk sharing, and create joint ventures to provide new services (Bazzoli, Dynan, et al., 
2000). 
On the other hand, Dranove et al. (2002) investigated whether managed care may 
lead to consolidation among hospitals and physicians. Managed care was associated with 
increase in the Herhindahl Index of hospital concentration from .096 in 198 1 to .I54 in 
the average market in 1994, which was comparable with a decrease from 10.4 equal-sized 
hospitals to 6.5 equal-sized hosp.itals. Researchers also found a 14-point decrease in the 
percentage of physicians in solo practice in the 1986-1995 period. Researchers 
concluded that higher levels of managed care penetration were positively associated with 
increases in concentration of hospital and physician markets. 
Cuellar and Gertler (working paper, 2002) studied whether physician-hospital 
integration is motivated by (1) efficiency gains (e.g., reducing transaction costs and 
gaining economies of scope); or is achieved for (2) exerting power in negotiating higher 
prices with managed care plans (Gal-Or, 1999). They discovered that adoption of POAs 
(excluding fully integrated models) was more likely to occur in markets with high 
managed care presence, managed care growth, and managed care dependency. The 
authors also found that hospitals integrated with POAs were not different from 
unintegrated hospitals in terms of operating costs, i.e. did not have efficiency gains. 
However, the results supported the negotiation contracts' power conceptualization, i.e. 
hospitals integrated with open and closed POAs had positive and significant effects on 
managed care prices and payer volumes than unintegrated hospitals. Cuellar and Gertler 
(2002) compared quality of care, measured by HCUP quality indicators, for different 
forms of POAs, which was important for both theoretical perspectives. They found that 
fully integrated organizations (medical foundations and salary POA) were associated with 
better quality outcomes in the HCUP's measures of surgical complication and ambulatory 
sensitive conditions and charge about the same in comparison with other less integrated 
physician-hospital models. 
Strategic positioning of health care providers may also be effective in achieving 
physician-hospital integration. Alexander et al. (1 996) studied whether the three strategic 
dimensions of POA formation-protecting hospital markets, expanding hospital markets, 
integratinglcoordinating delivery-were likely causes of POA formation. Alexander et al. 
(1 996) found that expansion of current markets and integration of clinical services were 
more likely to cause of POA formation. Also, health systems that placed high strategic 
importance on market expansion or clinical integration had a significantly greater number 
of physicians in POAs. However, use of purposeful sample and a cross-sectional study 
design were limitations'of the study. 
Dynan et al. (1998) studied strategies used by hospitals to form POAs. They 
classified hospitals as having: (1) a tight-only strategy if they had any combination of 
MSO, MF, ISM, and IHO; (2) a loose-only strategy if they had GPWW, IPA, or PHO 
combinations; (3) a hybrid strategy with a combination of both tight and loose 
organizational forms. The researchers found that a tight-only strategy exerted a 
significant, positive effect on three factors of functional integration (i.e., integration of 
administrative, practice management services, and organization of joint ventures to create 
new services) and a significant, negative effect on physician financial risk-sharing 
between hospitals and physicians. However, a hybrid strategy has a significant, positive 
effect on five factors (three mentioned above and also including computer linkages and 
salaried physician arrangements), indicating that the hybrid strategy achieves greater 
level of hnctional integration than the tight-only and loose-only strategies. Researchers 
concluded that hospitals and physicians integrate not only through involvement in 
governance, capital planning, and provision of practice management services, but also 
through clinical integration and economic involvement. Dynan et al. (1998) also 
mentioned the importance of studying both the structure and process elements, rather 
than relying on ownership and contractual elements, since their research showed that 
ownership may not be crucial for achieving tight integration between hospitals and 
physicians. In summary, several factors may influence physician-hospital integration: 
(1) Physician characteristics, such as older age, tenure, and physician involvement 
in governance and decision-making process of health systems; 
(2) Financial incentives for physicians, such as physician salary and stipend, and 
creative payment arrangements that balance individual and group risks; 
(3) Hospital structural characteristics, such as hospital size, Medicare patient mix, 
location in urban areas, affiliation with health systems, non-for-profit and 
teaching status; and hospital competition; 
(4) There are mixed findings on a managed care influence on integration of 
physicians and hospitals; however, global capitation payment system may be a 
more decisive factor in POAs' formation; 
(5) POAs are more likely to form for gaining contract negotiation power, rather 
than for efficiency reasons; 
(6) Hybrid POAs' strategy (combing loosely and tightly integrated models) may 
achieve a greater functional integration; however, fully integrated models (e.g. 
medical foundation and salary model) may have better quality outcomes than 
less integrated models. 
Vertical Integration 
"Vertical integration is the production by a single organizational entity of 
successive stages in the processing and distributing of goods and services" (p. 100, Mick, 
1993). In health services research literature, commonly used terminology for vertical 
integration is defined as follows: 
(1) Vertical "forward" integration is directed toward an organization's consumers 
such as patients, physicians, enrollees, and purchasers. Forward integration in the 
hospital industry includes linkages with physician group practices, outpatient clinics, 
skilled nursing facilities, home care agencies, because these are "sources of the hospital's 
patients and/or where patients go following hospitalization" (p. 141, Dowling, 1995; 
Grasso, 2000). Thompson (1967) also suggested stages of vertical integration "before" 
and "after" the core technology. If applied to health care, then inpatient care is the core 
technology, pre-hospital and post-hospital care are before and after stages, respectively. 
(2) Vertical "backward" integration is aimed at the inputs of production, such as 
supplies, equipment, drugs, trained labor, etc. Backward integration may be 
characterized by hospital ownership of a medical equipment company, laboratory, or 
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group purchasing organization, affiliation with a nursing school or medical school, i.e. 
sources of inputs used for production of patient care (Dowling, 1995; Grasso, 2000). 
Vertical forward integration among health providers increased through the mid- 
1990s, but then experienced a steady decline due to changes in the payment methods 
introduced by the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) for long-term and nursing care facilities 
". . .the percent of community hospitals offering home health care increased between 1990 
and 1998 (from 35.3 percent to 53.6 percent) but then declined in 2001 (to 44.2 percent). 
The percentage offering skilled nursing facility care followed a similar trajectory, 
increasing from 19.6 percent in 1990 to 33.3 percent in 1998, but declining, albeit 
slightly, in 2001 to 30.9 percent (Bazzoli, 2005)." 
Causes and Effects of Vertical Integration 
The concept of vertical integration is not new for the health care industry, and 
several reasons for vertical integration have been proposed and believed to improve 
performance of integrated health care providers (Ackerman, 1992, Robinson and 
Casalino, 1996, Robinson, 2001). 
(1) Vertical integration may "occur when the gains to specialization (by keeping 
the productive states in separate firms) are offset by the costs of using 
market exchange - that is, when it is cheaper to "make" the input than to 
"buy" it" (p. 59, Conrad et al., 1990); 
(2) Vertical integration may lower transaction costs through efficient 
negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement of restructuring in organizational 
units of the vertical systems (Conrad et al., 1990); 
(3) Vertical integration may also result in modest economies of scope by 
sharing facilities, joint purchasing, and coordinating administrative services, 
i.e. if similar production processes are used along the value chain 
(Robinson and Casalino, 1996, Conrad et al., 1990); 
(4) Physician-hospital and hospital - long-term care links may allow integrated 
providers to better control flows of patients (Cody, 1996); 
( 5 )  Financial risks may be better managed by vertically integrated providers 
(Robinson and Casalino, 1996). 
Robinson (1996) researched vertical integration of Californian hospitals with 
skilled-nursing facilities (SNFs) over two periods: 1982-1 986 and 1986-1 990. He found 
that high Medicare patient mix and non-profit status were significant predictors of 
developing hospital-based subacute care in both periods. Economies of scope had a 
strong association with integration, and capacity utilization had less strong influence on 
integration in the later period. Market conditions did not influence the decision to 
integrate into subacute care. Other theoretically driven causes of vertical integration, i.e. 
decrease in transaction costs, did not explain hospital integration into subacute care. 
Banks et al. (2001) also suggested that the post-1984 system of prospective payment for 
hospital care and the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) financial incentives have possibly 
encouraged vertical integration. Hospitals have incentives to transfer patients along the 
continuum of care sooner; however, traditional providers of long-term care (i.e. skilled 
nursing facilities ) have less incentives to accept complicated patients under the BBA 
prospective payment for SNFs,. Hospitals vertically integrated SNFs may have easier 
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placement for these patients (Banks et al., 2001). Young (1998) suggested that Integrated 
Delivery Systems (IDS) would be more suited to sustain financial strains, due to the 
BBA, than non-IDS. IDS could use strategic planning, design clinical and non-clinical 
task forces and teams for integrated care delivery, select appropriate patient transfer 
pricing and methodology between system members in order to minimize the negative 
BBA effect on their systems. 
However, many hospitals are now choosing to disintegrate with their nursing 
facilities (Bazzoli, 2005), because the costs associated with keeping SNF may exceed 
their benefits. Cody (1996) hypothesized that vertical integration of hospitals with 
outpatient and subacute/chronic care facilities were expected to substitute for inpatient 
volume and enhance revenues. Effects of seven vertical integration strategies on the 
change in total revenue from 1983 and 1990 were investigated. Cody (1996) found that 
adding more community-based physicians to the medical staff, providing more clinic care 
and outpatient surgery services had a positive and significant influence on the change in 
revenue from 1983 to 1990. On the other hand, Wan et al., (2001) found that profit 
margin was lower for health networks (IHNs) integrated into subacute and long-term care 
than for those with no integration. Researchers pointed out a possible selection problem 
because data had information on 100 top-ranked IHNs; a cross-sectional design may also 
be a draw back. In summary, it is concluded that: 
(1) The empirical findings are mixed - one study identified that vertical 
integration had positive and significant influence on the change in revenue of 
integrated providers; however, another study showed opposite results; 
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(2) Economies of scope may be associated with hospital integration with 
subacute care facilities; however, the concept of decreasing transaction costs 
is not substantially researched; 
(3) Organizational characteristics, such as high Medicare patient mix and non- 
profit status, are associated with vertical forward integration; 
(4) Changes in the payer environment may confound organizations' incentives to 
pursue vertical integration. 
Horizontal, physician-hospital, and vertical "forward" integration may facilitate a 
greater clinical integration among providers (Shortell, 1996). Therefore, in the next 
section, studies that may explain how structural integration of health providers is linked 
to clinical integration, and how clinical integration may affect hospital performance and 
quality of care are presented. 
Integrated Delivery Systems and Clinical Integration 
Vertically and horizontally integrated health providers may operate as Integrated 
Delivery Systems (IDS). "An organized [or integrated] delivery system is a network of 
organizations (e.g., ambulatory care clinics, physician groups, diagnostic centers, 
hospitals, nursing homes, home health care agencies) usually under common ownership 
which provides, or arranges to provide, a coordinated continuum of services to a defined 
population and is willing to be held clinically and fiscally responsible for the health status 
of that population (p. 8, Devers et al. 1994)." Gillies et al. (1993) defined clinical 
integration as "the extent to which patient care services are coordinated across the various 
functions, activities, and operating units of a system (p. 468)." Integrated Delivery 
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Systems (IDS) are more likely to be clinically integrated than freestanding health care 
providers. According to Shortell (1996), organized or integrated delivery systems may 
achieve clinical integration and, therefore, provide high quality care at lower costs. 
In theory, clinical integration of providers in IDS may facilitate: (1) coordination 
of clinical and non-clinical services in effective manner; (2) standardization of care; (3) 
population-based health statuslneeds assessment; (4) provision of better management of 
chronic diseases; (5) specialization among different health providers within the system; 
(6) improved continuity of care, provision of easier access to care, and less paperwork 
(Gillies et al., 1993, Shortell et al., 1994, Charns 1997, Casalino et al., 2003). 
Shortell et al. (1996) noted that "the key to successfully creating a clinically 
integrated continuum of care is the ability to achieve mass customization . . . that involves 
developing services to meet the unique needs of each patient but doing so in an efficient 
fashion, using relatively standardized support functions that can be applied to all patients 
and that can coordinate care for all patients across the continuum (p. 167)." Burns (1999) 
pointed out that standardization of clinical services through various care management 
processes (CMP) is the glue that could hold together the polarities in IDS. Burns (1999) 
defined CMP as use of clinical evidence-based practice guidelines and protocols, 
performance feed back to individual physicians, continuous quality improvement/ total 
quality management (CQIITQM), clinical information systems, case management, use of 
medical registries, and team approach to provision of care. Care management processes 
may move IDS toward mass customization and clinical integration, allowing meeting 
needs of individual patients in an efficient manner. 
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In practice, IDS may achieve clinical integration when (1) there are clear mission 
and values, aimed at clinical integration, that all IDS sub-units should follow, (2) 
strategic planning activities involving all sub-units are in place, (3) availability of 
information systems, providing data across IDS, (4) coordination of activities is promoted 
through common budgeting policies and practices (Shortell, Gillies, and Anderson, 
1994). 
Causes and Effects of Clinical Integration 
Organizational characteristics and financial incentives may influence clinical 
integration between providers. Shortell and colleagues (1996 and 2001) identified 
hospital characteristics that were related to clinical integration. Larger hospital size, 
close physician-system integration with large physician groups (25>), close geographic 
proximity between hospitals, physician administrative involvement, hospital strategic 
orientation to improve quality of care, and a greater degree of HMO market penetration 
were positively associated with clinical integration (Gillies et al., 1993, Devers et al., 
1994, Shortell et al., 1996). Cohen et al. (2000) suggested that integration (mostly for 
educational activities) of clinical departments in merged hospitals depends on successful 
leadership and management models. They identified several factors necessary for 
integration of clinical departments: single chairpersons, constant communication, flexible 
leadership and management structures, centralization of and patience in decision making 
which was trusted and accepted by physicians. 
Mark (1 998) studied effects of change in hospital characteristics over two years 
on total margin and average Medicare costs as of 1993 in hospitals that either adopted or 
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did not adopt physician - hospital organizations. They found that operating margins were 
higher when clinical departments heads were held accountable for profits and losses and 
when medical staff developed clinical guidelines. Whereas growth in average Medicare 
costs was lower when hospital boards had greater physician membership and when 
hospitals offered practice management services to physicians. Although direction of 
causality was a concern in this study, it suggested that greater levels of clinical 
integration and physician accountability may increase operating margins and lower 
hospital costs. 
Shortell et al., (2001) and Waters et al., (2001) found that compensation 
incentives that reimbursed physicians based on cost containment, productivity, and 
quality were positively associated with development and comprehensiveness of clinical 
integration practices. Casalino et al., (2003) also found that external incentives 
(physician bonuses, public recognition and other financial and non-financial incentives to 
provide better quality of care) were strongly associated with use of care management 
practices (CMP) in providing care to chronically ill patients. In particular, public 
recognition and better managed care contract opportunities were the most strongly 
associated. These findings suggest that health care purchasers and insurers should 
provide external financial and non-financial incentives to health providers in order to 
improve quality of care. 
Greater clinical integration and physician participation in health systems were 
associated with increased greater debt coverage (r=.54 to r=.58), availability of capital 
(r=.54 to r=.59), greater total net revenues (r=.47), operating margins (r=.5 l), and 
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system's cash flow (r=.48) (Devers et al. 1994, Shortell et al. 1994). However, the 
researchers mentioned that these findings should be interpreted cautiously because of 
cross-sectional study design and the lack of statistical control for other factors that might 
have influenced the systems' performance (Shortell et al. 1994). Lee and Wan (2002) 
examined relationships among structural clinical integration, average total charge, and 
patient outcomes. Clinical integration was conceptualized and structured as a latent 
variable in the LISREL model, using several hospital structural components: integration 
across sites of care (forward and backward integration), integration across divisions of 
care (use of high tech services and case management), integration of physicians (use of 
different types of POAs), integration of the information technology (use of 
administrative, management, and clinical information systems). They found positive 
associations between structural clinical integration and average total charge, as well as 
between average total charge per admission and surgical complications and in-hospital 
death. 
Lin and Wan (2002) concluded that clinical integration did not immediately 
improve financial performance of hospitals, and that structural clinical integration had 
only an indirect effect on patient outcomes. However, several limitations were noted by 
Lin and Wan (2002): the lack of random sampling of hospitals, a limitation in measuring 
clinical integration that reflected only hospital structural aspects, a questionable use of 
average total charge as a measure of efficiency, and limitations of risk adjustment 
models. Various studies demonstrate that different clinical management processes 
(CMP) may be more or less effective in improving quality of care. A number of 
randomized control trials found that efforts to implement evidence-based clinical 
guidelines were not very successful; only small-to-moderate improvements (not more 
than 5-10 percent) in the process of care have been found. Mixed and moderate effects of 
physician performance assessment and feedback on quality of care were also found in 8 
systematic literature reviews (Grol, 2001). The most effective forms of feedback were 
those provided by a respected peer or opinion leader using credible guidelines and 
embedded in a comprehensive program of continuous monitoring and improvement 
(Grol, 2001). . 
Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI) may be described as a constant 
improvement of processes of providing goods and services that meets or exceeds 
customer expectations (Shortell et al. 1998). A national survey of U.S. hospitals in 1993 
found that 69 percent of hospitals had adopted of some form of CQI (Shortell et al. 1998). 
A literature review by Shortell et al. (1998), assessing the impact of CQI on clinical 
practice, provides some interesting information. The majority of reviewed studies 
reported positive CQI effects on clinical practice. For example, CQI reduced length of 
stay and patient charges with no change in patient mortality, CQI lead to fewer adverse 
drug events, a lower mortality rate, and reduced costs. However, there were no studies 
that addressed quality issues across the continuum of acute, primary, and follow-up care. 
The weak study designs may have undermined the positive findings on CQI effects on 
quality of care (Shortell et al., 1998). 
Effective internal processes of care provision, physicianlunit specialization and 
team approach may positively affect quality of inpatient care. Aiken et al. (1 994) 
examined whether hospitals known to be good places for nursing ("magnet" hospitals, 
which are known for their team approach and integrative care delivery) have lower 
mortality than hospitals that are otherwise similar. They found that the magnet hospitals 
have a 4.6 percent lower mortality rate than matched control hospitals (Aiken et al., 
1994). Decreased mortality was also associated with pediatric ICUs with intensivists, co- 
management among internists and surgeons, facility-led services, and a specialized stroke 
unit (Mitchell and Shortell, 1997). However, limited and inconsistent research was 
performed on other organizational processes of care, such as collaboration and 
coordination of care, and organizational culture effects on quality (Mitchell and Shortell, 
1997). 
Shortell et al., (1994) identified the lack of developed clinical information system 
one of the major barriers for clinical integration. Waters et al., (2001) found evidence 
indicating importance of management information systems in formation of clinical 
integration between physician and organization. Casalino et al., (2003) detected that IT 
was positively associated with physicians' use of CMP. Hospital information technology 
(IT) adoption was positively associated, among other factors, with hospital system 
membership (Burke et al., 2002). In 1996, the health care industry spent $1 1.6 billion on 
computerized information systems, supporting clinical areas such as outcome 
measurement, clinical decision support, disease and case management, telemedicine; it is 
also expected that IT costs will be rising in the future (Snyder-Halpern et al., 2000). 
Even though the findings suggesting effectiveness of CMP were mixed, Grol 
(2001) identified 16 systematic reviews that showed effectiveness of multifaceted 
strategies for quality improvement, i.e. strategies that combined different approaches and 
targeted different barriers to improve care. These strategies were more effective than 
individual approaches in terms of quality of care. 
Grol(2001) concluded that there is a need to integrated different CMP in a wider 
quality system. Bazzoli et al. (2004), in reviewing literatures on processes of hospital 
integration, suggested that administrative consolidation and integration of low-volume 
clinical services may have come quickly, but a wide-scale clinical service integration was 
limited and took longer time to achieve. 
In summary, clinical integration may be a lengthy, resource and time intensive 
process: 
(1) Clinical integration is not fully achieved by many providers and requires a 
clear IDS mission, centralized leadership, strategic planning, information 
systems, coordination of activities, capital investments, and time; 
(2) Clinical integration is more likely to be achieved in large hospitals that were 
aligned with larger physician groups, strategically oriented to improve quality 
of care, located in competitive environments and in close geographic 
proximity with each other or reimbursed by global capitation; 
(3) Clinical integration is strongly and consistently associated with physicians' 
financial and non-financial incentives and physicians' participation in 
leadership of IDS; 
(4) Findings on whether increased financial performance associated with clinical 
integration are inconclusive; 
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(5) Effects of clinical integration practices on quality have also inconclusive 
results; 
(6) Clinical integration may result in cost-effective and high quality care, when 
standardization of care through multifaceted strategies for quality 
improvement are achieved; 
(7) There are no clear measures of clinical integration and those few are hard to 
find in existing data bases. 
Effects of External and Internal Factors on Quality of Care 
External forces may have stimulated transformation of freestanding health 
providers into integrated delivery systems (IDS) in the 1990s (Lesser and Ginsburg, 
2000, Kohn, 2000, Lake et al. 2003, Bazzoli et al., 1999). Managed care, competition, 
reimbursement regulations and hospital financial status may also affect quality of care. 
Since this literature review was not so far focusing on external factors' direct effects on 
quality of care, it may be beneficial to describe studies that actually examined these direct 
effects. 
Effects of Managed Care on Quality of Care 
Only a few empirical longitudinal studies were found that research managed care 
effect on hospital quality of care. Shen (2003) examined the effect of financial pressure 
on hospital care between 1985 and 1994. One of the variables representing financial 
pressure was a change in health maintenance organization (HMO) penetration at the 
county level. Quality was measured by mortality and complication rates for acute 
myocardial infarction (AMI). HMO penetration doubled between 1985 and 1994. Shen 
(2003) found that a 1 percent increase in HMO penetration was responsible for 0.20 
percent and 0.70 percent increase in hospital 30-day mortality rates in 1985-1990 and 
1990-1 994, respectively. Adverse HMO effect was reduced in magnitude and 
significance for mortality rates beyond 1 year, suggesting that HMO penetration affected 
the short-term mortality. 
However, Sari (2002) applied fixed, random effects, and instrumental variable 
fixed effects models, using hospital panel data for the 1992- 1997 period from 16 states, 
and found that higher managed care penetration improved quality, when inappropriate 
utilization, wound infections and adverseliatrogenic complications were used as quality 
indicators. Thus, findings on managed care effects on quality were mixed, which may be 
attributed to differences in quality measures that were used in the studies, i.e. AM1 
mortality versus patient safety indicators. Multiple empirical studies compared quality of 
care provided in managed care plans versus fee-for-services plans (FFS). Managed care 
cost-containment strategies, service access and use reduction strategies raised concerns 
about quality of care. Miller and Luft (1 994, 1997,2002), in their series of literature 
reviews, provided comprehensive analyses of several important empirical studies that 
compared managed care and FFS quality performances. They identified and assessed 
thirty-seven articles on quality of care provided by HMOs and non-HMOs plans for their 
1997 and 2002 reviews. There were equal numbers of positive and negative results 
comparing quality of HMO and non-HMO plans. The main conclusion was that quality 
of care for HMO enrollees was roughly comparable to those for non-HMO enrollees 
(Miller and Luft, 1997,2002). 
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Effects of Competition on Quality of Care 
Competition in health markets differs fiom competition in the other industries. In 
this section, a description how the nature of competition has changed fiom "medical arms 
race" to price competition in the health care industry from the early 1980s until 2000 is 
provided (Devers et al., 2003). Also articles on price competition's influence on quality 
of care are discussed. 
Health care competitive environment is affected by asymmetry of information 
between buyers and sellers, uncertain outcomes of care, the third party payment system, 
integration among health providers, cost reduction strategies, and other factors (Gaynor 
and Haas-Wilson, 1999; Miller, 1996). Thus, competition in health care may not 
function as predicted by the economic theory. In health care, providers compete not only 
based on price, but also based on quality of care, including access and style of care, 
reputation, and technical quality (Miller, 1996; Morrisey, 2001). 
The presence of health insurance made patients and their agents-physicians to be 
less concerned about prices (Gaynor and Haas-Wilson, 1999). Hospitals added services 
and technologies when their competitors did the same, which led to duplication and 
excess capacity (Robinson and Luft, 1987; Salkever, 1978; Melnick and Zwanziger, 
1988). Therefore, hospitals in more competitive markets had higher costs than hospitals 
in less competitive markets. This type of competition that increased hospital prices and 
costs was named "medical arms race". 
During the 1990s, managed care attempted to introduce price competition through 
selective contracting. Melnick and Zwanziger (1 988) and Zwanziger et al. (1 994) found 
that rates of increase in costs were lower in more competitive markets after the 
introduction of selected contracting. Melnick et al. (1992), Gaskin and Hadley (1997), 
Bamezai et al. (1999) also showed that a traditional model of competition (i.e., more 
competition-lower prices and costs) worked in the hospital markets with higher levels of 
managed care penetration and selective contracting. 
There was a concern that price competition among hospitals may negatively affect 
inpatient quality (Gaynor and Haas-Wilson, 1999). Only a handful of empirical studies 
looked at the. impact of hospital price competition on quality of care and the results were 
mixed. 
Mukamel et al. (2002) studied the effects of price competition on resource 
allocation and quality of care, suggesting that higher price competition may lead hospitals 
to allocate more resource into "hotel" rather than clinical services, which may result in 
worsening of quality outcomes. The researchers compared data for hospitals before and 
after selective contracting in California form 1982 to 1989. Mukamel and colleagues 
(2002) found evidence that clinical quality, measured by excess mortality, was associated 
with the amount of resources used in producing clinical services and that the increase in 
mortality (i.e., lowering of quality) was associated with a decrease of 1 standard deviation 
in clinical expenditures per adjusted discharge. Therefore, cost reduction through 
increased price competition and selective contracting in California may result in lower 
quality of care in hospitals. Volpp et al. (2003) also found similar results in New Jersey: 
after the introduction of hospital price competition, quality of care for Acute Myocardial 
Infarction (AMI) patients has deteriorated for the uninsured group. 
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Contrary, Kessler and McClellen (2000) examined the effects of hospital 
competition and HMO penetration on payments to hospital, mortality rates, and 
readmission rates for Medicare heart attack patients over the 1985-1994 period. They 
found that payments were lower, heart attack mortality was lower, and the complication 
rates were lower in high hospital competition and HMO penetration areas rather than in 
less competitive markets with lower HMO penetration levels. In other words, higher 
competition was associated with better quality outcomes. Sari (2002) also studied 
hospital panel data from 16 states in the 1992- 1997 period and confirmed that higher 
hospital market share and market concentration, i.e. lower hospital competition, were 
associated with lower quality outcomes measured by in-hospital complications. 
Effects of Reimbursement Regulations and Hospital 
Financial Status on Quality of Care 
Several shifts have occurred in the federal government reimbursement policy over 
the last two decades. These shifts are described in this section. Before 1983, Medicare 
reimbursed hospitals on a reasonable costs basis for inpatient care patients. This time 
was referred as the "Golden Era" of health care, because the government covered 
virtually all health care costs. However, the escalation of costs resulted in adoption of the 
Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) in 1983 that paid hospitals a fixed amount 
per discharged case, determined by the Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs). The 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 lowered the rates of growth in payments and levels of 
supplemental payments for Medicare patient. It was suggested that the PPS and the BBA 
may negatively affect quality of care (Banks et al., 2001). 
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The PPS reduced the reimbursement for the average Medicare patients for a 
majority of hospitals (Hadley et al., 1989). Hospitals responded by implementing 
operational changes, which resulted in low increases in the Medicare inpatient hospital 
costs. Hospital admissions fall 1 1.3 percent and occupancy rates decreased by 
approximately 10 percent between 1983 and 1987 (Feinglass et al., 199 1). Other effects 
included reductions in the Medicare patient length of stay, increases in outpatient service 
provision, and reduction of hospital staffing (Feder et al., 1987). 
Hospitals had an incentive to shift provision of care from inpatient to skilled 
nursing settings, because these types of services were still reimbursed on retrospective, 
cost basis and were not affected by the PPS. Lee et al. (1996) found that post-acute care 
substituted for acute care; post-acute care costs grew rapidly from 7 percent in 1986 to 22 
percent in 1993. Admissions to SNFs also grew from 9.6 to 11.8 in the 1981-1985 
(Feinglass et al. 1991). Health expenditures continue to grow, but at a lower rate since 
1983. Sager et al. (1989) also indicated a major shift in the location of death from 
hospitals to SNFs after the PPS of 1983. 
There were no indications that quality of care suffered as a result of the PPS 
regulation (Feinglass et al. 1991). Kahn et al. (1990) evaluated effects of the PPS before 
and after its implementation and found no association between the introduction of the 
PPS and 30- or 180-day mortality. However, Cutler (1 995) found the PPS was associated 
with increased short-term mortality in hospitals. Shen (2003) also studied the effects of 
the PPS on hospital quality using long-differences models for the period before and after 
the PPS. There was a short-term negative effect of the PPS on 30-day mortality rates 
from AMI. Thus, effects of the PPS on hospital quality are mixed. Hospital financial 
characteristics, as a possible reflection of cost-containment strategies, may also influence 
quality of care; but the empirical findings are also mixed (Fleming, 1990). Burstin et al., 
(1993) found that low inpatient operating costs per discharge increased the likelihood of 
negligent medical injuries. Bradbury et al., (1994) found positive and significant 
relationships between hospital resource expenditures and certain patient mortality and 
morbidity measures. They concluded that more care, i.e. a greater amount of services 
provided, does not mean better care. 
The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 addressed issues of the further rising 
costs by introducing a prospective payment system for outpatient care and skill nursing 
facility care, decreasing payments for home health care, and cutting DRG payments for 
selected DRGs when care load shift to SNFs. 
Other cost cutting policies included elimination of the inflation update to hospital 
DRG payments in 1998, limiting inflation adjustments in subsequent years, cutting 
capital payments, reducing adjustments for indirect medical education (IME) and 
disproportional share hospital (DSH) payments. One hundred nineteen ($1 19) billion 
dollars of hospital payment savings due to the BBA were estimated (Bazzoli et al. 2002). 
However, the BBA revisions restored about $2 1 billion of hospital payment savings for 
the period 1998-2004. Bazzoli et al. (2002) found that hospitals experienced decreasing 
hospital margins. Hospital also reduced length-of-stay and limited staff increases. 
Under the BBA provision, financial incentives to shift care to outpatient and 
skilled nursing facility settings were lost. Due to the BBA financial pressure and 
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decreased hospital margins, health providers may cut back on quality of care. However, 
there are very limited empirical studies that evaluated the BBA effects on quality of care. 
Clement et al. (working paper, 2004), in a descriptive study over the 1995-2000 period, 
observed worsening of quality after 1997, measured by a few inpatient quality and patient 
safety indicators. Summarizing the effects of external factors on health provider 
integration and quality, it may be concluded that: 
(1) Empirical studies convey mixed findings on managed care penetration effects 
on hospital quality of care. There were no substantial differences in quality of 
care provided by HMOs versus FFS plans. 
(2) Price competition among hospitals was introduced as a result of managed care 
cost-cutting strategies, i.e. selective contracting and capitation payment. The 
quality effects of price competition were mixed. 
(3) The PPS regulation's and hospital financial characteristics' influences on 
quality of care demonstrated mixed findings. Effects of the PPS and the BBA 
pressures on quality of care were not extensively researched. However, there 
is a concern that increasing financial pressure due to both the PPS and the 
BBA may worsen quality of care. 
Effects of Hospitals' Structures and Processes on Quality of Care 
Hospital internal factors may also affect quality of care. This section of the 
literature review discusses whether hospital system membership and hospital 
characteristics, such as professionalization of personnel and use of technology, hospital 
ownership and teaching status, and volume of services, influence quality of care. 
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Madison (2004) studied relationship between hospital system membership and the 
patient outcomes. She found that, even though the effect of hospital system membership 
on quality outcome was limited, patients, who were admitted to small rural system 
hospitals that were affiliated with big hospital partners within 100 miles, experienced 
lower mortality rates than patients initially admitted to independent hospitals. 
Physician qualification, expertise, and higher level of training may be related to 
quality care. The greater percentage of board certified physicians was associated with 
lower mortality rates in hospitals (Haqtz et al., 1989, Kelly and Hellinger, 1986). 
The higher percentage of registered nurses (RNs) versus less qualified nurses and 
the greater number of RN hours were associated with statistically significant decreases in 
the likelihood of patient dying within 20 days of admission, the rates of failure to rescue 
and pneumonia, and the rates of urinary tract infection, gastrointestinal bleeding, and 
cardiac arrest (Aiken et al., 2003, Cho et al., 2003, Needleman et al., 2002). 
However, Mark et al. (2004) found only "limited support for the prevailing notion 
that improving RN staffing unconditionally improves quality of care" (p.279). 
For-profit ownership status was associated with increased inpatient mortality, 
preventable adverse events of any type and operative adverse events, and events due to 
delayed diagnosis and therapy (Devereaux et al., 2002, Thomas et al., 2000). However, 
teaching status effects on quality had mixed findings, but the most rigorous studies with 
large sample sizes and adequate risk adjustments found that for common conditions, 
particularly in elderly patients, major teaching hospitals offered better care than non- 
teaching hospitals (Ayanian and Weissman, 2002). Hospitals with greater number of 
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high-tech services provided better quality care (Hartz et al., 1989, Silber et al., 1995). 
Systematic review of literature by Gandjour et al. (2003) showed evidence for a volume- 
mortality relationship, i.e. the greater the volume of services performed, the less 
mortality. In summary, it may be concluded that there are certain structural and process 
variables of hospitals, such as physician and nursing staff qualification, non-profit 
hospital ownership, provision of high-tech services technology, teaching status, high 
volume of services, may have positive effects on inpatient quality of care. In the next 
section, a review of existing taxonomies and how a use of taxonomy can benefit this 
research are provided. 
Taxonomy 
It is believed that taxonomy of health providers may assist in advancing research 
on integration in health care (Alexander et al., 1996). Taxonomy may be useful for 
identification of hospitals that belong to different types of systems and studying how 
hospital affiliation with systems may affect quality outcomes. Several taxonomies of 
integrated delivery systems were proposed by researchers. 
Webster's (2004) dictionary defines taxonomy as "the study of the general 
principles of scientific classification." Alexander et al. (1996) suggested that taxonomy 
of health care organizations may clarify strategies and structures that organizations use to 
adapt to turbulent environments, and may identify dimensions that produce distinct 
internal structures among health care organizations. The organizational taxonomy may 
also be necessary for tracking changes in the health industry and studying performance of 
health providers. 
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Different researchers attempted to classify integrated delivery systems (Burns and 
Thorpe, 1993; Alexander, 1996; Succi et al., 2001; Bazzoli et al., 1999; Madison, 2004). 
Unlike plants and animals that can be classified by inherent genotypes, organizations do 
not have unique "genetic" codes. Therefore, it is essential to find classification principles 
that allow allocation of health care organizations in different categories. Several factors 
were used to classify organizations: structure, strategy, ownership, types of affiliation, 
and others. Pros and cons of these classifications are discussed. 
Succi et al., (2001) looked at health system consolidation and formation of new 
health systems. Succi and colleagues (2001) classified systems by categories: (1) 
investor owned, (2) church affiliated not-for-profit (NFP), and (3) other private not-for- 
profit; and by size: (1) small: 2-5 member hospitals, (2) medium: 6-20 member 
hospitals, and (3) large: 2 1 or more member hospitals. 
However, several limitations may be noticed. Succi et al., (2001) used a cross- 
sectional design in their study that did not capture temporal trends in the health industry 
that affected integration processes. This classification did not incorporate other 
providers, which could also belong to IDS, i.e. the payers, non-physician providers, and 
community health centers. This classification was also not validated or used in other 
empirical studies, suggesting either instability of their groupings or technical complexity. 
These limitations were addressed in several ways by Bazzoli et al. (1 999) in their 
taxonomy of hospital system and networks. Bazzoli and colleagues (1999) used existing 
industrial organization economic and organization theories in creating this taxonomy. 
Measures of differentiation, integration, and centralization were developed at the 
hospital, POA, and provider-owned insurance company level and used as the 
classification factors. 
Bazzoli et al., (1999) found that differentiation and centralization were 
particularly important for the classification. They classified 90 percent of health systems 
as described below: 
(1) Centralized Health Systems - systems with high degree of centralization in 
hospital services, physician arrangements, and insurance products; ownership- 
based and contractual-based physician and insurance arrangements were 
employed at the system level; moderate differentiation in hospital services and 
physician arrangements and low differentiation in insurance products; urban 
locations and hospitals in close proximity of one another were common; 
teaching hospitals were more common in this category. 
(2) Centralized PhysicianJInsurance Health Systems - high levels of 
centralization for physician arrangements and insurance products at the health 
system level; hospital services were only moderately centralized; 
differentiation in all service/product dimensions was moderate; relatively 
small numbers of hospitals with low investor-owned representation; hospitals 
in close geographic proximity. 
(3) Moderately Centralized Health Systems - moderate levels of centralization for 
all service/product dimensions; high differentiation in hospital services and 
moderate differentiation in physician arrangements and insurance products; 
higher prevalence of church-sponsored institutions. 
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(4) Decentralized Health Systems - high levels of decentralization in hospital 
services, physician arrangements, and insurance products, these were more 
predominant at the hospital level than at system level; high levels of 
differentiation on the hospital, physician, and insurance dimensions; large 
number of hospitals that are disproportionately church-affiliated and are 
spread over a broad geographic area. 
(5) Independent Hospital Systems - little differentiation of hospital services, few 
physician arrangements, and little insurance product development; 
centralization on all of these dimensions is low to moderate; smaller, rural 
area systems; and investor-owned hospitals were predominant (Bazzoli et al., 
1999). 
The taxonomy captures structural dimensions of the health systems and their 
strategic activities. The taxonomy also incorporates vertical and horizontal integration 
among various types of health organizations. Large samples and use of panel data 
increased reliability and validity of taxonomic classification. Thus, this taxonomy is 
more comprehensive and is likely to be stable over time than other classifications. It has 
also been used to track changes in the health care industry (Bazzoli et al. 2001). 
Bazzoli et al. (2001) found that the number of health systems rose from 295 
(2,836 affiliated hospitals) in 1994 to 365 (2,512 affiliated hospitals) in 1998 in the U.S. 
The results of taxonomic analyses demonstrated no evidence "that providers' efforts to 
develop organized delivery systems nationwide are on a pathway to disintegration" (p. 
195, Bazzoli et al. 2001). 
Shortell et al. (2000) suggested that higher levels of centralization of health 
systems may facilitate more clinical integration due to diffusion of management and 
clinical information systems, quality management and care management practices. It 
may be expected that hospitals in more centralized health systems are more likely to 
achieve greater levels of clinical integration and, in turn, improve quality of care. 
Therefore, it is beneficial to use this taxonomy in studying how structural and process 
elements of different types of systems may affect quality of care over time (1995-2000). 
Summary 
This literature review demonstrates that structural integration in the health care 
industry was influenced by the variety of external and internal factors. The literature also 
suggests that structural integration through horizontal, vertical and hospital-physician 
integration may lead to clinical integration among health providers. However, a limited 
number of empirical studies researched integrated delivery systems' (IDS) and clinical 
integration's effects on hospital performance and quality of care. Those studies that did 
yielded mixed findings. The taxonomy that classifies hospitals in five different health 
systems, ranging from centralized to independent, is identified for use in this research on 
quality of care provided in hospitals that belong to different types of health systems. 
CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
In this chapter, a mechanistic and organic approach to organization theory is 
reviewed. Contingency theory attempts to bridge the mechanistic-organic dichotomy, 
however, adding a level of complexity to this dichotomy. Contingency theory helps us 
develop at least two plausible scenarios evaluating hospital strategic responses to the 
dynamics of the health care environment in the 1995-2000 period. Relevant tenets of 
contingency theory are used to develop a conceptual model that predicts hospital system 
leadership's choice of strategies that assist in either centralization or decentralization of 
their structures. 
General organizational behavior literature is discussed to set up a link between 
organizational structure fit with contingency factors and its effect on organizational 
performance. The conceptual model theoretically identifies strategies that may affect 
hospital structures. Hospitals affiliated with five types of health systems (i-e., having 
different structures) may develop and use different processes of care delivery, which, in 
turn, may result in varying quality performance across system types. The conceptual 
model is used in setting up a structure-process-performance link for empirical 
evaluation. As a result, a set of testable hypotheses is developed and is discussed the 
following sections of this chapter. 
Mechanistic Versus Organic Approach to Organization Theory 
Bums and Stalker (1961) distinguished between organic and mechanistic 
structures of organizations as representing two poles or extremes on a continuum of 
various organizational structures. The mechanistic structure is top-down, characterized 
by higher levels of centralization of decision making, specialization through job 
descriptions, and formalization by rules and regulations (Burns and Stalker, 1961). The 
organic structure is decentralized and low on functional specialization and formalization, 
where employees have a creative approach to decision-making. Mechanistic 
organizations administratively control their employees, while organic organizations rely 
on initiative and expertise of their employees. The mechanistic+x-ganic approach may 
also be attributed to large, multidivisional (M-form) corporations. For example, organic 
structures were used in decentralized, semi-autonomous operating centers of M-form 
organizations and creative processes were employed through long-term research, 
investment, and innovation sub-units (Thompson et al., 1983). 
The mechanistic-rganic dichotomy can be used to examine how organizational 
structures may adapt to different environmental conditions. In stable and simple 
environments, where tasks and technology are relatively routine and require less 
flexibility, organizations employ relatively high percentage of nonprofessional workers, 
the mechanistic structure may provide better outcomes (Thompson, 1967). 
In turbulent and complex environments, where tasks and technologies are non- 
routine, organizations innovate and employ a relatively high percentage of professionals, 
the organic structure may be suitable to maintain or improve organizational performance. 
The organic organizations rely more on lateral communication and coordination, 
because these organizations are effective when they can process more information, and 
have greater expertise and flexibility in complex environment. An organization also can 
be situated in between these two extremes, having varying levels of centralization, 
specialization, and formalization (Donaldson, 2001). 
Contingency theory uses the mechanistic-organic framework; however, adding 
increasing levels of sophistication and complexity to this approach. According to one 
scenario, contingency theory suggests that under unstable environmental conditions (e.g., 
turbulent and dynamic) with increasing task interdependence (i.e., connectedness of 
organizations with each other), large organizations do not necessarily use the organic 
approach, requiring decentralization. 
Instead, centralization of decision-making is beneficial for organizations that 
chose to integrate and consolidate their structures. However, according to another 
scenario, large organizations may use differentiation and divisionalization strategy to 
manage large organizational size, which requires a greater decentralization of their 
structures. Therefore, organizations' leadership may choose one or another strategy to be 
used in order to respond to environmental conditions by either centralization or 
decentralization of structures. 
In the following sections, a review of contingency theory is available; a 
discussion how one theory may lead to two different scenarios on how hospital systems 
under certain conditions may either chose greater centralization/decentralization and/or 
differentiation of their structures and services is provided. Testable hypotheses that may 
identify which system structures have a positive effect on hospitals performance 
measured by quality outcomes are proposed. 
Contingency Theory - Overview 
Contingency theory states that there is no single organizational structure that is 
highly effective for all organizations and that organizations can and must adapt to their 
environments (Galbreith, 1973; Donaldson, 1997). Contingency theory explains how 
changes in the environment affect organizational structures and organizational 
effectiveness and performance (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Each element of 
organizational structure is dependent upon one or more conditions or contingency factors 
(Donaldson, 2001). These main conditions are organizational environment, task 
uncertainty, task interdependence, and size (Burns and Stalker, 1991 ; Child, 1975; 
Galbreith, 1973; Thompson, 1967; Scott, 2003; Chandler, 1962; Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967; Donaldson, 1995 and 200 1). 
The contingency factors are moderators (Donaldson, 2001). Effects of one 
variable, organizational structure, on the second variable, organizational performance, 
depends on the third variable, a contingency factor and variations in its levels, or a fit 
among contingency conditions and organizational structures (see Figure 2). 
Contingency factors determine what organizational structural characteristics 
produce the highest levels of organizational performance. Changes in contingencies may 
lead to changes in organizational processes and structures through appropriate decision- 
making initiatives by organizational leadership, or the organization would perform poorly 
and possibly fail. There are two categories of contingency factors namely those that are 
Contingency Factors Structure b Performance 
- Good performance, 
- Poor performance at first, 
Figure 2: Tenants of Contingency Theory 
external to the organization and those that are internal (Donaldson, 2001). Organizational 
environment is an external condition. Task uncertainty, task interdependence, and 
organizational size are internal conditions. 
Environment reflects all elements and components outside the boundary of an 
organization, which may be defined by the organization and its actors (Scott, 2003). 
Donaldson (2001) proposed to reduce the environmental condition to three dimensions: 
"dynamism (which subsumes a notion of stability-instability and turbulence), complexity 
(which subsumes a notion of homogeneity-heterogeneity and concentration-dispersion), 
and munificence (which subsumes capacity) (p.20)." Dynamism is one of the major 
components of the environmental contingency (Thompson, 1967, Child, 1975, 
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Donaldson, 2001). Dynamism may be characterized not only as a rate of change, but also 
as the degree of unpredictability or instability, i.e. shifting environment makes 
organization's successful performance unpredictable (Dess and Beard, 1984, Thompson, 
Thompson (1 967) characterized environments as homogeneous, i.e. simple, or 
heterogeneous, i.e. complex. As heterogeneity increases, the number of functional 
divisions within an organization would increase to cope with the increasing 
environmental uncertainty. Munificence is the quantity of slack resources (Dess and 
Beard, 1984), such as availability of inputs and markets for outputs, fewer competitors 
and a known regulatory filed (Scott, 2003). Economic stringency or lowering 
munificence fosters organizational change. Organizational performance becomes less 
certain, as the environment becomes more dynamic and complex, and the availability of 
resources decreases. 
The internal contingency factors include task uncertainty, task interdependence 
and organizational size. Task uncertainty is closely related to the organic - mechanistic 
dichotomy. According to Donaldson's conceptualization (1 997), low uncertainty tasks 
are most effectively performed by a centralized hierarchy, since this is a simple structure, 
which allows quick decision-making, close coordination, and it is inexpensive to 
implement. As task uncertainty increases, then the hierarchy needs to loosen control and 
to be overlaid by decentralized structures. However, when other contingency factors, 
e.g., task interdependence and organizational size, start playing a more significant role, 
the direction of organizational restructuring becomes less clear. 
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Task interdependence describes how organizational parts are connected with each 
other (Donaldson, 2001). Thompson (1 967) defines organization's internal connections 
as pooled, sequential, and reciprocal interdependences. Pooled interdependence refers to 
overall coordination among organizational departments. If one branch of an organization 
does not perform well, the whole organizational performance is jeopardized. 
Standardization is used for coordination of pooled interdependence. Sequential is a serial 
interdependence, where the outputs of one branch become the inputs of another branch. 
It is coordinated by planning. Reciprocal interdependence refers to the cycle in which the 
outputs of one branch become inputs for the other branch, and the outputs of the last 
branch become the inputs for the first branch. Reciprocal interdependence is coordinated 
by mutual adjustment, i.e. feedback. 
Size is another major contingency and an organizational characteristic, reflecting 
the number of people working in an organization. Organizational size affects structure of 
an organization. Mintzberg (1 979) found that a small organization is more effective if it 
uses a simple organizational structure. As the organizational size increases, the 
organizational structure becomes more complex. For example, as size increases, the 
number of employees andlor hierarchical levels or branch offices may also increase 
(Scott, 2003). Size is positively associated with the number of organizational activities 
and functions (Scott, 2003). Environment affects internal contingencies of organizations, 
which, in turn, shapes organizational structure. Thus, internal contingency factors may 
become more immediate and direct causes of structure under conditions of achieving 
structural congruency with multiple contingency factors (Donaldson, 200 1). 
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Interplay among the environment, internal contingencies, and managerial actions 
influences the organizational design and affects its performance (Donaldson, 2001). An 
organization has to gain a "fit" of its structure with contingency factors (see Figure 2 on 
p. 64). This fit results in a desirable organizational performance. A "misalignment or 
misfit" between the contingencies and the structure results in a poor performance, which 
drives structural changes in the organization in order to regain the fit with new levels of 
contingencies (Donaldson, 200 1). As a result, structural adjustments in the right 
direction should improve organizational performance and lead to a new desirable fit 
between contingency factors and a new organizational structure. The fit-misfit parameter 
of contingency theory implies that an organization can adapt its structure to changing 
environments and contingencies, so that their effectiveness and performance are 
maintained at a desirable level (Donaldson 2001) or conversely, organizations can 
misjudge their environment and a type of structure .that is needed to function effectively 
in this environment, and performance declines. Organizations must continuously monitor 
alignment of their structures and performance. 
A number of researchers proposed a multicontingency approach to 
conceptualization of organizational fit and performance. Mintzberg (1 979) suggested 
that size, technology, environment, and management would influence the choice of 
organizational structure. A viable c ~ ~ g u r a t i o n  (i.e., a fit) of environment, leadership, 
strategy, and structure is necessary for good performance (Miller, 1987). Richard (1994) 
found that manufacturing firm leadership's judgment aimed at strategy-structure- 
environment alignment produced higher performance than did other judgments. 
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Therefore, organizational leadership may be able to strategically decide which structure is 
more appropriate in dealing with a particular external or internal contingency or a group 
of contingency factors. 
Gresov (1 989) simultaneously examined effects of task uncertainty and 
interdependence on unit structure and performance efficiency. There may be a conflict 
between contingency factors - the likelihood that structure would deviate from the 
demands of either task uncertainty, horizontal dependence (i.e., task interdependence), or 
both (Gresov, 1989). Organizations may adopt a mechanistic design to handle routine 
tasks and ignore the need to manage interdependence; or they may adopt an organic 
design to mange interdependence, thus, ignoring task requirements. Organizations may 
also adopt a hybrid structure to manage both contingencies. Gresov (1 989) found that an 
organic design had fit with an uncertain environment, but mixed support for a 
performance decrease from misfit. He implied that different structures and not 
necessarily optimal ones may result in a performance level sufficient for organizational 
survival. Gresov (1 989) concluded that "a multi-contingencies approach provided 
additional information about patterns of design.. ..this approach isolated instances in 
which equifinality could be observe.. .the model provided insight into both the 
phenomenon of misfit and the difficulties of observing it." Therefore, an organizational 
management may respond to one or another contingency factor based on a perceived 
importance of these factors. 
On the other hand, Burton, Lauridsen, and Obel(2002) tested the 
multicontingency fit model for strategic organizational structures, operationalizing misfit 
72 
by organizational performance. They found that firms with situational, or contingency 
misfits, or both, result in performance losses compared with firms with no misfits. They 
also found that one misfit of any kind may significantly compromise performance. 
However, a definition and measurement of a fit or a misfit is a difficult task and requires 
solid theoretical conceptualization (Gresov, 1989; Burton et al., 2002) 
A poor organizational performance may be used as a proxy for measuring a 
misfit, and a good organizational performance - as a fit proxy. Organizational 
performance may be measured in many ways. Total outputs, quality, productivity, 
efficiency, survival, adoption of innovations, employee satisfaction are often used as 
measures of organizational performance and effectiveness (Scott, 2003; Child, 1975, 
Dewar and Werbel, 1979, Hage and Dewar, 1973). Time is also an important component 
in measuring organizational performance (for example, how quick is a return on 
investment); and also researchers need to be aware of a passage of time in studying 
organizational performance. Some performance effects need to be studied in a short-run, 
others - in a long-run; or an organizational stage of development (i.e., newly formed 
versus developed organizations) may also influence performance (Scott, 2003). 
Different performance measures may also yield different results for different 
structures. For example, Kim and Burton (2002) studied the effect of task uncertainty 
and decentralization on project team performance, measured in three dimensions: cost, 
time, and quality. They found that, "under high task uncertainty, a decentralized team 
performs better in terms of cost and time, but a centralized team performs better in terms 
of quality. Under low task uncertainty, there is no performance difference between a 
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centralized team and a decentralized team in terms of cost and time, but a centralized 
team performs better in terms of quality (p. 365)." Their findings suggest a task 
uncertainty-structure fit's effect on performance is multidimensional and that 
organizations may chose their structure depending on their strategic goals, i.e. whether to 
improve quality or to reduce cost in this particular example. 
Juran (1 989) also used quality as a measure of organizational performance. He 
referred to quality not only as a quality of the end product, but also quality that is built 
into organizational design, production processes, and employees' job descriptions. 
Quality of care may measure performance of health care organizations. Alexander and 
Randolph (1 985), for example, researched separate effects of technology, structure, and 
the fit between them on quality of care. They collected primary data on performance of 
nursing units which was measured by patient evaluations of quality of care, reviews of 
patient records, interviews with nurses and patients, and observations of processes of 
nursing care. Alexander and Randolph (1 985) found that the fit between technology and 
structure was an important predictor of nursing subunit quality. 
In this study, patient outcomes are used to measure how hospitals structural 
characteristics, such as affiliation with different types of systems, may affect hospital 
performance in terms of quality of care in responding to contingencies of task 
interdependence and size. Data over a six-year period are used, and measures of external 
shifts in the environment that may had an effect on system restructuring over time are 
constructed. However, due to data (i.e., availability of only secondary data) and 
methodological constraints, it is unattainable to observe and to measure a fit between the 
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external environment and organizational structures and their direct and combined 
influence on quality outcomes. 
The following sections review how contingency theory may explain two different 
scenarios for hospital system restructuring. Specifically, (1) hospital system leadership 
might assess task interdependence as the main contingency factor affecting performance, 
requiring centralization of structures; or (2) hospital system leadership might react to 
increasing organizational size as systems are formed, requiring decentralization of 
structures. 
Scenario 1 for Centralization of Organizational Structures 
According to Donaldson (2001), task interdependence incorporates integration as 
a strategy that is used by an organization to set itself apart form competitors. Integration 
across specialized tasks and services is necessary in order to achieve unity of effort. 
Integration is related and achieved through various types of coordination. The overall 
managerial challenge is to strategically integrate various tasks, services, and production 
lines, using effective types of coordination in order to meet demands of the external and 
internal pressures (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Therefore, organization leadership may 
pursue centralization of structures in order to effectively integrate their task, services, and 
production lines. In other words, centralization may improve effectiveness of 
coordination in integrated organizations where there is a high degree of task 
interdependence. A schematic depiction for Scenario 1 is presented in Figure 3. 
Structural integration between organizations increases their task interdependence, 
and therefore, requires more coordination in order to improve an overall organizational 
Scenario 1 
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effectiveness and performance. Sequential and pooled interdependences among 
integrated organizations require complex coordination of activities. For example, vertical 
integration between organizations results in increased sequential interdependence 
between organizational branches (Thompson, 1967). Sequential interdependence is 
managed by planning. Implementation of innovation is an example where reciprocal 
interdependence between organizational sub-units is needed; thus, coordination by 
feedback is used. Coordination in integrated organizations is improved, when 
centralization fits and enhances the requirements (e.g., planning or feedback) of 
increasing levels of task interdependence. Therefore, organizational leadership may 
effectively deal with task interdependence by using the strategy of integration, which also 
requires a centralized means of coordination (Rumelt, 1974, Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967). 
The U.S. health care environment may be characterized as complex and dynamic 
due to various financial, structural, regulatory, and other forces affecting the industry in 
the last several decades (e.g., Kohn, 2000, Gaynor and Haas-Wilsion, 1999, Lake et al., 
2003). Environmental and task uncertainty make organization performance unpredictable 
(Thompson, 1967). As the environmental dynamism and task uncertainty increase, health 
care organizations may change their structures to regain the fit with the changed 
environment. 
According to contingency theory, turbulent environment and task uncertainty 
should force hospital structures to decentralize and decrease levels of specialization and 
formalization. However, the environmental forces, e.g. managed care, competition, 
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reimbursement reforms (e.g., the BBA), and others, stimulated massive consolidation in 
the health care industry in 1990s (Bazzoli et al., 1999, Gaynor and Haas-Wilsion, 1999, 
Lesser and Ginsburg, 2000, Dranove et al., 2002). This consolidation increases 
interdependence among health care providers (Donaldson, 200 1). For example, task 
interdependence that was achieved through physician-hospital alignments has increased 
under the global capitation payment system in the mid- 1990s (Bazzoli et al., (1 999/2000), 
which occurred in a timeframe relevant to this study. Task interdependence may increase 
when integrated delivery systems (IDS) are held accountable for the health status of the 
enrolled population and is reimbursed on a capitated basis. 
Hospitals consolidated into multihospital systems, formed physician-hospital 
organizations, and participate in other forms of IDS (Shortell et al., 1998; Bazzoli et al. 
1999). Different types of consolidation - horizontal and vertical - and different types of 
vertical integration - physician-hospital versus insurance-hospital - results in different 
types of task interdependence. Consolidation became a hospital strategy to respond to the 
turbulent health care environment (Gaynor and Haas-Wilsion, 1999). Consolidation 
increases reciprocal interdependence between organizations in the integrated delivery 
system systems, where performance of one organization is interconnected with the 
performance of the overall IDS (Thompson, 1967, Donaldson, 2001); therefore, IDS'S 
leadership may view task interdependence as a leading or dominant contingency factor in 
this situation. Task interdependence may stimulate IDS readjusting their structures 
towards greater centralization in order to manage effectively increasing connectedness of 
organizations in the systems. 
Effective management of consolidation and integration processes may allow IDS 
to achieve desired performance outcomes. Contingency theory implies that as task 
interdependence and centralization increase, differentiation and divisionalization 
decrease, because organizational services, products, and tasks become related and require 
more coordination at the systems' level and less delegation of authority to the hospital's 
level (Donaldson, 2001). Centralization of authority at the IDS level would allow the 
system leadership to use better processing of information for making effective decisions 
for and coordinating activities among sub-units in response to changing environments 
(Savage et al., 1997). The leadership may project that centralization of IDS would 
improve coordination and communication process among organizational sub-unites (i.e., 
various health providers) in the system. IDS'S centralization and coordination of 
processes would help achieve a tighter integration. Effective coordination of reciprocal 
interdependences may improve provision of care along the continuum of IDS and 
stimulate clinical integration within the system. These strategic decisions, structural 
tune-ups, and intraorganizational processes may improve organizational performance 
and result in better quality outcomes for health providers in centralized IDS. 
Hypotheses for Scenario 1 
Using the first scenario, hospitals in more centralized health systems have 
complex structures and resemble the IDS that was proposed by Shortell et al. (1996). In 
the highest stage, affiliates of the IDS are reciprocally interdependent, coordinating 
activities by feedback and achieving clinical integration; thus effectively responding to 
task interdependence (Charns, 1997). 
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Governance of Centralized Health Systems (CHS) is characterized as having high 
levels of administrative intensity (i.e., administrative staffing at the system level) and 
decision-making authority over policies related to ,the system. CHSs also have slightly 
higher representation of affiliates' members on the system board (Alexander et al., 2003). 
Centralized governance in health systems allows boards to make decisions quickly, which 
is important for IDS in operating in the turbulent environments (Savage et al., 1997). The 
leadership of Centralized Health Systems (CHS), due to high level of centralization of 
hospital services, physician arrangements, and insurance products, are more likely to 
develop and diffuse management and clinical information systems, quality management, 
and care management practices (Shortell et al., 2000). Hospitals in CHS are also more 
likely to be located in close geographical proximity (Bazzoli et al., 1999), which is also 
important for achieving clinical integration. 
Centralized Physician/Insurance Health Systems (CPIHS) are characterized as 
those that have high centralization for physician arrangements and insurance products 
and moderate centralization for hospital services (Bazzoli et al., 1999). In all other 
aspects, CPIHS are similar to CHS, and therefore, it is proposed to collapse both in one 
category, i.e. hospitals in more centralized systems. 
Hospitals in more centralized systems may have a better fit with the contingency 
of task interdependence than hospitals in decentralized systems (DHS). This effective 
alignment may result in the overall improvement of hospital performance manifested in 
improved quality outcomes in CHS and CPIHS. Young et al. (1998) found that surgical 
units which used a combination of coordination by feedback and by programming, had 
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best perceived quality, lowest mortality and morbidity. Coordination, continuity of care 
and clinical integration may positively affect clinical performance and improve quality 
outcomes for hospitals in centralized health systems and centralized physicianlinsurance 
health systems. Also, the leadership of centralized health systems may have more power 
and authority to consolidate certain administrative and clinical departments in their 
member hospitals. A volume of services provided in consolidated clinical departments 
should increase and positively affect the processes of care delivery (i.e., "the practice 
makes perfect"), and, as a result, improve quality performance of hospitals in more 
centralized health systems. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
HI: Hospitals in more centralized health systems (CHS and CPIHS) would 
produce better quality outcomes than hospitals in Decentralized Health Systems, all 
other things being equal. 
Clinical integration is highly correlated with physician-hospital integration 
(Shortell et al., 1996). Centralized Physician/Insurance Health Systems may have a 
greater arsenal of tools and means than other system types in providing financial and 
other incentives to their physicians in order to increase physician-organization alignment 
and to improve physicians' quality performance (for example, through following 
evidence-based clinical protocols and guidelines, monitoring physicians' clinical 
practices and activities, etc.). Therefore, hospitals in CPIHS may achieve greater 
integration of clinical processes, due to tighter physician-hospital alignment and 
potentially better incentives, and therefore, improve their quality performance in 
comparison with hospitals in CHS. The hypothesis is as follows: 
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H2: Hospitals in Centralized Physician/Insurance Health Systems would 
produce better quality outcomes than hospitals in Centralized Health Systems, all 
other things being equal. 
Scenario 2 for Decentralization of Organizational Structures 
On one hand, task interdependence may require centralization of structures. On 
the other hand, a decision on whether to centralize or to decentralize organizational 
structures may be made by leadership depending on other factors. The main factor for 
decentralization is o~ganizational size (Donaldson, 2001). Child (1 975) stated that 
organizational size defines the structure. Smaller organizations can control their 
employees directly through centralized authority. 
As organizational size increases, an organization needs to decentralize and rely 
more on indirect means of control over organizational processes, such as specialization 
(i.e., division of labor), formalization (i.e., pre-specified roles and relationships), and 
worker autonomy (i.e. technical competency of personnel) (Child, 1972; Scott, 2003). 
With an increase in size, the span of control of managers increases, because the number 
of managers and administrators stays unchanged or increases at a lower rate in 
comparison with greater increases in the number of workers (Blau, 1970). Thus, large 
organizations avoid being top heavy with high overhead costs, which may also improve 
their effectiveness and efficiency, resulting in better performance. Therefore, 
organization leadership may decide to manage the increasing organizational size by 
decentralization of organizational structures. A schematic depiction for Scenario 2 is 
presented in Figure 4. 
Scenario 2 
Theoretical Precursor I
Structure: 
Increasing Strategy: Process: 
' - -A  --ship 
niff~r~ntintion Decentralized Specialization Outcomes: 
U-..I+I. Q..-&--- IQIs and PSIS 
I 
Figure 4: Conceptual Model for Scenario 2 
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Organizational leadership may use differentiation and divisionalization strategy to 
fit organizational size with the structure when organizational services, products, tasks are 
unrelated and require decentralization of decision-making authority (Thompson, 1967, 
Donaldson, 2001). Lawrence and Lorsch (1 967) described differentiation as differences 
between organizational sub-units in goal orientations, time orientations, formality of 
structure, and interpersonal orientations. Structural differentiation is also defined as how 
an organization is split horizontally - the number of sub-units, job titles, span of control 
of top management - and vertically - the number of levels of hierarchy (Donaldson, 
2001). 
Divisionalization is also related to decentralization (Donaldson, 2001, Chenhall, 
1979). Divisionalization of organizations requires decentralization of authority because 
various divisions of large organizations become only loosely interdependent. Therefore, 
large organizations coordinate their activities by rules, procedures, and planning, which 
further emphasize decentralization of the structures. Therefore, decentralization is 
achieved through differentiation and divisionalization strategy. 
Specialization, formalization, and worker autonomy are positively correlated with 
decentralization of structures (Child, 1972; Scott, 2003). Decentralized organization may 
use specialization, formalization, and autonomy to improve effectiveness of 
organizational processes and, as a result, organizational performance. Specialization is 
the division of labor in the organization; it is measured by a scale of functional 
specialization that assesses the degree to which administrative (and possibly clinical) 
work has been specialized by functions (Donaldson, 2001). Specialization of tasks is 
necessitated by and occurs as a result of structural complexity of large organizations. 
Specialization makes processes of production more effective in these organizations. 
Formalization is the extent to which pre-specified procedures and processes for doing 
work are articulated and written down as well as used and enforced for defining 
procedures and jobs, recording performance, and passing information (Scott, 2003; 
Donaldson, 2001). 
The need for autonomy may result from increasing decentralization. The middle 
management and technical experts need less direct control within defined and formalized 
organizational frames, because they have sufficient technical knowledge of how to 
manage increasing volume of information, specific tasks and how to deal with their 
immediate contingencies, as the size grows. Technical personnel also develop 
professional autonomy, due to specialization (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Therefore, 
decentralization improves predictability of organizational performance by making middle 
management and technical experts comply with formalized procedures and tasks as 
indirect means of control while giving them some freedom to utilize their skills and 
creativity (Child, 1975). 
The organizational structure becomes complex as organizational size increases, 
therefore, differentiation and divisionalization strategy is used by large organizations to 
fit their size with their structures. This strategy requires more delegation of decision- 
making authority from the top to the middle management, greater specialization of 
personnel, formalization of procedures, and worker autonomy, which may improve 
organizational processes and further stimulate decentralization of structures. As a result, 
decentralization may increase effectiveness and predictability of organizational 
performance. 
In the health care industry, the large size of many integrated delivery systems 
(IDS) may reduce effective coordination and information exchanges between the top IDS 
management and the local hospital sub-units. Consolidation of health providers into 
systems vertically and horizontally increases the hierarchy of IDS (Arndt and Bigelow, 
1996, Meighan, 1994). Therefore, IDS need to decentralize their structures by delegating 
authority to the middle management, i.e. to the hospital level and local submarkets. 
Hospitals affiliated with decentralized systems maintain or further increase 
differentiation and divisionalization of IDS'S structures, provide more clinical autonomy 
to professionals (i.e., clinicians), and increase specialization of other hospital personnel. 
Differentiation and divisionalization strategy makes hospitals less dependent on the 
systems' center. Thus, differentiation and divisionalization may decrease hospitals' need 
for sequential and reciprocal coordination with other system members, and therefore, 
reduce hospitals' burden to improve the overall IDS performance, which makes a hospital 
wholly responsible for its own submarket and reduces some of hospital's task 
uncertainty. 
High differentiation and divisionalization of hospitals in the decentralized IDS 
may result in hospitals maintaining the full range of services, improving availability and 
accessibility and competitiveness of care in local submarkets. Indirect means of control, 
(i.e., managerial, financial, and clinical procedures and rules) may be used to formalize 
provision of care and maintain the overall control of the IDS over its local units or 
86 
branches. Specialization, due to routinization of tasks, may improve performance of 
clinical personnel (e.g., nursing staff) at the lower levels of hospital hierarchy, thus, 
reducing system errors and mistakes. Therefore, decentralization of authority in IDS may 
improve adjustments of hospitals to their local submarkets, enhance clinical performance 
and autonomy of personnel, reduce system errors, due to specialization of hospital 
personnel and formalization of processes, and increase service availability and 
accessibility in the local submarkets; thus, improving quality outcomes for hospitals in 
decentralized IDS. 
Hypotheses for Scenario 2 
According to the second scenario, as hospitals and health systems consolidate, 
their size increases and decisions have to be communicated vertically and horizontally 
across tall hierarchical structures. Top management of Centralized Health Systems 
(CHS) and Centralized PhysicianlInsurance Health Systems (CPIHS) may lose their 
ability to influence processes at the lower levels of their organizations, because 
centralized decision-making and means of control become less effective in managing 
increasing volumes of information, as size grows (Donaldson, 2001). Thus, centralized 
structures of CHS and CPIHS may be more dysfunctional under the contingency of size, 
and therefore, suffer from poor organizational performance, resulting in decreasing 
quality outcomes. However, Decentralized Health Systems may respond differently to 
the contingency of size because of their differentiation and divisionalization strategy, and 
organizational characteristics and processes. Decentralized Health Systems are large 
organizations and characterized by having high levels of differentiation of hospital 
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services, physician arrangements, and insurance products that are more predominant at 
the hospital level. The governance of DHS is characterized by low administrative 
intensity and low levels of centralization for both system and affiliate policies; and 
boards are dominated by nonaffiliated representatives (Alexander et al., 2003). Hospitals 
in DHS also tend to be spread over a broad geographic area (Bazzoli et al., 1999). The 
leadership of DHS decentralizes decision-making authority to implement strategies that 
are targeted to their local submarkets and to adjust structures to their immediate 
contingencies.(Pointer et al., 1995). 
Due to differentiation and divisionalization, DHS maintain substantial 
infrastructure, physician arrangements, and resource base in each submarket (Shortell et 
al., 2000). "Management and clinical information systems and quality and care 
management practices may be well organized within these submarkets (p. 15, Shortell et 
al., 2000)." Divisionalizaiton of hospitals in submarkets may increase hospital system's 
competitive advantages in the local markets (Luke et al., 1995). Therefore, hospitals in 
DHS may achieve desirable levels of performance and positive quality outcomes. 
Consequently, Decentralized Health Systems, because their decision making 
processes are decentralized at the hospital level, rely on specialization of hospital 
personnel, formalization and some degree of physician clinical autonomy as possible 
means of indirect control over hospital internal processes. This indirect control strategy 
may be more effective in managing large organizational size. Gupta et al. (1994) studied 
how professionals in institutionalized environment are coordinated and controlled and 
what forces shape organizational structures. Their results show that the more 
institutionalized the environment, the more organizations rely on professionals to 
improve performance. Decentralized decision-making and more clinical autonomy 
improve physician-IDS relationships (Alexander et al., 2001), which may be important 
for improving quality outcomes. Differentiation and divisionalization may promote 
increasing professionalizaiton and specialization of hospital personnel in DHS. 
Professionalization and specialization, in turn, may improve quality outcomes and reduce 
patient safety errors in hospitals that belong to DHS. 
As a result, hospitals in DHS may use differentiation strategy to manage their 
increasing size and set up indirect means of control over organizational processes through 
specialization of hospital personnel, their greater clinical autonomy, and formalization of 
procedures, which, in turn, may lead to improved quality of care. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
H3: Hospitals in Decentralized Health Systems would produce better quality 
outcomes than hospitals in more centralized health systems (CHS and CPIHS), all 
other things being equal. 
Interplay of Both Scenarios 
Moderately Centralized Health Systems (MCHS) and Independent Hospital 
Systems (IHS) have varying levels of centralization and differentiation. Thus, MCHS 
and IHS may be differently situated than the other types of systems. MCHS may use a 
combination of both centralization and differentiation to propel their performance. 
However, the structure of IHS, being low on centralization and differentiation, may not 
be well-fitted to respond effectively to the environmental challenges. 
Moderately Centralized Health Systems (MCHS) are described as having 
moderate levels of centralization for hospital services, physician arrangements, and 
insurance product dimensions and exhibiting relatively high differentiation in hospital 
services and moderate differentiation in physician arrangements and insurance products 
(Bazzoli et al., 1999). The MCHS's governance also has moderate administrative 
intensity and moderate levels of centralization for system-level policy decisions; 
however, MCHS have the highest level of centralization for affiliate-level policy-making 
and one of the highest percentage of affiliate representatives on system board (Alexander 
et al., 2003). 
The leadership of MCHS may decide that both task interdependence and large 
size contingencies are equally important. Moderate centralization for all categories may 
be used by the system's leadership to integrate the overarching system's activities with 
hospital's contingencies at the local submarkets. High differentiation of hospital services 
and moderate differentiation of physician arrangements and insurance products may also 
demonstrate that the MCHS' leadership tries to introduce some decentralization of 
structures. The leadership of MCHS may attempt to balance both contingencies, i.e. task 
interdependence by moderate centralization and increasing size by high-to-moderate 
differentiation and divisionalization. A combination of both strategies may improve the 
system's quality performance. The system center and local hospital sub-units may be 
smoothly integrated, achieving effective coordination and continuity of care, while the 
size is managed by some degree of differentiation and divisionalization. Bazzoli et al. 
(2001) found that more hospitals have joined into the moderately centralized systems and 
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the number of hospitals in this category has increased over time. These factors provide 
some evidence that moderately centralized system may become "a system of choice and 
preference" for hospitals because of its effectiveness. Empirical research also showed 
that hospitals in MCHS have highest profitability and low average age of plant, while 
having comparable costs with hospitals in more centralized systems (Bazzoli et al., 
2000). Effective hospitals may provide better quality of care (Donabedian, 1980 and 
1982). Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H4: Hospitals in Moderately Centralized Health Systems would produce 
better quality outcomes than hospitals in all other types of health systems (CHS, 
DHS, and CIPHS), all other things being equal. 
Hospitals in Independent Hospital Systems have low levels of centralization of 
hospital services, fewer physician arrangements, and little insurance development; they 
are also low on differentiation for the same categories (Bazzoli et al., 1999). Independent 
Hospital Systems (IHS) have "the smallest average board size, the highest average 
percentage of affiliate representatives on the board, and the lowest level of centralization 
for both system- and affiliate-level policy decisions" (Alexander et al., 2003, p. 238). 
Bazzoli et al. (2000) also found that hospitals affiliated with independent systems 
had the highest costs and lowest profits in comparison with hospitals affiliated with other 
types of systems. Hospitals in IHS are smaller organizations that are predominantly 
located in rural areas (Bazzoli et al., 1999). Having low levels of centralization does not 
allow hospitals in IHS to be effective in managing task interdependence. Also, hospitals 
in IHS lack the size to implement to differentiation and divisionalization strategy in order 
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to improve their performance. Having low levels of differentiation may preclude these 
hospitals from maintaining substantial infrastructure, physician arrangements, and 
resource base in their submarkets. This type of hospital system is only loosely integrated 
(Bazzoli et al., 2001). Thus, hospitals in Independent Hospital Systems may be 
disadvantaged in dealing with the turbulent health care environment. The following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
H5: Hospitals in Independent Hospital System would produce worse quality 
outcomes than hospitals in all other types of health systems (CHS, DHS, and 
CIPHS), all other things being equal. 
Summary 
Contingency theory provides at least two and possibly three general scenarios that 
may explain how hospitals affiliated with various types of health systems may differ in 
terms of their internal processes and quality performance. As a result, a set of competing 
and/or complementary testable hypotheses is proposed. The following Chapter 4 
discusses the methods that allow answering the research question and testing the 
proposed hypotheses. 
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODS 
Introduction 
Two research designs are proposed - a panel design, using fixed effects or 
random effects models, and a cross-sectional design for two separate years of 1997 and 
2000, using three stage estimation models - in order to account for possible feedback 
effects and to increase internal validity of results. Seven well-established data bases are 
used for the analyses. It is planned to assemble data from short-term, general, nonfederal 
hospitals from 11 states for 6 years from 1995 to 2000. Two years of data from Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organization (JCAHO) are available for 
hospitals in this study. Dependent variables are measures of patient quality outcomes, i.e. 
Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQIs) and Patient Safety Indicators (PSIS). Several sets of 
variables are suggested to measure: (I) hospital organizational characteristics, including 
the main explanatory variable - hospital affiliation with different types of health systems; 
(2) market characteristics; (3) patient characteristics; (4) clinical integration, using 
JCAHO data; (5) variables for cross-sectional studies, reflecting a choice of a health 
system and a choice of integration of internal clinical processes. In order to evaluate 
effects of structural designs of hospital systems and internal clinical processes and 
integration on quality outcomes, rigorous analytical methods are used. The research 
design and methods are discussed in the following sections. 
Study Design 
A research design should meet two criteria: (1) answer research questions and (2) 
adequately test hypotheses (Kerlinger, 1986). Experimental design with randomization 
of subjects to experimental and control groups and with a follow up over time - "the gold 
standard'- is the strongest design in identifying causation in studied relationships. Cook 
and Campbell (1979) noted three conditions for inferring cause: "(a) contiguity between 
the presumed cause and effect; (b) temporal precedence, in that the cause had to precede 
the effect in time; and (c) constant conjunction, in that the cause had to be present 
whenever the effect was obtained" (p. 10). Wooldridge (1999) stated that economic 
theory uses a notion of ceteris paribus in estimating a causal effect of one variable on 
another variable, holding other factors fixed in evaluating public policy. Econometric 
methods are often applied to simulate a ceteris paribus experiment. Experimental design 
is not feasible in studying hospitals in various types of health system and their effects on 
quality of care. Thus, econometric models are used instead. One of which is a panel 
model. Strengths and weaknesses of a panel design are discussed below. 
Strengths of Panel Design 
(1) A panel design controls for heterogeneity in a cross-sectional unit. Hospitals 
in various health systems are heterogeneous. Variation in quality of care may 
be attributed to time invariant variables related to some unobserved 
characteristics of hospitals, systems, and states. Panel data allow controlling 
for these time-invariant, unobserved variables, otherwise omitted from an 
econometric model, which results in biased parameter estimates. 
(2) Panel data provide "more informative data, more variability, less collinearity 
among the variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency" (p. 4, 
Baltagi, 1995). Panel data for multiple years add more variability and 
information on patient, hospital, market, and other characteristics. 
(3) "Panel data are better able to study the dynamics of adjustment" (p.4, Baltagi, 
1995). Panel data allow studying trends over time, duration of effects of 
interest, intertemporal relations, and life-cycles. Hospitals that join health 
systems may improve their quality performance, however, over a longer time 
period. Only panel data allow capturing this improvement over time; cross- 
sectional design can miss this temporal trend. 
(4) Panel data are better able to identify and measure effects that are not 
detectable in pure cross-sections or pure time-series data. Also, many 
variables can be more accurately measured at the micro level, and biases 
resulting from aggregation over firms and individuals are eliminated (Baltagi, 
1995). Panel data are usually gathered on micro units, like patients and 
hospitals. Panel data allow making stronger causal inferences than cross- 
sectional data 
Limitations of Panel Design 
(1) Design and data collection problem, including nonresponse, recall, and 
reference period (Baltagi, 1995). This study relies on well-established sources 
of data, e.g. AHA survey, these data are collected on annual basis and the 
format of questionnaires rarely changes. It is believed that hospitals' 
familiarity with the AHA survey may reduce some of the aforementioned 
biases. Missing records or outliers on key variables may be a problem; 
however, appropriate cleaning methods are used to reduce the effects of 
missing data and outliers. It is also believed that missing records are random 
and, thus, not a source of bias. 
(2) Even though there is an assumption that the proposed panel model is strictly 
exogenous, a feedback effect may become a serious concern. In this study, for 
example, a feedback effect may occur if quality of care in an earlier study 
period may motivate a hospital to join with a certain system type, which is 
perceived as the system to improve quality outcomes, in a later study period. 
Due to data limitation (i.e., JCAHO data are only available for two years), it is 
impossible to use lagged hospital quality performance variables to address for the 
feedback issue. It is a major limitation of the study. Thus, results form panel models are 
compared with results from cross-sectional models, i.e. three stage estimation models that 
may address the feedback problem. Three stage estimation model for studying quality 
outcomes by hospital system types is discussed below. 
Three Stage Estimation Model 
According to the conceptual model, a structure (e.g., a system type) would 
influence a process (e.g., a level of clinical integration) and a process would influence 
organizational performance (e.g., quality outcomes). However, a feedback or selection 
effect may be present. There is a notion that hospitals may select a specific health system 
type in order to improve their financial performance (Menke, 1997, Bazzoli et al., 2000). 
Quality performance may also influence hospitals to join with a certain system type and 
to alter their process of care delivery in order to achieve better quality outcomes. For 
example, it is expected that centralized health systems are more likely to achieve clinical 
integration, which may improve quality outcomes (Shortell et al., 2000). 
Three stage estimation model may address the feedback effect. Lagged financial 
and quality performance variables measure a previous hospital performance effect on a 
hospital's choice of a system type. Alexander and Morrisey (1988) and Bazzoli et al. 
(2000) also conceptualized that hospitals' affiliation with health systems, among others, 
depend upon favorable market conditions. These market factors may also be used to 
account for a hospital choice of a system type. Different health systems may put in place 
different processes of care delivery. Some types of health systems may be more effective 
in achieving greater clinical integration, due to higher levels of centralization (Shortell et 
al., 2000). Therefore, some hospitals may choose to select more centralized health 
systems in order to improve their process of care delivery through clinical integration. It 
is proposed to use two variables that reflect alignments and relationships between 
physicians and hospitals as variables for addressing a selection issue of a hospital choice 
of a level of integration of internal clinical processes in different types of health systems. 
Data Bases and Sources 
The data are assembled from multiple sources. Seven data bases are put together 
to provide sufficient measures of quality outcomes, hospital, patient, market and other 
characteristics for the current study. The data sources include and are described as 
follows: 
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(I) the 1995-2000 hospital discharge data for 1 1 states that participate in Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Healthcare Cost and Utilization 
Project State Inpatient Database (HCUP SID) provide patient clinical and 
nonclincal information, which are used to construct quality and patient safety 
indicators; 
(2) the 1995-2000 Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations (JCAHO) performance area scores assess organizational 
dimensions of the quality of hospital care and serve as measures of internal 
clinical processes and integration; 
(3) the 1995-2000 American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Surveys 
provide data on hospital characteristics and structure; 
(4) the Area Resource Files (ARF) provide market and socioeconomic variables at 
the county and Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) levels; 
(5) HMO Interstudy provides information on the number of HMOs and HMO 
penetration; 
(6) the 1995-2000 Medicare Case Mix Index Files; 
(7) the 1993-2000 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Medicare 
cost report data, which provide detailed hospital financial information. 
AHRQ's HCUP SID data base is used in the study. There were 13 states that 
participated in HCUP SID in 1995; 16 states joined in 2000, so there was a total of 29 
states in 2000. HCUP SID is the largest collection of all-payer, uniform, state-based, 
inpatient administrative data. HCUP SID contains information on patient demographics 
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(age, gender, and race for some states), patient clinical data (principal and secondary 
diagnoses and procedures, and length of stay), location of admission and discharge, 
expected payment source (Medicare, Medicaid, private insurance, self-pay, managed care 
for some states), and total charges. The HCUP SID data are on 11 states - Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. These states were chosen based on several characteristics: 
(1) participation in HCUP SID throughout the entire 1995-2000 period; (2) mandatory 
(rather than voluntary) hospital participation in data collection; (3) inclusion of hospitals 
specific identifiers for merging with other data bases, e.g. AHA, CMS, and others. Being 
a convenience sample, it still represents wide geographic areas in the U.S., covering 7 of 
the 9 census divisions. Thirty six percent (36%) of all community hospitals nationwide 
are located in these 1 1 states. 
The Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) 
performance area scores for hospitals that have undergone accreditation between 1995 
and 2000 are used. Around 80 percent of hospitals nationwide participate in the JCAHO 
accreditation program, where system hospitals are more likely to be accredited. JCAHO 
reviews the member hospitals every three years. Since the study period covers years 
from 1995 to 2000, JCAHO data are available for two triennial periods, in which the 
majority of hospitals have two sets of JCAHO performance scores within a 3-year 
interval period. The year of 1997 instead of 1995 is chosen for the cross-sectional 
analysis, because the JCAHO data base for 1995 includes only 550 hospitals, which is 
substantially less than 1,300 hospitals available for 1997. Some hospitals may have 
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missing data because they closed, merged, or had some other change, which makes this 
sample of hospitals unbalanced. 
The AHA Annual Survey is a recognized source of hospital data. AHA data have 
been extensively used in health services research. Hospital-specific, nationwide data are 
annually collected, which usually achieves an overall response rate of 85 percent or 
higher each year; however, single item's response rates may vary. AHA data include 
information on various hospital organizational characteristics and their geographic 
location. 
Other data sets are described below. Area Resource File (ARF) contains 
extensive, county-level data on market and economic conditions, socio-demographic 
characteristics, health resources, and other variables that may affect quality of care. ARF 
collects data from multiple sources, including census files, Physician Master File from 
the American Medical Association, and mortality and natality data from the National 
Center for Health Statistics. 
HMO Interstudy file contains data on approximately 650 HMOs in the country, 
including information on HMO enrollment and county service data and can be used for 
calculation of HMO market share and the number of HMOs in a particular market area. 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) data are also used to obtain the 
Medicare case-mix indexes. Medicare cost reports provide substantial financial data on 
hospitals that receiving Medicare payments. Medicare cost report data can help to 
identify underlying financial performance of hospitals. Approximately 87 percent of 
general acute care hospitals nationwide file Medicare cost reports. 
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Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis for this study is short-term, general, nonfederal hospitals that 
belong to different types of health systems: Centralized Health Systems (CHS), 
Centralized PhysiciadInsurance Health Systems (CPIHS), Moderately Centralized 
Health Systems (MCHS), Decentralized Health Systems (DHS), and Independent 
Hospital Systems (IHS). 
Sampling 
Complete data on approximately 3,050 hospitals for each year are merged from 
HCUP SID, AHA, ARF, and other data sources. The average number of hospitals in 
various types of health systems over the 1995 - 2000 period is as follows: (1) 170 
hospitals in CHS; (2) 297 hospitals in CPIHS; (3) 870 hospitals in MCHS; (4) 1,350 
hospitals in DHS; and (5) 360 hospitals in IHS. 
JCAHO data are available for about 1,298 hospitals in eleven states over the study 
period, 1995 - 2000. It is identified that around 714 hospitals belong to various types of 
health systems in 11 states: (1) 38 hospitals in CHS; (2) 52 hospitals in CPIHS; (3) 254 
hospitals in MCHS; (4) 337 hospitals in DHS; and (5) 33 hospitals in IHS. As a result, 
this sample includes about 740 hospitals in eleven states with complete records from all 
seven data sources. Since the sample is reduced from 2,647 hospitals to approximately 
1,298 hospitals in eleven states and 71 4 hospitals in different types of health systems, it 
may potentially introduce a threat to external validity. 
In order to increase reliability and generalizability of findings, descriptive 
statistics for hospitals in this sample for eleven states and those ones in the national 
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sample are compared. The statistics for hospitals that belong to health systems in the 
empirical sample with those in the national sample are also compared. 
Analytical Model 
In order to evaluate effects of hospital affiliation with systems on quality 
outcomes, rigorous research methods are necessary. A strict exogeneity assumption 
allows using fixed effects or random effects models with panel data. However, a 
feedback or selection effect may still be a problem. Since these data are limited to only 
two time periods (due to a JCAHO data limitation), it is impossible to use lagged quality 
outcomes and hospital financial performance to address the feedback issue in the panel 
model. 
Thus, the cross-sectional design, using three stage estimation models, which is 
evaluated separately for two years of 1997 (this year is chosen, because the 1997 
JCAHO's data set has substantially more hospitals than the 1995 data set) and 2000, is 
proposed to reassure validity of empirical findings and to address the feedback issue. 
Variables that reflect three-year shifts in the external environment are constructed 
and measured by the market-level variables, such as HMO penetration, competition 
among systems, and the number of HMOs. Changes over time (three years before the 
study years of 1997 and 2000) in levels of these variables may assess a fit-misfit 
relationship between external environmental shifts and hospital system structures. An 
analytical plan below provides a step-by-step procedure for empirical analyses. 
Empirical models are also described in greater detail and expressed mathematically in the 
following section. 
Plan for Empirical Analyses 
(1) Panel study: 
a) A strict exogeneity assumption allows us to set up fixed effects (FE) or random 
effects (RE) models (if assumptions for RE are met and supported by the 
Hausman specification test), where quality outcomes are directly associated 
with process (i.e., clinical integration) and structure (i.e., health system types) 
measures. A sensitivity analysis estimates the most appropriate way of 
combining internal clinical processes and integration variables (which is 
discussed later in this section). 
(2) Cross-sectional study: 
a) Conduct the Hausman test for endogeneity for a hospital's choice of a system 
type. If this test demonstrates endogenity problem, then cross-sectional three 
stage estimation models for separate years of 1997 and 2000 are used. Lagged 
quality outcomes and hospital financial performance and other variables 
reflective of preferable market conditions are used at this stage to account for 
the feedback or selection effect of a system type choice. 
b) A multinomial logit model for estimating predicted probabilities of a strategic 
choice of a system type is calculated for each hospital observation, using 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method. A dependent variable in this 
model is a system type or a grouping of health systems (e.g., hospitals grouped 
into more centralized health systems (CHS + CPIHS)); and it is a categorical 
variable. The multinomial logit model can be presented schematically: 
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System* = f (Hospital, Market, and Patient Characteristics of Quality of 
Care, Lagged Quality and Financial Performance and Other Market-Type 
Variables for a Choice of a System Type) 
c) At this stage, the Hausman test for endogeneity is conducted for a hospital's 
choice of a level of integration of internal clinical processes. If endogeneity is 
present, variables reflective of a selection of a level of integration of internal 
clinical processes are used. 
d) A negative binomial model for estimating predicted sums of scores of internal 
clinical processes and integration levels by different types of health systems is 
calculated for all hospital observations. A construction of internal clinical 
processes and integration scores is discussed later in the variable measurement 
section. The model can be presented schematically: 
CI* = f (Hospital, Market, and Patient Characteristics of Quality of Care, 
System*(predicted probability), Variables for a Choice of Internal Clinical 
Processes and Integration Level) 
e) Predicted scores of internal clinical processes and integration (CI*) are 
compared for different types of health systems or groupings of health systems 
by comparing estimated coefficients for different system types. The robust 
variance estimator for two-stage models is used to calculate correct error terms 
(Hardin, 2002). Conclusions are made on which types of health systems are 
more likely to have higher or lower levels of clinical integration based on the 
values of predicted probabilities. 
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(f) Predicted sums of scores of internal clinical processes and integration by 
different types of systems (from point D) are used in OLS linear models, 
estimating quality outcomes for hospitals in various types of health systems. It 
can be presented schematically: 
Quality Outcomes = f (CI* (predicted score), Hospital, Market, and 
Patient Characteristics of Quality of Care) 
g) Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is conducted on predicted values of quality 
outcomes, comparing outcomes across different types of health systems or 
groupings of health systems, depending on the hypotheses. Conclusions are 
made on which types of health systems are more likely to have better quality 
outcomes. 
(3) Simplified Model: 
a) It is possible that a measure of clinical integration, which is constructed using 
JCAHO variables, is a weak measure of clinical integration. In this case, a 
simplified model is proposed, where predicted probabilities for health systems 
are directly put into the final OLS model for estimating quality outcomes, and 
the internal clinical processes and integration stage is not analyzed. 
Description of Models 
Fixed effects (FE) model controls for unobserved hospital and market 
characteristics that, otherwise, may affect parameter estimates due to omitted variable 
bias. FE model introduces a separate intercept for each hospital and, as a result, takes 
time-invariant, unmeasured components out of the equation. FE model provides 
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consistent estimates of a, regardless of whether or not unobserved time-invariant factors 
are correlated with explanatory variables. 
Information from those hospitals that switched their affiliation from one type of 
system to another over a course of this study period is used; only these hospitals are 
selected out in the FE analysis. FE model identifies types of hospital systems and 
internal clinical processes and integration that have significant effects on patient 
outcomes. 
Random effects (RE) model provides additional strengths. RE model reduces a 
loss of degrees of freedom, controls for unobserved unmeasured characteristics, making 
parameters consistent, and also provides estimates for individual, time-invariant variables 
(such as gender), which get differenced out in FE model. However, it is quite difficult to 
meet all assumptions, specifically assuring that explanatory variables are not correlated 
with hospital specific component of the error term, for proposing RE model that provides 
consistent and efficient parameter estimates. 
Thus, the Hausman specification test is used to evaluate whether assumptions for 
random effects model are met. If this test demonstrates that RE assumptions are met, this 
model would become "the best choice" model in the analyses of hospital affiliation with 
various systems types and quality outcomes. The empirical models are mathematically 
represented and described in the following section. 
(1) General Fixed Effects or Random Effects Models - Panel Design: 
Kt = S ,  +S2CIIt  +S3Slt  + S 4 X l t  +S5MI t  + S 6 c t  +S,Time, + p ,  + E , ,  
Yjt is a vector defining quality outcomes; 
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CIjt is a vector representing clinical integration, measured by the sum of JCAHO 
variables; 
Sjt is a vector representing dummy variables for different types of health systems; 
Xjt is a vector representing hospital control variables; 
Mjt is a vector representing market control variables; 
Pjt is a vector representing patient control variables; 
pi is represents hospital specific, time-invariant, unobserved component; 
Timet is a vector of dummy variables, indicating the year when the dependent variable is 
observed; 
8,  S , S 3  S 4 S 5  6,6,  are vectors of parameters to be estimated; 
Ejt represents a random error term; 
i and t indexes hospitals and time. 
(2) Three Stage Estimation Model - Cross-Sectional Design: 
a) Multinomial Logit Model for Estimating Predicted Probabilities for Different 
Types of Health Systems: 
ysys = a. + a , X ,  + a 2 M 2  + a3P, + a4L,  + q O ,  + E 
b) Negative Binomial Model for Estimating Predicted Sums of Scores for Internal 
Clinical Processes and Integration Levels by System Types: 
Y ,  = Po +PIX ,  + P2M2 + AP3 + P49sys + P5MD5 + & 
c) OLS Regressions with Predicted Sums of Scores of Internal Clinical Processes 
and Integration by System Type: 
The vectors are described as follows: 
Y is a vector representing quality outcomes; 
jsys is an estimated predicted probability for each hospital being selected into a health 
system or a grouping of health systems; 
$,> is an estimated predicted score of an internal clinical processes and integration level 
for each hospital in a health system or a grouping of health systems; 
L is a vector representing lagged values of hospital quality and financial performance 
and accounting for the system type feedback effect; 
0 is a vector representing other variables reflective of favorable market conditions and 
accounting for the system type selection effect; 
MD is a vector representing alignments and relationships between physicians and 
hospitals and accounting for the internal clinical processes and integration selection 
effect; 
a , a 2 a 3 a 4 a , ~ , P 2 P 3 P 4 P s 6 , S 2 S 3 S 4  are vectors ofparameters to be estimated; 
E represents error term. 
(3) Simplified Model: 
Y = S ,  +S2jsys  + S 3 X 3  + S 4 M 4  +S5P5 + E  
Since measures of internal clinical processes and integration may be weak, a 
simplified model differs from the three stage estimation model by excluding predicted 
scores of internal clinical processes and integration and ANOVA steps from the analyses. 
All other components and descriptions of elements are similar with the three stage 
estimation model. 
Measurement of Variables 
In this section, measurements of this study's constructs and variables are 
discussed. Variables for this study are selected based upon the literature review, 
organizational theory, and a previous use of these variables in related empirical studies. 
Patients' quality outcomes are represented by the Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQIs) and 
Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs). A measure of internal clinical processes and integration 
is represented by a sum of JCAHO variables. Hospital characteristics include the main 
explanatory variable - hospitals' affiliation with different types of health systems - and 
other variables. Market characteristics are represented by hospital competition and 
managed care constructs as well as changes in these variables over time reflective of 
environmental shifts. Patient characteristics and other variables are represented by 
demographic variables and used as statistical controls. Lagged hospital quality and 
financial performance, variables reflective of favorable market conditions, and physician- 
hospital alignment and relationship variables are needed to account for the feedback or 
selection effect in cross-sectional analyses. Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQIs) and 
Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) are described in greater detail in the following sections 
and grouped together based on their clinical characteristics. 
Quality Outcomes 
Quality indicators are generated from the HCUP SID for the 1995-2000 period. 
Quality of care is multifaceted category that requires multiple measures. Inpatient 
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Quality Indicators (IQIs) and Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) are mortality rates and 
adverse events, respectively. IQIs and PSIs may serve as flags for potential quality 
problems rather than definitive measures of quality (AHRQ Pub.03-R204,2003). These 
measures are aggregated at the hospital level. In this study, a combination of quality 
indicators is used. Four IQIs from available 15 mortality indicators and 5 PSIs from 
available 20 adverse events indicators are selected. Risk-adjusted rates of IQIs and PSIs 
are applied to represent patient quality outcomes. 
One of the concerns here is that the better quality hospitals may have a more 
effective process of identification, coding, and reporting of inpatient deaths and adverse 
events than the worse quality hospitals. This is a limitation of using secondary data bases 
and a researcher has to keep this limitation in hisher mind. However, hospitals in those 
states that have a mandatory hospital participation in data collection for the HCUP SID 
project were chosen. It is believed that the HCUP SID project provided similar 
guidelines for data collection in these hospitals, which may have assured a higher level of 
data collection quality. In the following section, IQIs and PSIs are described in greater 
details, as well as, the rational for selecting these particular indicators. 
Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQIs) are risk-adjusted mortality rates. Four IQIs for 
the current study are selected because of their clinical significance, i.e. leading causes of 
deaths in the U.S. These IQIs are also selected for common reasons: 75 percent or more 
hospitals treat patients with relevant IQIs for the majority of years; and there are a large 
number of patients at risk for these IQIs in the empirical sample. Precision of 
measurement is high for these 4 IQIs (AHRQ Pub.02-R0204,2002). 
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IQI 15: Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI). According to the American Heart 
Association, approximately 1.5 million people suffer from AM1 each year; one-third of 
them die from heart attacks. AM1 indicator is precise, measuring substantial amount of 
provider level variation that is not attributable to random variation (AHRQ Pub.02- 
R0204,2002). McClellan and Staiger (working paper, 1999) stated that short-term AM1 
mortality is an excellent indictor of quality of care. McCarthy et al. (2000) studied the 
reliability of using administrative data in quality outcome research by comparing results 
from secondary sources with data gathered through primary data collection (e.g. medical 
records). 
IQI 16: Congestive Heart Failure (CHF) is a common disease, about 2 million 
people suffer from CHF each year; elderly patients have a greater risk of death from 
CHF; there is empirical evidence that hospitals at least in some states were able to 
decrease CHF mortality during 1990s (AHRQ Pub.02-R0204,2002). 
IQI 17: Stroke is the third leading cause of death in the U.S.; 10 - 15 percent of 
stroke patients die during the hospitalization (AHRQ Pub.02-R0204,2002). 
IQI 20: Pneumonia is the sixth leading cause of death in the country. McCarthy et 
al. (2000) found that 50 percent of pneumonia cases had at least one objective clinical 
evidence to confirm the complication (AHRQ Pub.02-R0204,2002). 
"Patient safety is defined as freedom from accidental injury due to medical care, 
or absence of medical errors, or absence of misuse of services" (p. 13 1, National 
Healthcare Quality Report, AHRQ, 2003). Institute of Medicine report (2000) estimated 
that 44,000 to 98,000 deaths occurs every year as a result of medical errors, making it the 
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eighth leading cause of death; estimated cost of medical errors is reported as $29 billion 
annually in lost income, disability, and health care costs. 
Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) are risk-adjusted rates of adverse events for a 
particular condition or procedure. Five PSIs are selected. These indicators perform well 
in terms of reliability, bias, relatedness of indicators, and persistence over time (AHRQ 
Pub.03-R203,2003). There is also one common reason for inclusion of these PSIs - a 
large number of patients were at risk for developing these complications during the 
. 1995-2000 period. In this study, PSIs may be subdivided into three categories: (1) 
adverse iatrogenic events; (2) adverse nursing events; (3) adverse events due to errors in 
post-operative process of care. 
Adverse iatrogenic events. 
PSI 15: Accidental puncture and laceration was proposed to capture complications 
due to technical difficulties in medical care. For example, Taylor et al. (1 998) found that 
95 percent of patients, who had laparoscopic cholecystectomy, with an ICD-9 code of 
accidental puncture and laceration had a confirmed injury of the bile duct or gallbladder. 
Iezzoni et al. (1994) and Johantgen et al. (1998) proposed to use this indicator and 
categorized it as an iatrogenic complication. McCarthy et al. (2000) found that 83.3 
percent patients with this complication had at least one objective clinical evidence to 
confirm the complication. Romano et al. (2003) reported 7 percent increase in accidental 
puncture or laceration during the 1995-2000 period. PSI 15 attributes for 1.34 days in 
excess LOS, $8,271 in excess charge, and 2.16 percent of excess mortality (Zhan and 
Miller, 2003). 
Adverse nursing events. 
PSI 3: Decubitus ulcer is limited to secondary diagnosis for screening out cases of 
ulcers present due to objective clinical reasons. This indicator was identified as very 
favorable in indicating errors in nursing and process of care (AHRQ Pub.03-R203,2003). 
Empirical studies found that nursing staffing, skill mix, and nursing hours were 
associated with occurrence of decubitus ulcer in hospitals (Needleman et al., 2002). 
Romano et al. (2003) reported 19 percent increase in the 1995-2000 period. PSI 3 
attributes for 3.98 days in excess LOS, $10,845 in excess charge, and 7.23 percent of 
excess mortality (Zhan and Miller, 2003). 
PSI 7: Infection due to medical care is primary related to intravenous lines and 
catheters. According to American Nurses Association, this indicator is nursing-sensitive 
for acute care settings. Iezzoni et al. (1994) also included this indicator in their set of 
inpatient quality indicators suggested for use with administrative data. Nursing staff is 
mainly responsible for monitoring patients with central lines and catheters and making 
sure that they are removed on time. Romano et al. (2003) found a 14 percent increase in 
the infection rate over the 1995-2000 period. PSI 7 attributes for 9.58 days in excess 
LOS, $38,656 in excess charge, and 4.3 1 percent of excess mortality (Zhan and Miller, 
2003). 
Adverse events due to errors in post-operative process of care. 
PSI 12: Post-operative pulmonary embolism (PE) or deep vein thrombosis (DVT) 
cases are limited to secondary diagnosis to eliminate complications that were present on 
admission. This PSI is characterized as useful estimator of adverse events, because 
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preventive techniques (e.g., anticoagulant therapy) should decrease the rate of this 
complication (AHRQ Pub.03-R203,2003). There are mixed findings on whether nursing 
is associated with post-operative PE or DVT. 
McCarthy et al. (2000) noted that detection of 66.7 percent of surgical cases had 
at least one objective clinical evidence to confirm the complication. Romano et al. 
(2003) found a 42 percent increase in post-operative PE or DVT during the 1995-2000 
period. PSI 12 attributes for 5.36 days in excess LOS, $21,709 in excess charge, and 6.56 
percent of excess mortality (Zhan and Miller, 2003). 
PSI 13: Post-operative sepsis is limited to secondary diagnosis to select out cases 
of sepsis present on admission (AHRQ Pub.03-R203,2003). Iezzoni et al. (1994) 
included this indicator in their list of quality measures detectible in the administrative 
data bases. McCarthy et al. (2000) identified that 8 1.5 percent of post-operative infection 
cases had at least one objective clinical evidence to confirm the complication. A forty- 
one percent (4 1 %) increase in septicemia was reported in the 1995-2000 period (Romano 
et al., 2003). PSI 13 attributes for 10.89 days in excess LOS, $57,727 in excess charge, 
and 21.92 percent of excess mortality (Zhan and Miller, 2003). 
IQI and PSI Processing Steps 
The software, which was developed by the AHRQ and researchers from Stanford 
University, generates observed and risk adjusted IQIs and PSIS. Observed rates are 
generated in three steps. 
First, identification of outcomes of interest (numerators, i.e. deaths or adverse 
events) in inpatient records is achieved by setting a series of flag variables that select out 
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necessary outcon~es from the raw inpatient data. Second, identification of population at 
risk (denominator) is also done by the similar process of running the hospital discharge 
records. Third, observed or raw IQIs and PSIs are calculated by simple division of 
outcomes of interests by the populations at risk. At this point, the software allows 
stratification of data by different categories, such as hospitals, age groups, racelethnicity, 
gender, and payer categories. 
Risk adjustment for IQIs and PSIs slightly varies. IQIs and PSIs adjustment for 
age and gender are applied to the observed rates. The software provides the baseline file 
means and regression coefficients for age and sex derived from AHRQ's SID for 29 
states, i.e. the average case-mix. These means and coefficient are then applied to the 
sample of interest, which allows comparability of rates across different hospitals. IQIs 
are adjusted in a linear model by APR-DRGs. It is recommended to run version 15 of 
3M's All Patient Refined - Diagnoses Related Groups (APR-DRG) software on raw 
patient data before running the IQI's software in order to create APR-DRG categories, 
and severity and mortality indicators. PSIs are adjusted by modified DRGs and co- 
morbidities using logistic regression to account for differences among hospitals. 
Internal Clinical Processes and Integration 
Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) 
performance area scores are used to assess internal clinical processes and integration. 
Devers et al. (2004) evaluated the role of JCAHO in promoting patient safety. They 
found that hospitals try to meet JCAHO recommendations mainly in three areas: "(1) 
developing better process for reporting, analyzing, and preventing sentinel events (e.g., 
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patients falls and use of patient restraints); (2) meeting patient safety standards . . .(3) 
meeting all or specific JCAHO patient goals, particularly improving communication and 
the accuracy of patient identification" (p. 104, Devers et al., 2004). 
JCAHO data are generated from on-site hospital surveys done by JCAHO 
accreditation teams on a triennial basis. More than 500 human, organizational, and 
facility standards of quality of hospital care are assessed for accreditation purposes. A 
five-point scale is used to score hospital's compliance with each standard: (1) score 1 - 
substantial compliance - the organization meets all major provisions of the standard and 
intent; (2) score 2 - significant compliance - the organization meets most of the 
provisions of the standard and intent; (3) score 3 - partial compliance - the organization 
meets some provisions of the standard and intent ; (4) score 4 - minimal compliance - the 
organization meets few provisions of the standard and intent; (5) score 5 - 
noncompliance - the organization fails to meet the provisions of the standard and intent 
(JCAHO, 200 1). 
Individual scores are then aggregated into 44 performance area scores. 
Performance area scores are also measured by the five-point scale noted above. For 
example, if .the worst score (5) is present for any standard associated within a particular 
performance area is identified, then this value (5) is assigned to the performance area. 
Five performance area scores measure internal clinical processes and integration: 
(1) Initial Assessment Procedures standards include procedures used to determine 
patients needs, e.g. a physical examination and health history, appropriate 
diagnostic tests and screening. 
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(2) Anesthesia Care refers to the set of standards that address the planning and 
delivery of anesthesia including assessment of patients' conditions prior to 
anesthesia, informing patients of risks, options, and monitoring. 
(3) Medication Use refers to the processes used to prescribe, prepare, dispense, 
and administer medication, including specific issues such as preparation of 
medication in accordance with all laws and regulations, safety, and 
availability of emergency medication. 
(4) Operative Procedures refers to the grouping of standards, which address the 
processes used in the determination of appropriate operative procedures, 
appropriateness of preoperative preparation and monitoring, and safety of 
procedures. 
(5) Availability of Patient Specific Information are aimed at ensuring that the 
necessary information that supports and documents the care provided to 
patients is obtained and maintained in the medical record in a timely manner. 
These JCAHO standards may be reflective of areas related to clinical integration, 
such as use of clinical information systems and clinical evidence-based practices, 
guidelines, protocols, and medical registries (Burns, 1999). For example, medication use 
standard demonstrate whether a hospital is in compliance with pharmaceutical guidelines 
and protocols. Availability of patient specific information and initial patient assessment 
procedures may be building blocks of a system-wide clinical information system. 
Anesthesia care and operative procedures represent the sets of standards that may be used 
across all system members, thus, easing quality monitoring and promoting clinical 
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integration. Therefore, Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 
(JCAHO) standards may capture aspects of clinical integration. However, only the 
empirical analyses would demonstrate whether JCAHO variables can or cannot hold as 
"good" measures of clinical integration. JCAHO's scores (1-5) are consolidated into a 
single measure of compliance. Scores 1 and 2 are given a value of 1, i.e. compliance with 
JCAHO standards, and scores 3,4, and 5 are given a value of 0, i.e. not in compliance 
with JCAHO standards. 
A sensitivity analysis to find out a way of summing these compliance measures 
across five variables (Initial Assessment Procedures, Anesthesia Care, Medication Use, 
Operative Procedures, and Availability of Patient Specific Information) is used. For 
example, if there are no differences in marginal effects across all' five JCAHO variables 
on quality outcomes, a summation of all five JCAHO variables into a single measure of 
clinical integration is possible. Thus, zero is the minimum score, representing no clinical 
integration, and five becomes the maximum score, representing a greater level of clinical 
integration. 
If some JCAHO variables have significant marginal effects but other variables do 
not, a summation only significant ones into a single measure of internal clinical processes 
and integration is attainable, and insignificant JCAHO variables are discarded. Other 
combinations may also occur and can be considered. The summation of JCAHO 
variables into a single construct would help to create a more comprehensive measure of 
clinical integration, to increase variability, and to make the analyses more focused on the 
research questions. 
Hospital Organizational Characteristics 
Hospitals affiliated with different types of health systems - centralized health 
system (CHS), centralized physician/insurance health system (CPIHS), moderately 
centralized health system (MCHS), decentralized health system (DHS), and independent 
hospital system (IHS) - is a set of dummy variables and the main explanatory variables. 
These variables are constructed from and available in the AHA data files. 
Hospital size is measured by the total beds staffed and set up; it is a continuous 
variable. Hospital ownership is measured by three dummy variables, distinguishing 
between for-profit, non-profit (including other non-profit and church-affiliated), and 
public hospitals (i.e., omitted category). Hospital teaching status is also represented by 
dummy variables, having major-, minor-, and non-teaching status (i.e., omitted category). 
Service mix and scope measures the number of tertiary hospital services, 
categorized into 3 groups: (1) 0-10 (i.e., omitted category), (2) 10-20, and (3) 20-30 
services. 
Geographic locations - urban and rural (i.e., omitted category) locations - are 
dummy variables. These variables control for organizational and environmental features 
that may affect health system formation and quality of care. 
Total nursing staff per staffed bed is a ratio of RNs and LPNs to staffed patient 
bed. Ratio of registered nurses (RNs) to License Practical Nurses (LPNs) is a measure of 
nursing skill-mix. These variables control for nursing related features that may affect 
quality of care. Other control variables are described in the following sections of this 
chapter. 
Market Characteristics 
Hirschrnan Herfindahl Index ranges between zero and one and is measured at a 
hospital system level; a low HHI represents a greater competition in a particular MSA or 
county. HMO penetration also ranges between zero and one. The number of HMOs is a 
count of HMOs operating in a county or MSA. Previous research demonstrated mixed 
results on the effects of hospital competition and managed care penetration on quality 
outcomes (Sari, 2002; Shen, 2003); thus, it is necessary to control for market 
characteristics in the model. 
Three-year change variables are constructed for these market characteristics and 
used in the cross-sectional study, accounting for possible relationships between the 
environmental shifts and systems' structures and indirect effects on hospital performance. 
Changes in levels of market variables from 1997 to 1994 prior the 1997 cross-sectional 
analysis and changes in levels of market variables from 2000 to 1998 prior the 2000 
cross-sectional analysis are used. 
Patient Characteristics 
Patient characteristics are measured at the hospital level. Patient age is a 
categorical variable, having three groups: (1) the percentage of patients whose age is < 19 
years (i.e., omitted category); (2) the percentage of patients whose age lies between 19 
and 64 years; and (3) the percentage of patients whose age is over 64. Gender is 
measured as the percentage of patients who are female (percent of males is an omitted 
category). Race is measured as the percentage of white and non-white (percent of non- 
white is an omitted category). Volume captures the total number of patients at risk for 
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this study's diseases or patient safety issues (i.e., denominators in calculating mortality 
rates and patient adverse events). 
Patient acuity (mortality34 and severity34) is measured by the percentage of 
patients with 3 or 4 stages of risk of mortality and by the percentage of patients with 3 or 
4 stages of severity of illness (3M mortality and severity scores). These variables control 
for patient features that may affect quality of care. Since mortality34 and severity34 are 
highly correlated, mortality34 is used for models estimating IQIs, and severity34 is used 
for models estimating PSIS. Case-mix severity index is a numeric variable, representing 
severity of Medicare cases. This variable comes from the CMS data files and is not 
correlated with patient acuity variables. Case-mix index averages around 1 ; values less 
than 1 represent hospitals with Medicare case-mixes that have lower severity than the 
average, and vice versa. It is important to control for hospital case-mix because hospitals 
that provide care to more severely ill patients may need more staffing and organizational 
inputs to produce the desired quality outcomes. 
Cross-Sectional Analyses 
Variables addressing a choice of a health system type. 
Lagged quality outcomes and lagged operating margin and days cash on hand 
measure how a previous financial and quality performance may affect a current hospital's 
choice of a system type, addressing the feedback issue. Lagged operating margin is a 
numeric variable, measuring net income for hospital services in the year of 1995 and the 
year of 1998, i.e., two years before the 1997 and the 2000 three stage estimation models. 
Lagged days cash on hand indicate that the number of days that a hospital could cover its 
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operating expenses (excluding depreciation and interest) with its unrestricted cash and 
investments in the years of 1995 and 1998. Lagged IQIs and lagged PSIs are measured 
as IQI and PSI quality signal factors that are summed over 4 IQIs and 5 PSIs in 1995 and 
1998 for the 1997 and 2000 three stage estimation models. 
Proportion of other hospitals that belong to more centralized health systems in a 
market in the prior time period (two years prior) is calculated by dividing the number of 
short-term general hospitals in a county for rural hospitals and a MSA for urban 
hospitals, other then hospital in question (target hospital), that belong to more centralized 
health systems (CHS and CPIHS) by the total number of short-term general hospitals in 
that county and MSA, excluding the target hospital. Some markets may only have one or 
two hospitals, thus, excluding target hospitals from the numerator and denominator is 
important to avoid spurious correlation. 
Proportion of other hospitals that belong to more decentralized health systems in a 
market in the prior time period (two years prior) is derived by dividing the number of 
general hospitals in a county for rural hospitals and a MSA for urban hospitals, other then 
target hospital, that are affiliate with more decentralized health systems (DHS and 
MCHS) by the total number of short-term general hospitals in that county and MSA, 
excluding target hospitals. 
A hospital's decision to conform to its environment may lead this hospital to join 
into a more predominant form of a health system in a market. Since a predominant 
system type is an environmental construct, which is external to an organization, it should 
not have a direct influence on quality of care provided in a particular hospital. Quality of 
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care is more likely to be influenced by internal organizational factors, such as its structure 
andlor process. 
Following Alexander and Morrisey (1988) and Bazzoli et al. (2000), measures of 
favorable market conditions (i.e., hospitals affiliated with systems were more likely to be 
located in favorable markets) to address the system type selection issue are presented. 
Total population is the number of people living in a county or a MSA and 
possibly measures a resource base for hospitals. Per capita income is average income for 
a county or a MSA and may capture purchasing power of population and demand for 
health services. Proportion of population over 65 years old and eligible for Medicare is a 
numeric variable; and the CMS represents one of the major health care purchasers in the 
health market. Higher population, higher per capita income and greater proportion of the 
population that is 65+ represent a broad resource base and may motivate hospitals to join 
into systems to be able to take better advantage of favorable markets when compared to 
freestanding hospitals (Alexander and Morrisey, 1998, Bazzoli et al., 2000). Favorable 
market conditions may be related to a greater centralization of health systems. 
Centralized health systems may be more effective in providing services to large groups of 
people and navigating them through a continuum of care, because centralization may 
improve the system coordinating and communicating abilities (Shortell et al., 2000). 
MDs per 1000 population is a ratio of practicing MDs by 1,000 population in a 
county or a MSA. Physicians may try to secure their inpatient practices in more 
competitive markets, i.e. areas with the greater number of MDs, by affiliating with health 
systems. Centralized health systems may be better suited to hire and retain physicians on 
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staff because of their strategic and organizational predispositions. For example, the 
Kaiser Permanente health system is a good example of a highly centralized health system 
that employs physicians in a highly competitive physician market such as California. 
Therefore, physicians in highly competitive markets may prefer to work or to be affiliated 
with more centralized health systems, since centralized health systems may provide 
physicians with better job opportunities and job security. 
Market conditions may directly affect structures, i.e. formation of various types of 
health systems, and, indirectly, processes of care provision, i.e. clinical integration. 
However, it is believed that preferable market conditions do not directly affect quality of 
care. Hospitals provide care to individual patients on a case-by-case basis and not 
discriminating by whether or not a patient comes from a market with greater number of 
people, per capita income, and proportion of the population that is 65+. 
The number of physicians in a market may also not be directly related to quality 
of care, because other individual physicians' characteristics (i.e., physician qualification, 
expertise, and higher level of training) are more likely to be related to a physician 
component of quality (Hartz et al., 1989, Kelly and Hellinger, 1986) and are independent 
of the number of physicians in a market. However, data on physician professional 
characteristics are not available, which is a limitation of the current study. 
Variables addressing a choice of a internal clinical processes and integration level. 
Proportion of area physicians aged 45-54 is the number of physicians in this age group in 
a country or a MSA divided by the total number of physicians in that market. Previous 
research demonstrates that physician-hospital integration is one of characteristics of 
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clinical integration (Devers et al. 1994, Shortell et al. 1994). Older physicians may have 
a stronger alignment with hospitals in health systems, because physicians in tliis age 
category are more likely to assume leadership and decision-making positions in their 
health systems. It assumed that centralized health systems are more likely to grant 
physicians with greater decision making authority than other types of systems. 
Therefore, physicians of older age may be more likely to pursue and to implement 
clinically integration policies and strategies promoted in more centralized systems. A 
level of internal clinical processes and integration should not directly correlate with 
physician age, since it is more likely to be correlated with other system characteristics - 
centralization, coordination, communication (Shortell, 2000) - independent of physician 
age. 
Physicians and hospitals have formed various physician-organization 
arrangements (POAs) (Cave, 1995, Morrisey et al., 1996, Burns and Thorpe, 1993). 
POAs are associated with functional integration (Dynan et al., 1998). Dynan et al. (1998) 
classified hospitals as having: (1) tight-only hospital-physician arrangements if they had 
any combination of Management Service Organization (MSO), Integrated Salary Model 
(ISM), Model Medical Foundation (MF), Integrated Health Organization (IHO); (2) 
loose-only arrangements if they had Group Practice Without Walls (GPWW), 
Independent Practice Association (IPA), Physician-Hospital Organization (PHO) 
combinations; (3) hybrid arrangements with a combination of both tight and loose 
organizational forms. Dynan et al. (1998) suggested that hospitals with tight-only and 
hybrid POAs are more likely to facilitate process integration than loose-only 
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arrangements due to differences in their strategic, structural, and financial characteristics. 
Madison (2004) and Cuellar and Gertler (working paper, 2002) identified several 
pathways through which POAs may influence quality outcomes. 
For example, POAs provide a greater incentive for quality monitoring, improve 
cooperation and coordination in care delivery, overcome informational problems 
(providing incentives to remove agency problems), and may reduce transaction costs, and 
thus, improving patient treatment patterns and outcomes. Tight-only POAs strategy may 
achieve a greater level of clinical integration than other types of POAs, thus, having a 
direct effect on internal clinical processes and integration. However, POAs do not have a 
direct affect on quality, but through certain pathways (Madison, 2004; Cuellar and 
Gertler, working paper, 2002). Madison (2004) found that POAs did not have any 
measurable impact on patient treatment and outcome. Cuellar and Gertler (working 
paper, 2002) found that MF and ISM (i.e., tightly integrated models) provided better 
quality care than the other types of POAs. 
Following Madison's (2004) and Cuellar and Gertler's (working paper, 2002) 
logic, it is suggested that tight-only POAs may improve process of care delivery, through 
greater levels of integration of internal clinical processes and indirectly affecting quality 
of care. It is proposed using types of POAs to account for a choice of an internal clinical 
processes and integration level, omitting a loose-only category. The description of the 
study variables, their construction and data sources are also presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Variables, Definitions, and Sources 
I 
Dependent Variables: 
Variable 
Clinical Outcomes: 
IQI 15: AM1 
IQI 16: CHF 
IQI 17: Stroke 
IQI 20: Pneumonia 
PSI 15: Accidental 
puncture and laceration 
PSI 3: Decubitus ulcer 
PSI 7: Infection due to 
medical care 
PSI 12: Post-operative PE 
or DVT 
PSI 13: Post-operative 
sepsis 
Definition 
Key Independent 
Variable: 
Hospital Afiliation with 
Various Health Systems or 
Groupings of Health 
Systems (CHS+CPIHS) 
Internal Clinical 
Processes and 
Integration Variable: 
Initial assessment 
procedures: 
I )  Initial Assessment 
Procedures 
2) Anesthesia care 
3) Medication use 
4) Operative procedures 
5) Availability of patient 
specific information 
IQI risk adjusted rates 
IQI risk adjusted rates 
IQI risk adjusted rates 
IQI risk adjusted rates 
PSI risk adjusted rates 
PSI risk adjusted rates 
PSI risk adjusted rates 
PSI risk adjusted rates 
PSI risk adjusted rates 
I -hospitals in CHS; 
2 -hospitals in CPIHS; 
3 -hospitals in MCHS; 
4 - hospitals in DHS; 
5 -hospitals in IHS (omitted category) 
Summed 5 JCAHO hospital compliance 
scores for hospital clinical process 
standards, ranging from 0 - no clinical 
integration - to 5 - fuller clinical 
integration 
Hospital Characteristics: 
Hospital size Total number of beds staffed and set up 
Hospital ownership 
Service mix and scope 
(I)  Non-profit 
(2) For-profit 
(3) Public (omitted category) 
(I)  0 - 10 services (omitted category) 
(2) 10 - 20 services and 
(3) 20 - 30 services 
I Continuous variable 
Hospital teaching status 
Continuous variable 
Continuous variable 
Continuous variable 
Continuous variable 
( I )  Major-teaching 
(2) Minor-teaching 
Continuous variable 
Continuous variable 
Continuous variable 
I Continuous variable 
Dummy variables 
Categorical variable 
Dummy variables 
I Dummy variables 
Source of Data 
HCUP SID: 
1995-2000 
HCUP SID: 
1995-2000 
HCUP SID: 
1995-2000 
HCUP SID: 
1995-2000 
HCUP SID: 
1995-2000 
HCUP SID: 
1995-2000 
AHA: 1995-2000 
JCAHO: 1995- 
2000 
AHA: 1995-2000 
AHA: 1995-2000 
AHA: 1995-2000 
AHA: 1995-2000 
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AHA: 1995-2000 
AHA: 1995-2000 
AHA: 1995-2000 
CMS: 1993-2000 
CMS: 1993-2000 
AHA: 1995-2000 
Interstudy: 1995- 
2000 
Interstudy: 1995- 
2000 
AHA: 1995-2000 
Interstudy: 1995- 
2000 
Interstudy: 1995- 
2000 
HCUP SID: 1995- 
2000 
HCUP SID: 1995- 
2000 
HCUP SID: 1995- 
2000 
HCUP SID: 1995- 
Dummy variables 
Continuous variable 
Continuous variable 
Continuous variable 
Continuous variable 
Categorical variable: 
ranges between 0 and 
1 
Categorical variable: 
ranges between 0 and 
1 
Continuous variable 
Categorical variable 
Categorical variable 
Continuous variable 
Categorical variable 
Categorical variable 
Categorical variable 
Continuous variable 
Geographic location 
Total nursing staff per 
staffed bed 
RNs to LPNs ratio 
Operating margin for 1995 
and 1998 
Days cash on hand for 
1995 and 1998 
Market characteristics: 
Hirschman Herfindahl 
Index 
HMO market share 
Number of HMOs 
HHI change 1 period 
HHI change 2"* period 
HMO share IS' period 
HMO share 2nd period 
# of HMO 1' period 
# of HMO 2nd period 
Patient characteristics: 
Patient age 
Gender 
Race 
Volume 
(3) Non-teaching status (omitted category) 
(1) Urban 
(2) Rural (omitted category) 
Ratio of RNs and LPNs to staffed patient 
bed. 
Ratio of RNs to LPNs 
Operating incometnet patient revenue 
(Cash + ST investments + unrestricted LT 
investments) / ((total expenses - 
depreciation) I) 
Sum of squared market shares of inpatient 
days - a low HHI score represents a 
greater hospital competition. 
Percentage of population covered by 
HMOs in a county or MSA - a low score 
means low HMO penetration. 
Count of HMOs operating in a county or 
MSA. 
HHI (1997) - HHI (1994) 
HHI (2000) - HHI (1998) 
HMO share (1997) - HMO share (1994) 
HMO share (2000) - HMO share (1998) 
# of HMO (1997) - # of HMO (1994) 
# of HMO (2000) - # of HMO (1998) 
(1) the %of patients whose age is < 19 
years (omitted category) 
(2) the %of patients whose age lies 
between 19 and 64 years 
(3) the %of patients whose age is over 64 
The % of a hospital's patients who are 
female 
The % of a hospital's patients who are 
male (omitted category) 
(1) the %of hospital's patients who are 
white 
(2) the % of non-white (omitted 
category) 
Number patients at risk for a certain IQI 
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Patient acuity (mortality34 
and severity34) 
Case-mix severity index 
Cross-Sectional Analyses 
(a) Health System Choice 
Proportion of other 
hospitals that belong to 
more centralized health 
systems in a market 
Proportion of other 
hospitals that belong to 
more decentralized health 
systems in a market 
Total population 
Per capita income 
Population over 65 years 
old 
MDs per 1000 population 
Lagged operating margin 
for 1995 and 1998 
Lagged days cash on hand 
for 1995 and 1998 
Lagged IQls for 1995 and 
1998 
Lagged PSIs for 1995 and 
1998 
(b) Choice of a Clinical 
Processes and Integration 
Level 
Proportion of area 
physicians aged 45-54 
and PSI 
- the % of a hospital's patients with 
mortality risk of stage 3 or 4 (IQI related) 
- the %of a hospital's patient mix with 
severity of illnesses risk of stage 3 or 4 
(PSI related) 
Averages around 1; values lesser than 1 
represent cases with lower severity 
The total number of other general 
hospitals in more centralized health 
systems (CHS and CPIHS) by the total 
number of short-term general hospitals in 
that county or MSA, excluding a target 
hospital 
The total number of other general 
hospitals in more decentralized health 
systems (DHS and MCHS) by the total 
number of short-term general hospitals in 
that county or MSA, excluding a target 
hospital 
Number of population in 1000s living in a 
county or MSA 
Per capita income in 1000s in a county or 
MS A 
Percent of population 65 and over years 
old in county and MSA 
Ratio of practicing MDs by 1,000 
population in a county or MSA 
Operating income/net patient revenue 
(Cash + ST investments + unrestricted LT 
investments) / ((total expenses - 
depreciation) /) 
Summed over 4 IQIs 
Summed over 5 PSIs 
The number of physicians in this age 
group in a country or MSA divided by the 
total number of physicians in that market 
Continuous variables 
Continuous variable 
Continuous variable 
Continuous variable 
Continuous variable 
Continuous variable 
Continuous variable 
Continuous variable 
Continuous variable 
Continuous variable 
Continuous variables 
Continuous variables 
Continuous variable 
HCUP SID: 1995- 
2000 
CMS case-mix 
files: 1995-2000 
AHA: 1995-2000 
AHA: 1995-2000 
ARF: 1995-2000 
ARF: 1995-2000 
ARF: 1995-2000 
ARF: 1995-2000 
CMS: 1993-2000 
CMS: 1993-2000 
HCUP SID: 
1995-2000 
ARF: 1995-2000 
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Summary 
This chapter described the research design, data sources, analytical plan, 
AHA: 1995-2000 
empirical models, and variable measurements to be used in the current study. Panel and 
Note: AHA-American Hospital Association; HCUP SID--Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project State 
Inpatient data bases; ARF-Area Resource Files; JCAH-Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations 
Categorical variable Types of POAs 
cross-sectional models are proposed to identify relationships among hospital system 
( I )  tight-only POAs, combining MSO, 
ISM, MF, IHO 
(2) loose-only POAs, combining GPWW, 
IPA, PHO (omitted category) 
(3) hybrid POAs, combing different types 
types, clinical integration, and quality outcomes; and to determine which health system 
type or a grouping of health systems are more likely to achieve greater levels of 
integration of internal clinical processes and better quality performance. The data are 
assembled from multiple sources for the 1995-2000 period. Seven data bases are put 
together to provide sufficient measures of quality, hospital, patient, market characteristics 
for the current study. Patient risk-adjusted indicators (IQIs and PSIs) are generated from 
the HCUP SID, using the software provided by AHRQ. Four IQIs and five PSIs flag 
potential quality problems present in hospitals affiliated with various types of health 
systems. Performances of three models are compared: (1) the panel model, estimated by 
fixed effects or random effects; (2) the cross-sectional models for the separate years of 
1997 and 2000, estimated by three stage estimation models; and (3) the cross-sectional, 
simplified model, if the measure of internal clinical processes and integration is weak. 
CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
Introduction 
First, descriptive statistics, such as system hospitals' organizational characteristics 
and compliance with JCAHO requirements, quality outcomes and trends in outcomes for 
the national sample and the empirical 11 states sample of system hospitals, are presented 
and discussed. Second, findings from the panel, longitudinal models evaluating the 
effects of system structures and internal processes on quality outcomes are reported and 
discussed. Finally, results from the cross-sectional analyses are reported and discussed. 
Descriptive Analyses 
The empirical sample is reduced from about 2,647 system hospitals in the national 
sample to approximately 857 system hospitals in the eleven states (i.e., HCUP SID data 
were only available for these states). There were 714 hospitals on average in different 
types of health systems per year in the empirical sample. The sample declined even 
further when the JCAHO data were merged in. There were 119 observations with 
complete data in 1995,229 observations in 1996,246 observations in 1997,267 
observations in 1998,203 observations in 1999, and 234 observations in 2000. 
Since JCAHO accredits the same panel of hospitals on the triennial basis, a 
decision was made to reorganize and reconstruct data into two panels: 1995-1997, 
representing the first JCAHO review year, and 1998-2000, representing the second 
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JCAHO review year. The number of observations was 600 on average in different panel, 
longitudinal models. Due to significant variations in the sample size, a careful 
descriptive analysis is necessary to identify differences in system hospitals' 
organizational characteristics between the national and empirical samples. 
Organizational characteristics for hospitals and different types of health systems 
in the national and the 11 state empirical samples are presented and discussed at first. 
Next, adjusted least squared means (ALSM) approach are examined to identify trends in 
quality indicators for hospitals in different system types and over the study period for the 
empirical sample, adjusting for residual variation in patients' age, gender, acuity of 
illnesses, and case-mix index (CMI) at the hospital level. 
System Hospitals' Organizational Characteristics 
The descriptive results of hospital and system characteristics and trends in system 
hospitals are discussed for the national and empirical samples. Results of t-tests and Chi- 
squared tests of organizational characteristics between the national and the empirical 
samples are compared. Then hospital characteristics by five system types averaged over 
six years of data and Chi-squared tests of differences in organizational characteristics for 
these hospitals in five system types are evaluated. Hospital compliance-noncompliance 
with JCAHO requirements (i.e., clinical process and integration measures) is presented in 
a series of tables and graphs and compared for the national and empirical samples. 
Trends in mortality (IQI) and patient safety (PSI) rates adjusted for several hospital 
characteristics for the empirical sample hospitals over the study period are also reported. 
The following sections separately discuss descriptive tables and graphs. 
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Tables 3 and 4 present orghizational characteristics of system hospitals in the 
national and the empirical (1 1 states) samples over the study period from 1995 to 2000. 
Some differences may be visually detected in these characteristics for the national and 
empirical samples. For example, the percentages of hospitals in different system types 
did not vary in the national sample (Table 3) in comparison with the empirical sample 
that varied at a higher rate for system hospitals (Table 4). However, the trends over time 
were similar in both samples, though changes were less dramatic for the national sample. 
In the following paragraphs, changes in hospital affiliation with different types of health 
systems over time are described in a greater detail, because these are main structural 
characteristics in this study. 
In the national sample, the percent of hospitals in Centralized Health Systems 
(CHS) fluctuated around 5.25-5.75 percent during the 1995-1996 period (Table 3). The 
percent then declined to 3.92 percent in 1998 and increased to 7.87 percent in 2000 
(Table 3). In the empirical sample, the percent of CHS hospitals ranged between 5.28 
percent-7.55 percent over the 1995-1996 period, then sharply dropped to 1.3 1 percent in 
1998 and climbed to 9.33 in 2000 (Table 4). The representation of hospitals in 
Centralized Physician Insurance Health Systems (CPIHS) decreased from 1 1.40 percent 
in 1995 to 7.93 percent in 1997, increased to about 10 percent in 1998 and 1999, and then 
declined to 7.64 percent in 2000 in the national sample (Table 3). In the eleven state 
sample, the percent of hospitals in CPIHS decreased steadily from 13.88 percent in 1995 
to 6.02 percent in 1998, increased to 7.23 percent in 1999, and then experienced a sharp 
decline to 2.76 percent in 2000 (Table 4). 
Table 3: System Hospitals' Organizational Characteristics in the National Sample Over the Study Period 
Categories 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Number of beds 176.56 175.71 176.68 173.90 174.70 176.17 
Centralized Health Systems (%) 5.25 5.75 5.29 3.92 4.1 1 7.87 
Centralized Physician Insurance Health Systems (%) 1 1.40 8.63 7.93 10.28 10.70 7.64 
Moderately Centralized Health Systems (%) 20.36 26.88 27.14 31.24 32.32 33.16 
Decentralized Health Systems (%) 52.40 45.30 47.23 39.99 39.23 41.35 
Independent Hospital Systems (%) 10.60 13.44 12.41 14.57 13.63 9.97 
Public (%) 17.22 16.64 15.48 15.07 14.76 14.05 
For-profit (%) 20.96 21.55 23.13 22.52 21.80 22.08 
Voluntary (%) 61.83 61.81 61.39 62.41 63.44 63.86 
Major teaching (%) 6.32 6.58 6.67 6.67 6.62 6.76 
Minor teaching (%) 14.11 14.49 14.88 14.65 14.53 12.1.2 
Non-teaching (%) 79.57 78.94 78.45 78.68 78.85 81.12 
Service Mix and Scope: 
0 -  lo(%) 55.02 54.21 54.00 56.50 54.91 54.32 
10 - 20 (%) 32.93 32.53 32.47 30.45 32.07 31.99 
20 - 30 (%) 12.05 13.26 13.53 13.05 13.02 13.69 
Urban (%) 72.99 72.85 73.04 73.04 73.23 73.20 
Rural (%) 27.01 27.15 26.96 26.96 26.77 26.80 
Cash Flow to Total Revenue (94) 10.28 10.42 10.47 8.88 8.20 8.81 
RN Percent of Licensed Nursing (%) 81.47 82.43 82.32 83.32 83.66 84.14 
Sample Size 2,672 2,692 2,667 2,654 2,613 2,588 
Table 4: System Hospitals' Organizational Characteristics in the Empirical Sample (1 1 states) Over the Study Period 
Categories 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Number of beds 205.10 204.47 205.72 205.01 207.14 208.43 
Centralized Health Systems (%) 5.28 7.55 6.68 1.3 1 1.30 9.33 
- Centralized Physician Insurance Health Systems (%) 13.88 7.69 6.02 6.96 7.23 2.76 
Moderately Centralized Health Systems (%) 26.55 33.57 33.69 36.27 39.88 42.84 
Decentralized Health Systems (%) 50.53 47.27 50.00 48.49 44.65 41.79 
Independent Hospital Systems (%) 3.77 3.92 3.61 6.96 6.94 3 -29 
Public (%) 12.82 12.40 11.64 11.37 11.47 10.55 
For-profit (%) 20.21 20.67 22.35 21.23 21.51 21.82 
Voluntary (%) 66.97 66.93 66.01 67.40 67.02 67.63 
Major teaching (%) 7.27 7.58 7.60 7.66 7.80 7.91 
Minor teaching (%) 17.44 17.91 18.43 18.79 18.79 14.75 
Non-teaching (%) 75.29 74.51 73.96 73.55 73.40 77.34 
Service Mix and Scope: 
0 - 10 (%) 37.02 36.69 38.14 43.29 41.39 39.60 
10 -20(%) 46.20 44.52 43.06 38.93 40.94 41.83 
20 - 30 (%) 16.78 18.79 18.79 17.79 17.67 18.57 
Urban (%) 81.32 81.10 81.21 80.87 80.87 80.98 
Rural (%) 18.68 18.90 18.79 19.13 19.13 19.02 
Cash Flow to Total Revenue (%) 9.83 10.50 9.97 8.49 8.71 9.23 
RN Percent of Licensed Nursing (%) 86.04 86.56 86.66 87.51 87.65 88.12 
Sample Size 855 862 859 853 837 825 
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The percent of hospitals in Moderately Centralized Health Systems (MCHS) has 
been steadily growing from 20.36 percent to 33.16 percent over the study period in the 
national sample (Table 3). A similar trend was also found in the empirical sample, i.e. 
increasing from 26.55 percent to 42.88 percent. For hospitals in the Decentralized 
Health Systems (DHS), a decreasing trend from 52.40 percent in 1995 to 39.23 percent 
was observed in 1999, which increased up to 41.35 percent by 2000 in the national 
sample. A decreasing trend was also observed in the 11 state sample for the same system 
type, i.e. from 50.53 percent in 1995 to 41.79 percent in 2000 (Table 4). The percentage 
of hospitals in Independent Hospital Systems (IHS) has been increasing up to 14.57 
percent in 1998, but then declined to 9.97 percent in 2000 in the national sample. In the 
empirical sample, the percentage of hospitals in IHS has increased from around 3.6 
percent in the beginning for the study period to 6.95 percent in 1998 and 1999, but then 
sharply declined to 3.29 percent in 2000. 
Other characteristics are described as follows. Overall, hospital organizational 
characteristics were fairly stable from one year to another in both samples. For example, 
in the national sample, the average number of hospital beds has been steadily and slightly 
decreasing from 176.56 in 1995 to 173.90 in 1998, and then increased up to 176.1 7 in 
2000. The average number of hospital beds in the empirical sample was greater then in 
the national sample by approximately 30 beds. During the 1995-1 998 period, the 
average number of beds had change little, hovering around 205 beds. System hospitals in 
the empirical sample had a smaller percent of public hospitals and larger percentages of 
voluntary hospitals in comparison with the national sample (Table 3 and 4). A greater 
percentage of hospitals in the empirical sample were in major- or minor-teaching 
categories, provided a greater mix and scope of services, located in urban areas, and had 
more nursing staff. The results of t-tests and Chi-squared tests comparing system 
hospitals' characteristics for the empirical and the national samples are provided later in 
the text. 
Figure 5 provides a visual depiction of the trends in hospitals by system type over 
the study period for the empirical sample. A decreasing trend for hospitals in CHS from 
1995 to 1998 is consistent finding with the previous research (Bazzoli et al., 2001). 
However, an increase in hospitals in the CHS category after 1998 has not yet been 
studied. A steady increase in the percent of hospitals in MCHS and a decrease in the 
percent of hospitals that are DHS over the study period can be observed. 
In addition, t and Chi-squared tests were conducted on data pooled across six 
years for both the national and the 11 state empirical samples to assess whether the 
findings of this study can be generalizable to system hospitals in the entire country. 
These tests reveal that hospitals in the empirical sample have a larger mean number of 
beds than in the national sample (205.96 vs. 175.65, respectively) (Table 5). The 
distribution of hospitals by system types in the 11 state and the national samples are also 
significantly different with the exception of hospitals in Centralized Health Systems 
(CHS). 
The percentage of CHS hospitals is similar in both samples (5.37 percent vs. 5.28 
percent). However, the national sample has larger percentage of hospitals in Centralized 
Physician Insurance Health Systems (CPIHS) and in Independent Hospital Systems (IHS) 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Percent of Systems 
Centralized Health System I Centralized Physicianllnsurance System I Moderately Centralized Health System 
I Decentralized Health System I Independent Health System 
Figure 5: Trends in Hospitals in Different Types of Health Systems for the Empirical Sample 
Table 5: Comparison of the National Sample and the Empirical Sample - System Hospitals' Characteristics Pooled Over 
the Study Period 
National Sample 11 State Sample 
Chi- 
squared 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev (or t-) value Pr>lt( 
Number of Beds 175.65 174.89 205.96 187.76 10.24 <.ooo 1 
Centralized Health Systems (%) 5.37 20.42 5.28 20.22 0.08 0.7736 
Centralized Physician Insurance Health Systems (%) 9.40 23.55 7.28 23.55 19.28 <.OOO 1 
Moderately Centralized Health Systems (%) 28.60 26.54 35.62 45.30 74.07 <.OOO 1 
Decentralized Health Systems (%) 44.18 42.83 47.07 48.56 9.33 0.0022 
Independent Hospital Systems (%) 12.45 30.14 4.75 19.22 209.57 <.OOO 1 
Public (%) 15.55 36.24 11.72 32.16 45.79 <.0001 
For-profit (%) 22.00 41.43 21.29 40.94 1.15 0.2833 
Voluntary (%) 62.45 48.43 66.99 47.03 34.66 <.OOO 1 
Major Teaching (%) 6.60 24.83 7.64 26.56 6.52 0.0107 
Minor Teaching (%) 14.14 34.84 17.70 38.17 38.63 <.0001 
Non-teaching (%) 79.26 40.55 74.66 43.50 48.05 <.0001 
Service Mix and Scope: 
0 -  lo(%) 
10 - 20 (%) 
20 - 30 (%) 
Urban (%) 73.06 44.37 81.06 39.19 146.02 <.0001 
Rural (%) 26.94 44.37 18.64 39.94 146.03 <.0001 
Cash Flow to Total Revenue (%) 9.53 8.89 9.47 8.62 -0.36 0.7206 
RN Percent of Licensed Nursing (%) 82.88 11.94 87.08 8.76 20.94 <.0001 
Sample Size 15,886 5,147 - 
W 
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than the national sample (9.40 percent vs. 7.28 percent and 12.45 percent vs. 4.75 
percent, respectively). The percentage of hospitals in Moderately Centralized Health 
Systems (MCHS) and Decentralized Health Systems (DHS) is greater in the empirical 
sample (35.62 percent vs. 28.6 percent and 47.07 percent vs. 44.18 percent, respectively). 
A smaller percentage of system hospitals has public ownership in the empirical 
sample than in the national sample (1 1.72 percent vs. 15.55 percent). The eleven state 
sample has a similar percentage of investor-owned hospitals (21.29 percent vs. 22.00 
percent) and a larger percent of voluntary hospitals (and 66.99 percent vs. 62.45 percent) 
in comparison with the national sample (Table 3). Relatively more system hospitals were 
in major and minor teaching categories in the empirical sample than in the national 
sample (7.64 percent vs. 6.60 percent and 17.70 percent vs. 14.14 percent, respectively). 
Hospitals in the empirical samples provide a greater mix and number of services 
(1 8.06 percent vs. 13.10 percent for the 20-30 service category and 42.58 percent vs. 
32.07 percent for the 10-20 service category) and less likely to be in the 0-10 service 
category (39.35 percent vs. 57.82 percent) than hospitals nationally. Hospitals in the 
empirical sample are more likely to be located in urban areas (81.06 percent vs. 73.06 
percent) and less likely in rural areas (18.64 percent vs. 26.94 percent). The eleven state 
sample hospitals have a greater percentage of total nursing staff that are RNs (87.08 
percent vs. 82.88 percent). There is no difference in the ratio of cash flow to total 
revenue between the two samples (Table 5). 
Based on the t and Chi-squared tests, it is concluded that the empirical (1 1 state) 
sample of system hospitals significantly differs from the national sample of system 
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hospitals. The findings of the current study cannot be generalized to an average system 
hospital. Hospitals in the empirical sample are more likely to be disproportionately 
urban, larger in size, voluntary, nonpublic, and having a higher level teaching status and 
greater service complexity and nurses that are RNs. Thus, the findings are limited to 
system hospitals in these eleven states. 
Table 6 presents organizational characteristics for hospitals in the different types 
of health systems, averaged over six years of data in the eleven state empirical sample. 
Chi-squared tests were conducted to compare organizational characteristics of hospitals 
by system types to assess similarities and differences in different system hospitals. 
Hospitals in CHS and CPIHS are on average larger in size (276 and 262 number of beds), 
followed by MCHS with 212, DHS with 189, and IHS with 164 beds (Table 6). 
Although most of hospitals in these five system types are voluntary, non-profit hospitals, 
a greater percentage of DHS and IHS hospitals have for-profit status (39.85 percent and 
25.80 percent, respectively); and 23.49 percent of CHS hospitals are publicly owned. 
There is a descending progression in the percentages of system hospitals that are 
major teaching hospitals - 15.86 percent (highest) of CHS hospitals are major teaching 
institutions versus 3.5 percent (lowest) of IHS hospitals are major teaching. A similar 
dynamic is observed in terms of the service mix and scope: hospitals in CHS offer a 
greater number and scope of services than hospitals in other types of systems. Hospitals 
in all system types in the empirical sample tend to be located in urban areas, though more 
hospitals in MCHS and DHS are more likely to be located in rural areas (19.61 percent 
and 23.75 percent, respectively). There are no differences in hospital cash flow (all 
Tables 6: Hospital Characteristics by System Type and Averaged Over the Study Period in the Empirical Sample (1995- 
2000) 
Chi-squared 
CHS CPIHS MCHS DHS IHS (or t-) value Pr>ltl 
Number of Beds 276.97 262.78 21 1.62 189.43 164.3 1 4142.70 <.OOO 1 
Public (%) 23.49 13.98 7.04 13.92 9.63 53.25 <. 000 1 
For-profit (%) 1.37 2.34 8.72 39.85 25.80 617.64 <.OOO 1 
Voluntary (%) 75.14 83.68 84.24 46.23 64.57 627.71 <.OOO 1 
Major Teaching (%) 15.86 14.61 10.52 2.95 3.50 137.52 <.0001 
Minor Teaching (%) 33.73 24.41 20.28 15.45 17.85 29.38 <.OOO 1 
Non-teaching (%) 50.42 60.98 69.20 81.60 78.65 136.99 <.OOO 1 
Service Mix and Scope: 
0 - 10 (%) 
10 -20 (%) 
20 - 30 (%) 
Urban (%) 96.16 90.33 80.39 76.25 91.19 84.23 <.OOO 1 
Rural (%) 3.84 9.67 19.61 23.75 8.81 84.23 <.OOO 1 
Cash Flow to Total Revenue (%) 9.00 8.16 9.32 10.81 10.00 11278.82 .I98 
RN Percent of Licensed Nursing (%) 90.20 89.61 87.40 86.32 85.99 11247.04 .005 
Sam~le  Size 38 5 2 254 337 3 3 
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around 8-10 percent) for different system types. Hospitals in centralized health systems 
tend to have a greater percentage of RNs of licensed nursing staff when compared with 
other system types. In conclusion, there are clear and statistically significant 
organizational differences in hospitals in different types of health systems in almost all 
system and hospital characteristics (except for the cash flow to total revenue), and it is 
important to control for these differences in the multivariate settings. 
System Hospitals' Compliance with JCAHO Requirements 
As discussed earlier - the JCAHO data were reorganized into 2 panels: 1995- 
1997, representing the first JCAHO review year, and 1998-2000, representing the second 
JCAHO review year. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics on the hospitals' 
compliance/noncompliance with the five JCAHO performance area variables used as 
clinical process measures for the current study, comparing hospitals' JCAHO scores in 
the national and the eleven state samples. 
Big differences in Joint Commission for Accreditation of Health care 
Organization's compliance in three out of five performance areas from the first to the 
second review period are observed in both samples and presented in Table 7. An increase 
in non-compliance in initial patient assessment procedures was present (24.73 percent 
versus 36.29 percent for the national sample and 23.60 percent versus 33.33 percent for 
the eleven state sample), and decreases in non-compliance in medication use (35.1 1 
percent versus 29.71 percent and 36.01 percent versus 28.03 percent, respectively) and 
availability of patient specific information (44.37 percent versus 37.56 percent and 42.83 
percent versus 38.38, respectively) were also notable. 
Table 7: System Hospitals Not in Compliance with JCAHO Performance Area Requirements in the National and 
Empirical Samples in Two Study Periods 
1 st Study Period (95-97) 
National Sample 11 State Sample 
%not in % not in Chi- 
N compliance N compliance squared Pr>lt( 
Initial Assessment Procedures 3,312 24.73 572 23.60 0.33 0.56 
Anesthesia Care 3,047 4.30 571 6.30 4.39 0.04** 
Medication Use 3,312 35.1 1 5 72 36.01 0.17 0.68 
Operative Procedures 3,050 5.54 571 4.90 0.38 0.53 
Availability of Patient Specific 
Information 3,311 44.37 5 72 42.83 0.47 0.49 
2nd Study Period (98-00) 
National Sample 1 1 State Sample 
% not in % not in Chi- 
N compliance compliance squared Pr>ltl 
Initial Assessment Procedures 3,703 36.29 693 33.33 2.23 0.14 
Anesthesia Care 3,493 3.75 689 3.19 0.5 1 0.48 
Medication Use 3,702 29.71 692 28.03 0.79 0.37 
Operative Procedures 3,504 5.99 690 6.38 0.15 0.67 
Availability of Patient Specific 
Information 3,703 37.56 693 38.38 0.17 0.68 
Note: * means significance at .10 level, * * at .05 level, * * * at .O1 level 
In the first study period, about a quarter of hospitals in the national and the 
empirical samples (24.73 percent and 23.60 percent, respectively) were not in compliance 
for initial assessment procedures; about one third (35.1 1 percent and 36.01 percent) - for 
medication use, and about a half (44.37 percent and 42.83 percent) - for availability of 
patient specific information in both samples. Hospitals compliance with JCAHO 
performance areas for anesthesia care and operative procedures was high in both the 
national and eleven state samples (95.70 percent and 93.70 percent for anesthesia care 
and 94.46 percent and 95.10 percent for operative procedures) (Ta6le 7). Chi-squared 
test detected that hospitals in the national and empirical samples were different from each 
other on the anesthesia care compliance in the first review year, with fewer hospital in the 
eleven state sample in compliance. 
In the eleven state sample, Table 8 and Figure 6 demonstrate a visible decrease in 
noncompliance in three (anesthesia care, medication use, availability of patient specific 
information) out of five JCAHO performance areas in the balanced sample of hospitals 
that have JCAHO data in both study periods. Noncompliance with JCAHO performance 
areas requirements for initial assessment procedures increased from 23.28 percent in the 
first study period to 35.83 percent in the second study period. Noncompliance with 
JCAHO performance areas requirements for operative procedures has just slightly 
increased from 4.46 percent to 6.29 percent of study hospitals (Table 8). In conclusion, 
the national and empirical eleven state samples were not different from each other on 
compliance with JCAHO requirements with the exception of anesthesia use in the first 
Table 8: Percent of System Hospitals Not in Compliance with JCAHO Performance Area Requirements in the Empirical 
Sample in Two Study Periods 
11 State Sample 
1 st study period 2nd study period 
(95-97) (98-00) 
% not in % not in 
N compliance N compliance 
Initial Assessment Procedures 494 23.28 494 35.83 
Anesthesia Care 494 6.71 494 3.25 
Medication Use 493 36.5 1 493 26.57 
Operative Procedures 493 4.46 493 6.29 
Availability of Patient Specific Information 492 42.3 1 492 40.89 
--t Initial Assessment Procedure 
--t- Anesthesia Care 
- - Medication Use 
- X- Operative Procedures 
+Availability of Patient Specific 
1 2 
Study periods 
lnfor 
Figure 6: Trends in System Hospitals Not in Compliance with JCAHO Performance Areas in the Empirical Sample 
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review year. Thus, multivariate findings in terms of hospital compliance with JCAHO 
requirements may be nationally generalizable to an average hospital. A significant 
variation in compliance with JCAHO requirements among the study hospitals was 
observed. In general, the hospital compliance with JCAHO requirements has been 
improving over the study period for three out of five JCHAO performance areas, which 
may be showing the impact of the Institute of Medicine reports in 1999 and 2000 on 
medical errors and quality and also increased pressure on JCAHO to be more stringent 
and force hospitals to improve these performance areas. 
Adjusted Least Squared Means 
Adjusted Least Squared Means (ALSM) were calculated separately for each IQI 
and PSI and for 1995, 1998, and 2000 years. The ALSM procedure removes residual 
differences in hospital level patient characteristics, severity and complication that had 
measurable and significant effects on IQI mortality and PSI adverse event rates. 
y =a, +a,S ,  +a,P ,  + E  
where y is a vector defining quality outcomes (i.e., IQIs and PSIS); 
S is a vector representing dummy variables for different system types, i.e. Centralized 
Health Systems (CHS), 
Centralized Physician/Insurance Health Systems (CPIHS), 
Moderately Centralized Health Systems (MCHS), 
Decentralized Health Systems (DHS), 
Independent Health System (IHS - a reference category); 
P represents patient characteristics, i.e. age, gender, patient acuity, and CMI. 
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The estimated regressions were run with the system type variables and the key 
patient characteristics, holding these characteristics at their mean values. By doing that, 
the ALSM procedure isolates the hospital systems' effects on mortality and adverse 
events. Tables 9 and 10 demonstrate IQI mortality rates and PSI adverse event rates for 
the Adjusted Least Squared Means Models in 1995, 1998, and 2000. Mortality and 
adverse event rates are presented by the system type, where Independent Hospital System 
(IHS) is a reference category. Regression coefficients and standard errors represent 
differences (some of which were statistically significant at varying levels of significance) 
in the mortality and adverse event rates by system types in comparison with the IHS. 
A comparison of the adjusted least squared means for the IQI mortality rates for 
AMI, CHF, Stroke, and Pneumonia revealed that the "best performers" (i.e. system 
hospitals with the lowest mortality rate) were hospitals in DHS, CHS, and CPIHS when 
compared to IHS hospitals during the 1995-2000 period. The ALSM mortality rates 
were significantly lower for these latter system types relative to IHS (Table 9). This 
relationship held over time for hospitals in DHS, but it was less stable for hospitals in 
CHS and CPIHS as shown in Table 9 and Figure 7 (the graph with AM1 and CHF was 
chosen because this conditions were most illustrative of the differences among hospital 
systems). 
The descriptive ALSM findings suggest that both decentralization and 
centralization of hospital structures may decrease mortality rates for AMI, CHF, Stroke, 
and Pneumonia. This finding is in disagreement with the conceptual model and opposing 
Scenarios 1 and 2, where only one, either centralized or decentralized, health system 
Table 9: IQI Mortality Rates for the Adjusted Least Squared Means Models in 1995, 1998, and 2000 
System Type IQI 15: AM1 - 1995 IQI 15: AM1 - 1998 IQI 15: AM1 - 200 
Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. 
IHS 13.37 9.96 12.44 
CHS 11.88 - 1.49 0.94 6.84 -3.12* 1.84 11.86 -0.59 1.15 
CPIHS 12.94 -0.43 0.64 8.65 -1.30 1.01 9.72 -2.72 1.75 
MCHS 12.48 -0.90 0.56 10.11 0.16 0.68 13.66 1.21 0.92 
DHS 12.54 -0.83* 0.48 8.27 -1.69*** 0.65 10.97 -1.48 0.93 
Sample Size 629 606 577 
System Type IQI 16: CHF - 1995 IQI 16: CHF - 1998 IQI 16: CHF - 2000 
Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. 
IHS 5.39 4.46 5.34 
CHS 
CPIHS 
MCHS 
DHS 4.37 -1.01*** 0.23 3.96 -0.50 0.30 4.57 -0.77*** 0.29 
Sample Size 756 812 730 
System Type IQI 17: Stroke - 1995 IQI 17: Stroke - 1998 IQI 17: Stroke - 2000 
Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. 
IHS 12.99 11.19 14.24 
CHS 10.40 -2.59*** 0.84 9.23 -1.96 1.73 13.63 -0.61 0.92 
CPIHS 12.73 -0.26 0.57 9.66 -1.54 0.94 10.27 -3.97*** 1.43 
MCHS 12.72 -0.27 0.49 11.11 -0.09 0.60 14.02 -0.2 1 0.71 
Continued 
Table 9: IQI Mortality Rates for the Adjusted Least Squared Means Models in 1995, 1998, and 2000 (Continued) 
System Type IQI 15: AM1 - 1995 IQI 15: AM1 - 1998 IQI 15: AM1 - 200 
Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. 
DHS 10.69 -2.30*** 0.41 9.39 -1.80*** 0.57 12.35 -1.89*** 0.72 
Sample Size 685 684 653 
System Type IQI 20: Pneumonia - 1995 IQI 20: Pneumonia - 1998 IQI 20: Pneumonia - 2000 
Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. 
IHS 8.59 8.05 9.48 
CHS 6.43 -2.17*** 0.62 6.44 -1.61 1.27 9.71 0.23 0.63 
CPIHS 8.78 0.18 0.42 7.25 -0.80 0.66 6.66 -2.82*** 0.98 
MCHS 8.59 0.00 0.35 7.80 -0.25 0.41 9.78 0.3 1 0.48 
DHS 7.17 -1.42*** 0.30 6.41 -1.64*** 0.39 8.41 -1.07** 0.48 
Sample Size 792 787 76 1 
Note: * means significance at . 1 0 level, ** at .05 level, * * * at .O 1 level 
Figure 7: Trends in Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) and Congestive Heart Failure (CHF), 1995-2000 
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structure was predicted to have better quality outcomes. However, the ALSM findings 
for IQIs suggested a possible system effect on mortality rates in system hospitals, which 
is the most valuable finding at this stage. Multivariate analyses are going to be conducted 
that would provide statistical control for other factors that may affect quality outcomes. 
In terms of PSI adverse event rates, no clear patterns exist across system types 
(Table 10 and Figure 8). Mortality rates and patient safety adverse events increased or 
leveled after 1998 (Figures 7 and 8) which may be suggestive of the BBA effect or 
possible changes in the hospital reporting patterns of medical errors after the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) reports in 1999 and 2000. The longitudinal study needs to look for 
potential adverse quality effects from the BBA, andlor potentially other market/policy 
factors, andlor reporting of adverse events post the IOM report (1999), since historically 
there was a substantial under-reporting of adverse events in hospitals. 
In conclusion, the ALSM demonstrates that there are statistically significant 
differences in mortality rates between various types of health systems, although patterns 
are less clear for the patient safety indicators. Multivariate analyses are need to examine 
how the system characteristics and internal clinical processes adopted by different system 
types may affect quality performance as measured as IQI and PSI and holding other 
factors constant. The following sections describe correlation analysis and the results of 
the panel, multivariate models. 
Correlation Analysis 
Prior to performing a correlation analysis, outliers on dependent and independent 
variables were identified and set to missing. These outliers could significantly skew the 
Table 10: PSI Adverse Event Rates for the Adjusted Least Squared Means Models in 1995, 1998, and 2000 
System Type PSI 3: Decubitus ulcer - 1995 PSI 3: Decubitus ulcer - 1998 PSI 3: Decubitus ulcer - 2000 
Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. 
IHS 2.07 1.95 1.72 
CHS 1.81 -0.26 0.28 2.36 0.41 0.42 2.41 0.68*** 0.22 
CPIHS 1.88 -0.18 0.19 1.98 0.02 0.22 1.82 0.09 0.35 
MCHS 1.59 -0.48*** 0.16 1.79 -0.16 0.14 2.07 0.35** 0.16 
DHS 1.96 -0.1 1 0.13 2.02 0.07 0.13 1.97 0.24 0.17 
Sam~le  size 8 10 808 774 
System Type PSI 7: Infection due to PSI 7: Infection due to PSI 7: Infection due to 
medical care - 1995 medical care - 1998 medical care - 2000 
Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. 
IHS 0.13 0.17 0.18 
CHS 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.23 0.06* 0.04 0.19 0.01 0.02 
CPIHS 0.12 -0.01 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.20 0.02 0.03 
MCHS 0.13 -0.0 1 0.01 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.19 0.01 0.02 
DHS 0.12 -0.01 0.01 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.16 -0.02 0.02 
Sample size 8 17 8 19 894 
System Type PSI 12: Post-operative PSI 12: Post-operative PSI 12: Post-operative 
PE or DVT - 1995 PE or DVT - 1998 PE or DVT - 2000 
Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. 
IHS 0.55 0.74 0.80 
CHS 0.61 0.06 0.08 0.92 .0.17 0.16 1.0 0.20** 0.08 
CPIHS 0.53 -0.02 0.05 0.79 0.05 0.08 0.84 0.03 0.12 
MCHS 0.58 0.03 0.05 0.68 -0.07 0.05 0.83 0.03 0.06 
Continued 
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Table 10: PSI Adverse Event Rates for the Adjusted Least Squared Means Models in 1995, 1998, and 2000 (Continued) 
System Type PSI 3: Decubitus ulcer - 1995 PSI 3: Decubitus ulcer - 1998 PSI 3: Decubitus ulcer - 2000 
Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. 
DHS 0.57 0.02 0.04 0.76 0.02 0.05 0.86 0.06 0.06 
Sample Size 789 782 759 
System Type PSI 13 : Post-operative PSI 13: Post-operative PSI 13 : Post-operative 
semis - 1995 semis - 1998 semis - 2000 
Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. 
IHS 0.47 0.98 0.99 
CHS 0.45 -0.02 0.13 1.03 0.05 0.30 0.94 -0.05 0.17 
CPIHS 0.37 -0.10 0.09 1.01 0.03 0.17 0.70 -0.29 0.27 
MCHS 0.39 -0.09 0.08 0.91 -0.07 0.10 0.88 -0.1 1 0.13 
DHS 0.49 0.02 0.06 0.90 -0.08 0.10 1.15 0.16 0.14 
Sarn~le Size 65 1 662 646 
System Type PSI 15: Accidental PSI 15: Accidental PSI 15: Accidental 
puncture and laceration - puncture and laceration - puncture and laceration - 
1995 1998 2000 
Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. Rate Coef. Std. Err. 
IHS 0.26 0.27 0.32 
CHS 0.26 0.00 0.04 0.30 0.02 0.06 0.26 -0.05* 0.03 
CPIHS 0.26 0.00 0.03 0.30 0.03 0.03 0.40 0.09** 0.04 
MCHS 0.32 0.06*** 0.02 0.30 0.03 0.02 0.34 0.03 0.02 
DHS 0.27 0.01 0.02 0.30 0.02 0.02 0.33 0.01 0.02 
Sample Size 8 17 8 19 790 
Note: * means significance at .10 level, ** at .05 level, *** at . O l  level 
Figure 8: Trends in Post-Operative Pulmonary Embolism (PE) and Deep Vein Thrombosis (DVT) and Accidental 
Puncture or Laceration, 1995 - 2000 
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data and/or be due to reporting errors. A rule - being three standard deviations away from 
the mean - was used to identify outliers and applied to all continuous variables. 
The correlation analysis of pooled cross-sectional data was conducted to evaluate 
which variables can enter into the multivariate models. It was discovered that several 
variables were highly correlated. It was found that total number of beds (a measure of 
hospital size) was correlated with the number of patients at risk for PSI adverse events (a 
measure of patient volume) at a level greater than the standard cut off point (r=0.75) 
(Appendix 1). 
Once a hospital size and volume relationship was analyzed after first-differencing 
these measures over two time periods, it was found that they were not correlated. These 
two variables may be measuring different phenomena - the size is a common measure of 
power and a resource base in organizational research; and the volume is a measure of 
clinical proficiency (i.e., "practice makes perfect"). A simple statistical explanation is 
also viable - the number of beds is stable over time, but the volume of patients may vary 
from year to year, and therefore, these two measures are not correlated when analyzed 
over time. The decision was made to keep both variables in the empirical models since 
they may be capturing two different phenomena and not correlated over time. 
The measures of hospital financial performance, i.e. operating margin and the 
ratio of cash flow to total revenues were highly correlated (~0 .77 ) ;  thus, only one 
measure of hospital financial performance (the ratio of cash flow to total revenue) enters 
into the multivariate models. Hospital mortality and severity levels 3 and 4 had an 
expected ~ 0 . 9 4  correlation. Thus, mortality levels 3 and 4 are used in the IQI models 
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and severity levels 3 and 4 are used in the PSI models. These measures were also highly 
correlated after first differencing. 
The ratio of the number of physicians in the 45-54 age category by the total 
population in the market was constructed. This new measure of physicians per 
population was highly correlated with the total number of physicians ( ~ 0 . 9 4 )  in the 
cross-sectional correlation analysis and (r=0.82) after first-differencing them over two 
time periods; therefore, the total number of physicians and population in the market area 
were excludec! from the models, and the physicians in 45-54 age category per population 
stayed in the multivariate models. 
The other highly correlated, mutually exclusive variables were as follows. 
Hospital investor and nonprofit ownership types were correlated at F -0.82. The services 
mix and scope categories 10-20 and 20-30 were also highly correlated at r= -0.89. Two 
patients age categories (<I9 and 19-64) were highly correlated with the older age (64+) 
category (r= -0.86 and r= -0.81, respectively). Hospital minor teaching and nonteaching 
status were correlated at r= -0.79. Hospital rural or urban location were correlated at F - 
1. In these mutually exclusive categories of dummy variables, one of the categories is 
excluded from and becomes a reference category in the multivariate models. Appendix 1 
presents the cross-sectional correlation matrix. 
Panel, Longitudinal Analyses 
Fixed and random effects models were estimated. The Hausman specification test 
was conducted (for details see Chapter 4, pp. 104-1 05). Firstly, the less efficient but 
consistent models - the fixed effects models - were estimated. Secondly, the efficient 
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models - the random effects models - were estimated. Thirdly, the Hausman 
specification tests were used to compare differences in the coefficients between fixed and 
random effects models (pp. 104-105). The Hausman specification test indicated that 
there was no difference between fixed and random effects models (could not reject the 
null hypothesis of no systematic difference in the coefficients at the 0.05 level), 
suggesting that the random effects models were preferable given that they are consistent 
and efficient (Table 1 I). 
Random Effects Models with Inpatient Quality Indicators 
Random effects models (coefficients and standard errors) with IQIs - AMI, CHF, 
Stroke, and Pneumonia risk-adjusted mortality rates - as dependent variables are 
presented and discussed in this section. The description of the main system's structure 
and internal clinical process and integration effects on IQIs follows. 
As suggested by the hypothesis 1, a greater level of systems' centralization may 
lead to lower mortality rates. Hospital affiliation with the centralized health system 
(CHS) had a significant, quality improving effect for all four risk-adjusted mortality 
rates: AMI, CHF, Stroke and Pneumonia. Hospital affiliation with independent health 
systems (IHS) was a reference category in the models. The AM1 risk-adjusted mortality 
rate is 3.332 lower for CHS hospitals than for IHS hospitals. The similar trend was 
observed for the CHF, Stroke, and Pneumonia risk adjusted rates that were 1.5 19, 3.10, 
and 2.108 lower in CHS rather than IHS hospitals, holding all other factors constant. The 
regression coefficients and standard errors for these findings are presented in the 
following Table 12. 
Table 1 1 : Chi-squared Tests and p-values for the Hausman Specification Tests of Model Selection Comparing Consistent 
FE Estimators With More Efficient RE Estimators 
Chi-squared p-value Degrees of Freedom 
CHF 3 5.44 0.35 3 3 
Stroke 22.45 0.92 33 
Pneumonia 30.93 0.57 3 3 
Decubitus Ulcer 32.1 1 0.5 1 33 
Infection Due to Medical Care 39.56 0.20 33 
Post-operative PE or DVT 34.53 0.39 3 3 
Post-operative Sepsis 41.70 0.14 33 
Accidental 
Puncture or Laceration 45.58 0.07 33 
Table 12: Random Effects Models of Different Health System Types and Internal Clinical Process Effects on IQI Mortality Rates 
Variable AM1 CHF Stroke Pneumonia 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
CHS -3.332*** 1.43 8 -1.519** 0.764 -3.100** 1.522 -2.108* 1.138 
CPIHS -1.655 1.3 83 -0.3 13 0.738 -1.746 1.484 -1.189 1.105 
MCHS -1.723 1.278 -0.01 8 0.686 - 1.244 1.364 -0.090 1.03 1 
DHS -1.712 1.299 -0.210 0.696 -1.606 1.3 89 -0.739 1.043 
Patient Specific Information -0.372 0.42 1 -0.439** 0.213 -0.753* 0.453 -0.981*** 0.313 
Medication Use 0.392 0.448 0.129 0.230 -0.104 0.496 -0.295 0.338 
Initial Assessment Procedures 0.708 0.45 1 0.005 0.236 1.077** 0.497 0.332 0.345 
Operative Procedures - 1.263 0.791 -0.139 0.440 -0.045 0.919 -0.780 0.650 
Anesthesia Care 0.508 0.835 -0.140 0.427 -0.7 16 0.876 0.060 0.621 
Total Beds 0.012*** 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.008*** 0.003 0.005*** 0.002 
For-profit -1.951* 1.122 -1.357*** 0.492 -0.057 1.049 -0.983 0.738 
Nonprofit 0.990 0.966 -0.328 0.409 1.980** 0.882 0.440 0.614 
Service Scope and Mix (20 - 
3 0) 2.451*** 1.028 0.785 0.532 2.479** 1.145 0.977 0.773 
Service Scope and Mix (1 0 - 
20) 2.1 12*** 0.879 0.866** 0.434 2.024** 0.984 1.168* 0.623 
Major Teaching -1.561 1.078 -0.337 0.582 -0.650 1.156 -0.713 0.867 
Minor Teaching 0.584 0.620 -0.194 0.3 15 0.109 0.62 1 -0.184 0.474 
Urban 1.089 0.993 -0.620 0.426 0.306 0.908 -0.012 0.636 
Total Nursing Staff Per Staffed 
Bed 0.304 0.588 -0.129 0.275 0.538 0.588 0.193 0.4 10 
RNs to LPNs Ratio -0.021 0.037 -0.008 0.0 15 -0.050 0.035 -0.008 0.023 
Cash Flow to Total Revenue 0.067*** 0.026 0.02 1 0.013 0.009 0.027 0.012 0.020 
Age 19 - 64 (%) -0.01 1 0.063 0.040 0.029 0.027 0.06 1 0.025 0.043 
Age > 64 (%) 0.134*** 0.047 0.077*** 0.022 0.115** 0.046 0.061* 0.032 
Continued + 
a 
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Table 12: Random Effects Models of Different Health System Types and Internal Clinical Process Effects on IQI Mortality Rates (Continued) 
Variable AM1 CHF Stroke Pneumonia 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Female (%) 0.060 0.078 0.01 1 0.037 0.001 0.082 0.006 0.056 
Black (%) 0.006 0.019 -0.018* 0.010 -0.002 0.018 -0.007 0.014 
Mortality Score 3 & 4 (%) -0.201*** 0.071 -0.1 14*** 0.034 -0.191*** 0.071 -0.104** 0.05 1 
Case Mix Index -1.752 2.179 -1.994** 1.016 -2.190 2.142 -3.410** 1.518 
Log of Volume (Total Patients 
at Risk) -2.727*** 0.439 0.146 0.23 1 -2.025*** 0.545 -0.633* 0.374 
Hirschman Herfindah1 Index 0.557 1.105 0.091 0.516 1.317 1.093 0.394 0.771 
HMO Penetration -1.231 1.540 -0.701 0.795 -2.143 1.617 0.407 1.181 
Log of Per Capita Income 
(1000s) 0.959 1.277 0.207 0.615 2.072* 1.243 0.645 0.932 
Population Over 65 (%) -24.852*** 5.897 -14.646*** 2.937 -28.249*** 5.944 -20.498*** 4.409 
MDs 45 - 54 Years Old Per 
Population -0.587 0.784 0.582 0.397 0.156 0.819 0.541 0.598 
Tight Physician-Hospital 
Arrangements -0.2 16 0.543 -0.171 0.2 82 -0.406 0.592 -0.509 0.418 
Hybrid Physician-Hospital 
Arrangements 0.42 1 0.535 -0.078 0.28 1 -0.398 0.581 -0.126 0.418 
Second Time Period (1998 - 
2000) -0.143 0.422 0.250 0.227 0.276 0.486 0.284 0.333 
Constant 17.628 9.422 4.871 4.345 18.521 9.197 13.194 6.578 
Sample Size 492 472 432 475 
Number of Groups 365 318 292 321 
Note: * means significance at .10 level, ** at .05 level, *** at .0 1 level 
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Findings of t-tests derived through tests of linear restrictions demonstrated that 
CHS hospitals had better quality performance than hospitals in moderately centralized 
(MCHS) and decentralized health systems (DHS) in all four IQI models at varying 
significance levels (Table 13). 
AM1 mortality rates were lower at a rate of 1.609 and 1.62 in CHS hospitals 
compared with MCHS and DHS hospitals at the 0.1 significance level'. Hospitals in 
CHS had 1.501 and 1.309 lower CHF mortality rates than hospitals in MCHS and DHS, 
respectively, at the 0.01 significance level. Stroke mortality rates were 1.856 and 1.494 
lower in CHS hospitals than in MCHS and DHS. Also, Pneumonia mortality rates were 
2.0 1 8 and 1.369 lower in CHS hospitals rather than in MCHS and DHS hospitals (Tables 
12 and 13). These findings may suggest that a higher level of centralization of hospital 
services may be an important structural factor that could also improve the process of care 
delivery and quality outcomes for AMI, CHF, Stroke and Pneumonia patients in CHS 
hospitals. In addition, t-tests for differences in coefficients for CHS and CPIHS showed 
no difference in 2 out of 4 models: Stroke and Pneumonia risk-adjusted mortality rates 
(Table 13). 
In terms of AM1 and CHF mortality rate, hospitals in CHS had 1.677 (at the 0.1 
significance level) and 1.206 (at the 0.05 significance level) lower rates than hospitals in 
CPIHS. These findings do not support Hypothesis 2, which postulated that quality of 
care may be better (i.e., lower mortality rates) in CPIHS hospitals due to their tighter 
I The differences in rates by system types were calculated as follows: 1.609 = -3.332-(-1.723), where (- 
3.332) is a coefficient for the CHS category, (-1.723) is a coefficient for the MCHS category (Table 1 I). P- 
values for these differences are provided in Table 12. 
Table 13: P-values of Tests of Linear Restriction Comparing Centralized Health Systems 
to the Other System Types in IQI Random Effects Models 
Health System Type AM1 CHF Stroke Pneumonia 
Centralized Physician Insurance 0.09 1 * 0.017** 0.191 0.215 
Moderately Centralized 0.05 1 * O.OOl*** 0.034** O.OOl*** 
Decentralized 0.057* 0.003*** 0.092* 0.032** 
Note: * means significance at .10 level, ** at .05 level, *** at .O1 level 
physician-hospital integration. Centralization of hospital services at the system level 
(which is a main structural characteristic of centralized health systems) may have a 
positive effect on how these services are provided through possibly improved process of 
communication and coordination, and an effective use of clinical expertise along the 
continuum of care delivery in the centralized health systems. A discussion of these 
findings is provided in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
Hospital affiliation with CHS and CPIHS were recoded into one variable 
representing a system with more centralized structure. This aggregation of systems into 
more centralized category was proposed in the conceptual model because CPIHS were 
different from CHS structures by having highly centralized physician arrangements and 
insurance products and moderately centralized hospital service. In all other aspects, 
CPIHS were similar to CHS. Hospital affiliation with MCHS and DHS were also 
recoded into a single variable representing a system with more decentralized structure as 
their structural characteristics were also thought to be compatible. Hospitals in 
independent hospital systems (IHS) remained a reference category. However, once 
empirical analyses were performed, the significant centralization effect become weaker 
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when models were run with these aggregated system types. Hospitals in more centralized 
systems have 2.698 lower AM1 mortality rate than hospitals in IHS, however, significant 
only at the 0.1 significance level (Table 14). The rest of the IQI models showed no 
difference in mortality rates for hospitals in more centralized versus independent hospital 
systems. 
Table 14: Random Effects Models of Aggregated Health System Types on IQI Mortality 
Rates 
AM1 CHF Stroke Pneumonia 
Variable Std. Std. Std. Std. 
Coef. Err. Coef. Err. Coef. Err. Coef. Err. 
More Centralized -2.698* 1.558 -0.813 0.71 0 -2.325 1.408 -1.553 1.089 
More Decentralized -1.591 1.510 -0.103 0.682 -1.416 1.346 -0.277 1.045 
Note: * means significance at .10 level, ** at .05 level, *** at .O1 level 
Tests of linear restrictions (t-tests) demonstrated that more centralized health 
system may still have lower mortality rates than more decentralized health systems, 
supporting hypothesis 1. However, these findings were less representative (significant in 
3 out of 4 models) than findings with single system types (significant in all 4 models) 
(Tables 13 and 15). Thus, there may be structural or process characteristics that are 
specific to each system type (e.g., high level of centralization of hospitals services in 
CHS) and aggregation of systems may not be appropriate in this case. Only one process 
of care delivery measure had a statistically significant trend shown in IQI models2. 
2 Sensitivity analyses (tests of linear restrictions) were conducted to estimate whether there are differences 
in marginal effects and direction across all five JCAHO variables on quality outcomes. We found that the 
differences are quite large, and therefore, summation of all five JCAHO variables into a si.ngle measure of 
clinical integration was not attainable. All five single JCAHO variable retained in the models as separate 
measures. 
Table 15: p-values of Tests of Linear Restriction Comparing More Centralized to More 
Decentralized Health Systems in IQI Random Effects Models 
Health System Type AM1 CHF Stroke Pneumonia 
More Decentralized 0.08 1 * 0.014** 0.1224 0.004*** 
Note: * means significance at .10 level, ** at .05 level, *** at .0 1 level 
As system hospital compliance with JCAHO requirement for availability of patient 
specific information improves, CHF, Stroke, and Pneumonia risk-adjusted mortality rates 
decrease by 0.439,0.752, and 0.98 1, respectively (Table 12). System hospitals in 
compliance with JCAHO requirement for availability of patient specific performance area 
may have attempted to improve their clinical information systems that may resulted in 
reduction of inpatient mortality. 
The rest of JCAHO variables did not demonstrate any significant trends in the IQI 
models. However, in only one model, hospital compliance with JCAHO requirement for 
initial assessment procedures may be associated with an increase in the Stroke mortality 
rates by 1.077, which may appear due to random variation. A discussion of these 
findings is provided in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
The other interesting hospital characteristics that were statistically significant in 
the IQI models are discussed below. Investor owned hospitals had 1.95 1 and 1.357 lower 
AM1 and CHF risk-adjusted mortality rates than publicly owned hospitals (Table 12). 
Investor owned hospitals may locate in or relocate their facilities in markets with a 
healthier and wealthier population base in comparison to publicly owned hospitals that 
are more likely to have an inner city location. Nonprofit hospital ownership status is 
associated with significantly higher Stroke mortality rate (1.980) than in publicly owned 
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hospitals (Table 12). As the total number of beds increases by one, the mortality rates for 
AMI, Stroke, and Pneumonia increase by 0.012,0.008, and 0.005, respectively at the 0.01 
significance level (Table 12). Hospitals in a 10-20 service mix and scope category have 
higher mortality rates that are highly significant in 3 IQI models for AMI, CHF, and 
Stroke and moderately significant in Pneumonia model in comparison to the reference 
group (the 0-10 service scope and mix category). Hospitals in a 20-30 service category 
have higher mortality rates for AM1 and Stroke than in the reference category (Table 12). 
These findings may suggest a possible explanation - as the hospital size, complexity, and 
the number and scope of services grow, the possibility of making a clinical mistake 
andlor not being able to identify andcorrect it in time may also increase. 
The models did not show any significant hospital financial performance trends on 
quality outcomes. The only finding that was significant suggested that one percentage 
point increase in the cash flow to total revenue ratio may lead to a 0.067 increase in the 
AM1 risk-adjusted mortality rate (Table 12). This finding is somewhat counterintuitive, 
is not observed in the.rest of IQI models, and may be attributed to random variation and 
noise. 
Some interesting patient specific effects are discussed below. Hospitals with a 
higher level of patient acuity (measured by the percentage of patients with 3 or 4 stages 
of risk of mortality) managed to lower their AMI, CHF, Stroke, Pneumonia mortality 
rates by 0.20 1,O. 1 14,O. 191, and 0.104, respectively. In the similar manner, as the 
complexity of cases measured by CMI grows, the mortality rates for CHF patients 
decrease by 1.994 and for Pneumonia patients - by 3.410. Also, AMI, Stroke, and 
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Pneumonia mortality rates go down by 2.727,2.025, and 0.633 as the volume of patient 
for these condition increases (Table 12). On one hand, having cared for more severe and 
complex patients and having a greater volume of patients, hospitals may increase their 
clinical expertise in providing better care for these types of patients. On the other hand, 
the location of death for sicker patients may be shifting outside the hospital, i.e. hospices, 
skilled nursing facilities. It was also found that having a greater percent of elderly 
patients (over 64 years old) increases mortality rate for AM1 patients by 0.134, CHF 
patients by 0.077, Stroke patients by 0.1 15, and Pneumonia by 0.061 in sys!em hospitals 
(Table 12). 
Only one market characteristics had a statistically significant and strong effect in 
IQI mortality models. A greater percent of older people (>65 years old) in a market 
significantly reduces mortality rates for AMI, CHF, Stroke, and Pneumonia (Table 12). 
This finding is somewhat unexpected and counterintuitive. One possibility is that 
hospitals in markets with greater elderly population may have improved their clinical 
expertise on how to provide better inpatient services to elderly patients. Alternatively, 
other providers of services for elderly (i.e., skilled nursing facilities) may be located in 
these markets, and there are, thus, more opportunities to transfer sick, older patients to 
these settings where they ultimately may die. 
Random Eflects Models with Patient Safety Indicators 
Tables 16 and 17 present random effects models with Patient Safety Indicators 
(PSIS) - Decubitus ulcer, Infection due to medical care, Post-operative PE and DVT, 
Post-operative sepsis, and Accidental puncture and laceration - as dependent variables. 
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Health system effects on adverse event rates were not observed in the PSI models. 
Test of linear restrictions showed significance in only one PSI for Accidental puncture 
and laceration, which may occur due to random variation (Tables 18 and 19). Thus, on 
one hand, structural characteristics of hospital-led health systems may be less important 
in improving patient safety in comparison with the effects of health systems on mortality 
outcomes (Tables 12 and 13). On the other hand, patient safety efforts may be newer 
programs so hospitals have yet to systematically work and improve in these areas. 
In terms of the measures of internal clinical process and integration, hospital 
compliance with the JCAHO requirements for availability of patient specific information 
was marginally significant and associated with reduction of rates of Infection due to 
medical care (Table 16). This finding may be plausible because it is consistent with the 
direction (i.e., negative signs) in the rest of PSI models, even though not significant. 
However, there are other significant, but inconsistent findings that seem less plausible. 
For example, hospital JCAHO compliance with operative procedures performance area 
was significant and negative in one PSI model; however, significant and positive in 
another PSI model (Table 16). Hospital compliance with initial assessment procedures 
and anesthesia care may have also followed this inconsistent trend. Significant, but 
inconsistent results in JCAHO measures may appear due to random variation. The 
hospital characteristics that had statistically significant effects in PSI models are 
described below. As in the IQI models, investor owned hospitals were better quality 
performers than publicly owned hospitals in two PSIS models. The coefficients were 
negative and significant. The risk adjusted adverse event rates for Post-operative PE and 
Table 16: Random Effects Models of Different Health System Types and Internal Clinical Process Effects on PSI Adverse Event Rates 
Accidental 
Variable Decubitus Ulcer Infection Due to Post-operative Post-operative Puncture 
Medical Care PE or DVT Sepsis or Laceration 
Std. Std. Std. Std. Std. 
Coef. Err. Coef. Err. Coef. Err. Coef. Err. Coef. Err. 
CHS -0.272 0.306 -0.006 0.030 0.054 0.134 -0.059 0.245 0.010 0.053 
CPIHS 
MCHS 
DHS 
Patient Specific Information -0.038 0.076 -0.015* 0.008 -0.015 0.035 -0.002 0.068 -0.010 0.0 14 
Medication Use 0.086 0.085 0.003 0.009 -0.062 0.039 0.060 0.076 -0.010 0.015 
Initial Assessment 
Procedures -0.053 0.085 -0.009 0.009 0.015 0.039 -0.061 0.076 0.037** 0.015 
Operative Procedures 0.165 0.170 -0.033** 0.017 0.163** 0.075 -0.038 0.146 -0.045 0.029 
Anesthesia Care 0.208 0.157 0.034** 0.016 -0.002 0.072 0.019 0.140 -0.036 0.028 
Total Beds 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.0002** 0.000 
For-profit 0.129 0.215 -0.015 0.020 -0.190** 0.091 -0.162 0.182 -0.102*** 0.036 
Nonprofit -0.107 0.180 -0.013 0.017 -0.290*** 0.076 -0.165 0.154 -0.012 0.030 
Service Scope and Mix (20 - 
30) -0.121 0.208 0.008 0.021 0.020 0.094 -0.174 0.193 0.046 0.037 
Service Scope and Mix (10 - 
20) -0.171 0.168 -0.005 0.017 -0.011 0.076 -0.140 0.168 -0.012 0.029 
Major Teaching 0.202 0.268 0.048* 0.025 0.126 0.112 -0.138 0.204 -0.016 0.044 
Minor Teaching -0.006 0.134 -0.006 0.013 -0.013 0.057 -0.124 0.107 -0.040* 0.023 
Urban -0.123 0.193 0.029 0.018 -0.131* 0.079 0.358** 0.165 0.01 1 0.032 
Total Nursing Staff Per 
Staffed Bed 0.04 1 0.110 0.041*** 0.011 0.014 0.048 -0.102 0.093 -0.019 0.019 
RNs to LPNs Ratio 0.004 0.007 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.007 0.006 0.001 0.001 
Continued 
Table 16: Random Effects Models of Different Health System Types and Internal Clinical Process Effects on PSI Adverse Event Rates 
(Continued) 
Accidental 
Variable Decubitus Ulcer Infection Due to Post-operative Post-operative Puncture 
Medical Care PE or DVT Sepsis or Laceration 
Cash Flow to Total Revenue -0.007 0.005 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.002** 0.001 
Age 19-64(%) 0.013 0.013 -0.004*** 0.001 -0.005 0.005 0.004 0.01 1 0.001 0.002 
Age > 64 (%) -0.003 0.009 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.001 0.004 -0.010 0.008 -0.003* 0.002 
Female (%) 0.028* 0.016 -0.002 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.020 0.014 -0.001 0.003 
Black (%) 0.018*** 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.007** 0.003 -0.001 0.001 
Severity Score 3 & 4 (%) 0.088*** 0.012 0.004*** 0.001 0.020*** 0.005 0.014 0.011 . 0.012*** 0.002 
Case Mix Index -1.418*** 0.459 0.005 0.043 -0.447** 0.215 0.710 0.436 -0.088 0.079 
Log of Volume (Total 
Patients at Risk) 0.1 14 0.095 0.012 0.010 0.098** 0.040 -0.086 0.071 0.014 0.019 
Hirschman Herfindah1 
Index -0.396* 0.230 -0.045** 0.022 0.108 0.095 -0.166 0.186 0.031 0.039 
HMO Penetration 0.338 0.315 -0.03 1 0.032 0.038 0.138 -0.422 0.265 -0.050 0.056 
Log of Per Capita Income 
(1 000s) -0.020 0.284 -0.033 0.026 0.073 0.1 15 0.166 0.223 -0.065 0.047 
Population Over 65 (%) -2.504* 1.350 -0.107 0.125 -0.866 0.549 1.060 1.083 -0.156 0.224 
MDs 45 - 54 Years Old Per 
Population -0.220 0.174 0.039** 0.017 0.071 0.074 0.006 0.141 0.051* 0.030 
Tight Physician-Hospital 
Arrangements 0.016 0.108 -0.006 0.01 1 -0.085* 0.049 -0.005 0.092 0.008 0.019 
Hybrid Physician-Hospital 
Arrangements 0.1 10 0.109 -0.009 0.011 -0.038 0.049 -0.1 12 0.091 0.019 0.019 
Second Time Period (1998 - 
2000) 0.303*** 0.079 0.041*** 0.008 0.247*** 0.037 0.440*** 0.069 0.068*** 0.015 
Constant -1.054 1.891 0.505 0.186 -0.264 0.788 -0.834 1.665 0.360 0.338 
Sample Size 474 474 468 42 1 468 
Number of Grou~s 318 319 316 286 319 
Note: * means significance at .10 level, ** at .05 level, *** at .Ol level 
Table 17: Random Effects Models of Aggregated Health System Types on PSI Adverse Event 
Rates 
Infection 
Variable Dicubitus Due Post-op PE Post-op Accident 
Ulcer to Med Care and DVT Sepsis Puncture 
Std. Std. Std. Std. Std. 
Coef. Err. Coef. Err. Coef. Err. Coef. Err. Coef. Err. 
More 
Centralized -0.222 0.285 0.001 0.029 0.087 0.124 0.038 0.227 0.020 0.049 
More 
Decentralized -0.341 0.275 0.018 0.027 0.114 0.120 0.049 0.218 0.075 0.048 
Note: * means significance at .10 level, ** at .05 level, *** at .Ol level 
Table 18: p-values of Tests of Linear Restriction Comparing Centralized Health Systems 
to the Other System Types in PSI Random Effects Models 
Infection Accidental Post- Post- 
Decubitus due operative operative Puncture Health System Type Ulcer PE or DVT Sepsis or Care Laceration 
Centralized Physician 
Insurance 0.659 0.53 1 0.584 0.275 0.68 
Moderately Centralized 0.699 0.33 0.222 0.468 0.012** 
Decentralized 0.559 0.774 0.941 0.37 0.057* 
Note: * means significance at .10 level, ** at .05 level, ***  at .O1 level 
Table 19: p-values of Tests of Linear Restriction Comparing More Centralized to More 
Centralized Health Systems in PSI Random Effects Models 
Infection 
Health System Type Decubitus Due to Post- Post- Accidental 
Ulcer Medical operative operative Puncture or 
Care PE or DVT Sepsis Laceration 
More Decentralized 0.29 0.102 0.59 0.91 0.005*** 
Note: * means significance at .10 level, **  at .05 level, ***  at .O1 level 
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DVT and Accidental puncture and laceration were 0.190 and 0.102 lower for investor 
owned hospitals. Nonprofit hospitals also had lower adverse event rate for Post-operative 
PE and DVT in comparison with public hospitals (Table 16). 
Other hospital-level findings are mainly scattered and do not form into any 
discernable trends in the PSI models. As the number of bed increases, the rate of adverse 
events for Accidental puncture and laceration declines. Hospitals in the major teaching 
category may have more patients that develop Infection due to medical care than 
hospitals with no teaching affiliation, i.e. reference group. Being in a minor teaching 
category may be associated with lower rates of Accidental puncture and laceration. 
Hospital location in urban areas was associated with a marginally significant decrease in 
the rate of Post-operative PE and DVT, but an increase in Post-operative sepsis (Table 
16). 
A greater number of nursing staff per patient bed has a significant and positive 
effect on patent safety outcomes in terms of Infection due to medical care rate. This rate 
increases by 0.041. Infection due to medical care is nursing sensitive, thus, having more 
nurses may increase a possibility of them making a mistake. Alternatively, having more 
nurses on staff may signal a sicker and more susceptible patient population that may not 
be captured by other variables. Also, hospitals that have a tightly managed physician- 
organization arrangements (POA) may have 0.085 lower rates of Post-operative PE and 
DVT in comparison with loosely integrated POAs (Table 16). 
In terms of patient characteristics, however, several trends are worth noting. 
Hospitals with a greater percentage of highly severe patients in 3 and 4 risk groups have 
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greater risk-adjusted adverse event rates detected in 4 out of 5 PSI models. This finding 
is strongly significant and positive (Table 16). A volume measure (number of patients at 
risk for an 'adverse event) is significant and positive for Post-operative PE and DVT 
adverse event rate, i.e. increasing the rates for these events. The directions for patients' 
acuity and volume reversed in the PSI models in comparison with the IQI models where 
patients' acuity and volume decreased risk-adjusted mortality rates. These findings may 
suggest that system hospitals choose to put more efforts and inputs into reducing well- 
monitored and evaluated inpatient mortality, rather than into less discernable and studied 
patient safety problems. 
A significant and negative effect of hospitals treating more complex patient mix 
(CMI) was similar in both PSI and IQI models. As complexity of cases grows, the rates 
of Decubitus ulcer and Post-operative PE and DVT decrease by 1.41 8 and 0.447, 
respectively, which is similar with the IQI finding (Tables 16 and 12). 
Another interesting finding that having a greater percent of black patients was associated 
with higher rates of Decubitus ulcer and Post-operative sepsis. Also, rates of risk- 
adjusted Infection due to medical care and Accidental puncture and laceration events 
were lower in hospitals with a greater percentage of elderly patients (over 64 years old) 
rather than in hospitals with a greater percent of younger patients (less than 19, i.e. 
reference category). 
This finding is counterintuitive; however, younger surgical patients, such as 
trauma, ICU patients, may require quick clinical responselreaction, and thus, a greater 
possibility of making a mistake. These types of case complexity may not be captured in 
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the empirical models. Also, having more patients in the middle age group (19-64) was 
also associated with a decrease in the rate of Infection due to medical care (Table 16). 
Several market characteristics demonstrated statistically significant effects on 
patient safety outcomes. Hospitals located in markets with lower levels of competition 
are more likely to be better quality providers in terms of Decubitus ulcer and Infection 
due to medical care adverse events. These risk-adjusted rates decrease by 0.396 and 
0.045, respectively, as HHI increases (i.e., competition decreases). 
Decubitus ulcer rates may be 2.504 lower in markets with a greater percentage of 
elderly residents (over 65). Markets with greater proportion of physicians in the 45-54 
age category per population are characterized by having statistically significant and 
positive (i.e., increasing) rates of Infection due to medical care and Accidental puncture 
and laceration. This may occur because more procedures provided in markets with the 
greater number of physicians. 
A strong and positive trend was also observed in the second time period. The 
rates of Decubitus ulcer, Infection due to medical care, Post-operative PE and DVT, Post- 
operative sepsis, and Accidental puncture or laceration increased by 0.303,0.041,0.247, 
0.440, and 0.068, respectively. This trend may be suggestive of a possible Balanced 
Budget Act's effect or other unobservable market or policy effects on patient safety 
outcomes. One of the explanations is that hospitals' proficiency and rigor in reporting of 
the adverse events may have been increasing, especially after the Institute of Medicine 
(IOM) reports in 1999 and 2000. The cross-sectional analyses are described in the 
following section. 
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Cross-Sectional Analyses 
Since the panel data was limited to only two time periods (due to a JCAHO data 
limitation), it was impossible to use lagged quality outcomes and hospital financial 
performance to address a possible feedback issue in the panel model. The cross-sectional 
design, using three stage estimation models, which is evaluated separately for two years 
of 1997 (this year is chosen, because the 1997 JCAHO's data set has substantially more 
hospitals than the 1995 data set) and 2000, was proposed to reassure validity of empirical 
findings with panel data and to address a possible feedback issue. 
Lagged quality outcomes and hospital financial performance and other variables 
reflective of preferable market conditions were proposed at this stage to account for a 
possible feedback or the effect of a system type choice. Three stage estimation models 
have been undertaken; however, due to serious limitations, cross - sectional analyses 
were viewed as problematic and unreliable. Multinomial logit models for estimating 
predicted probabilities for different types of health systems were conducted at first with 
the 1997 data. 
The sample size for the year 1997 was 246 hospitals with complete data, i.e. 
system hospitals with HCUP and JCAHO data. The cross-sectional models with a full set 
of variables (Chapter 4) were run with types of systems as dependent (categorical) 
variables and IHS as a reference group. The number of observations has drop even more 
to about 146 observations for the multinomial models due to missing data in lagged 
quality outcomes (e.g., 45 missing for AMI) and lagged cash flow to total revenue (63 
missing). 
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The models were also not sustainable - they did not provide an overall Chi- 
squared p-values, LR Chi-squared, and log likelihood, and a number of variables (e.g., 
major and minor teaching, for-profit ownership status) dropped out from the models. 
Sensitivity analyses demonstrated that the only one JCAHO variable - availability of 
patient specific information - had a significant and negative effect on mortality 
indicators. The rest of variables were not sufficient predictors of quality. 
Since measures of internal clinical process and integration were weak and 
merging in JCAHO data lead to significant reduction of the sample size, a simplified 
model was undertaken. The simplified model differs from the three stage estimation 
model by excluding predicted scores of clinical integration (JCAHO) step from the 
analyses. All other components and descriptions of elements were similar with the three 
stage estimation model, and predicted probabilities for health systems were directly put 
into the final OLS model for estimating quality outcomes, and the clinical integration 
stage was not analyzed. Exclusion of JCAHO data increased the 1997 sample size to 738 
observations. However, when the multinomial models were run, the number of 
observations still went down to about 330. This drop in observations happens due to a 
cumulative effect of missing values in key measures, lagged values of quality indicators 
(22 1 missing observation) and cash flow to total revenue (244 missing observations). 
The multinomial models remained unstable. Therefore, two factors - the weak clinical 
process measure and the significant decline in the sample size with and without JCAHO 
data - could sufficiently and unpredictably affect the cross-sectional findings. Therefore, 
the decision was made not continue further with the proposed cross-sectional analyses. 
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Summary 
It was found that the IQI and PSI models have different patterns. In the IQI 
models, hospitals in CHS tend to perform better than hospitals in MCHS, DHS, and IHS 
in all four models. There is no difference in mortality indicators between hospitals in 
CHS and CPIHS in two models, but hospitals in CHS have better performance in the 
other two models than hospitals in CPIHS. System hospitals that are in compliance with 
the JCAHO performance area for availability of patient specific information may 
improve clinical process and integration of care delivery for patients at risk for CHF, 
Stroke, Pneumonia, and Infection due to medical care. The PSI models did not indicate 
any hospital-led health systems' effects on the rates of adverse events. There were some 
pattern effects as well as single effects of other hospital, patient, and market characteristic 
on mortality and patient safety rates. Tables providing schematic depictions of 
hypotheses that were supported, partially supported, and unsupported as well as 
implications of these and other main findings are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to assess structural and process elements associated 
with the delivery of high quality care. It is proposed that structural differences among 
health systems may yield differences in care provision, resulting in differences in quality 
outcomes. It is conceptualized that centralization of authority in centralized health 
systems and differentiatiodspecialization of services in decentralized health systems 
would result in different approaches to care delivery processes in various types of healtli 
systems and lead to different quality outcomes in these system types. Three research 
questions were posed: 
1. What types of health systems and their member hospitals are associated with the 
best quality outcomes, produced by hospitals in those systems? 
2. What types of health systems and their member hospitals are associated with the 
worst quality outcomes, produced by hospitals in those systems? 
3. Are there differences in care delivery processes associated with positive or 
negative quality outcomes in hospitals in various types of health systems? 
The conceptual model, based on Contingency Theory, suggested contrasting 
scenarios and hypotheses. According to Scenario 1, greater centralization of hospital-led 
health systems may allow systems' leadership to manage effectively increasing 
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interconnectedness of providers, improve coordination, internal clinical processes, and 
integration of organizations, and consolidate certain administrative and possibly clinical 
services in centralized health systems, which would increase volume of services provided 
at a certain facility within the system. As a result, it was hypothesized that better quality 
outcomes would be observed in more centralized health systems in comparison with more 
decentralized health systems. It was also hypothesized that centralized physician- 
insurance systems would have better quality outcomes than just centralized health 
systems due to their tighter physician-hospital integration, which could improve internal 
process and integration of care delivery, and due to possible financial incentives that 
physicians may receive from their affiliated systems to improve quality. 
According to Scenario 2, decentralization of large health systems may improve 
adjustments of hospitals with internal contingency of size and increase service 
availability and accessibility through differentiation of services. Specialization of tasks is 
also necessitated by and occurs as a result of structural complexity of large organizations. 
Specialization, formalization, and worker autonomy are positively correlated with 
decentralization of structures (Child, 1972; Scott, 2003). Decentralized organization may 
use specialization, formalization, and autonomy to improve effectiveness of 
organizational processes and, as a result, organizational performance. Different hospitals 
within Decentralized Health Systems (DHS) may get engaged into "internal competition" 
with their fellow members to improve quality. Thus, it was hypothesized that better 
quality outcomes could be observed in more decentralized health systems in comparison 
with more centralized. 
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The interplay of both scenarios provides that, on one hand, moderately centralized 
health systems can potentially become quality champions in comparison with other 
system types, because they may have found the "right" organizational structure and 
strategic balance between centralization and differentiation of their structures and 
services given the environment in which they operate. On the other hand, independent 
health systems were hypothesized to have the worst quality outcomes in comparison with 
other system types, because their structures may be characterized as neither centralized 
nor differentiated. 
The data from seven well-established data bases were assembled for short-term, 
general, nonfederal hospitals from 11 states for 6 years from 1995 to 2000. Two research 
designs - panel and cross-sectional - were proposed. However, due to missing 
observations on key variables, the cross-sectional study was not viable. Random effects 
models, though, provided consistent and efficient results. In the following sections, the 
findings and conclusions are summarized, the implications and significance for the 
theory, policy and future research are provided, as well as, the limitations of this study 
are described. 
Summary and Interpretation of the Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive analyses demonstrated that hospitals in .the empirical, 1 1 state sample 
were different from the hospitals in the national sample. There were more hospitals in 
Centralized Physician/Insurance Health Systems (CPIHS) and Independent Hospital 
Systems (IHS); however, lesser hospitals in Moderately Centralized Health Systems 
(MCHS) and Decentralized Health Systems (DHS) in the empirical sample rather than in 
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the national sample. There was no difference in the percentages of hospitals in 
Centralized Health Systems (CHS) in two samples. System hospitals in the empirical 
sample (in comparison with system hospitals in the national sample) were more likely: 
a) to be larger by 30 beds on average; 
b) to have nonpublic and voluntary ownership; 
c) to be in major and minor teaching categories; 
d) to provide a greater mix and number of services; 
e) to be located in urban areas and less likely in rural areas; 
f) to have a greater percentage of total nursing staff that were RNs. 
Therefore, based on the t and Chi-squared tests, it was concluded that system 
hospitals in the empirical (1 1 state) sample were different than system hospitals in the 
national sample. The findings of this study cannot be generalized to hospitals in the 
USA. 
In the descriptive study, it was also found that organizational characteristics of 
system hospitals varied by system type. More sample hospitals belonged to Moderately 
Centralized Health System (MCHS) and Decentralized Health System (DHS) types and 
lesser hospitals belonged to Centralized Health Systems (CHS), Centralized 
Physician/Insurance Health Systems (CPIHS), and Independent Hospital Systems (IHS). 
Most of system hospitals in the empirical sample had a voluntary, nonprofit ownership 
status. However, a greater percentage of DHS and IHS hospitals had for-profit status. 
CHS and CPIHS in comparison with other system types stand out by having: 
a) a greater number of beds; more hospitals in major teaching category; 
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b) a greater number and scope of services provided; 
c) a greater percentage of RNs of licensed nursing staff when compared with 
other system types. 
In conclusion, there were clear organizational differences among hospitals in 
different types of health systems which were necessary to control statistically in the 
multivariate regressions. 
The Adjusted Least Squared Means (ALSM) methodology was used to identify 
trends in,quality and patient safety outcomes by system types during the study period. It 
was also examined whether there was a hospital system relationship with quality 
outcomes, controlling for residual differences in hospital level patient characteristics 
(age, gender, and race), acuity (3 and 4 levels of mortality and severity) and complication 
(case-mix index) that had measurable and significant effects on IQI mortality and PSI 
adverse event rates. The ALSM found a relationship between system types and inpatient 
quality indicators (IQIs), i.e., hospitals in DHS, CHS, and CPIHS in comparison with 
IHS hospitals had lower mortality rates during the 1995-2000 period. 
However, in terms of PSI adverse event rates, the findings were less clear and 
significant. Mortality rates and patient safety adverse events increased or leveled off 
after 1998, which may be suggestive of the BBA effect, changes in the hospital reporting 
practice of patient adverse events post the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report on medical 
errors in 1999, and/or other marketlpolicy effects on system hospitals' quality 
performance. Summarizing the ALSM findings and descriptive analysis of system 
differences, it may be concluded that: 
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a) both decentralization and centralization of hospital structures may be 
associated with decreased mortality rates; 
b) hospital system effect was less clear when patient safety indicators were used 
as dependent variables; 
c) even though the ALSM controlled for hospital specific patient characteristics, 
statistical controls for hospital and market characteristics were essential. 
Multivariate analyses were conducted with statistical controls and helped to 
clarify hospital system effects on quality and patient safety outcomes in the ALSM 
models. 
Summary and Interpretation of the Hypotheses Testing 
Even though the conceptual model suggested that Inpatient Quality Indicators 
(IQI) mortally rates and Patient Safety Indicators (PSI) adverse events would flag 
potential quality problems in the same way, the empirical results show otherwise. 
Models with IQI mortality rates and PSI adverse events convey quite different stories of 
hospital system effects on quality performance. Thus, the findings from IQI (Table 20) 
and PSI models are summarized and discussed separately. 
Inpatient Quality Indicator Models 
In the conceptual model, the aggregation of centralized and centralized physician- 
insurance health systems into one category was proposed (i.e., systems with more 
centralized structures). The aggregation of decentralized and moderately decentralized 
health systems into another category was also proposed (i.e., systems with more 
decentralized structures). These made sense conceptually; however, empirically, these 
Table 20: Summary of Hypotheses Tested in the IQI models 
aggregations were not satisfactory in singling out hospital system effects on quality 
performance. Also, the cross-sectional study was not viable due to missing and 
incomplete data. Thus, empirical evaluation of which system type may have a better 
internal process and integration of care delivery in place that could lead to lower 
mortality rates was not possible. 
Supported 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Partially 
supported; 
hospitals in 
IHS were 
worse than 
in CHS 
Hypotheses 
Centralization of structures+ quality performance 
H 1 : Hospitals in more centralized health systems would 
have better quality performance than hospitals in DHS 
Tighter physician-hospital integration + quality 
performance 
H 2: Hospitals in CPIHS would have better quality 
performance than hospitals in CHS 
Decentralization to outcomes + quality performance 
H 3: Hospitals in DHS would have better quality 
performance than hospitals in more centralized structures 
Combination of centralization and differentiation- 
quality performance 
H 4: Hospital in MCHS would have better quality than 
hospitals in other system types 
Low centralization and differentiation -+ quality 
performance 
H 5: Hospital in IHS would have worse quality than 
hospitals in other system types performance 
Expected 
Direction 
Decrease 
Mortality 
Decrease 
Mortality 
Decrease 
Mortality 
Decrease 
Mortality 
Increase 
Mortality 
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Therefore, the findings for five essential system types (instead of aggregated 
system categories) are discussed. The effects of systems' internal clinical processes and 
integration on quality are discussed for hospitals in general, rather than specifically by 
each single system type. 
Hypothesis 1, centralization of hospital-led health systems would result in better 
quality performance was supported. Hospitals in Centralized Health Systems (CHS) had 
lower mortality rates for Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI), Congestive Heart Failure 
(CHF), Stroke, and Pneumonia patients compared with almost. all other types of health 
systems at varying significance levels (Tables 11 and 12). Only quality performance of 
hospitals in Centralized Physician/Insurance Health Systems in terms of Stroke and 
Pneumonia mortality rates were similar to those in CHS hospitals. 
Centralization of hospital-led health systems may result in more effective internal 
clinical processes, and thus, better quality performance. Centralization of structures may 
possibly improve internal process of care delivery and integration of services by: 
a) enhanced coordination of activities, communication between providers, timely 
adjustments of process of care delivery and structures to external pressures 
(Shortell et al., 1996 and 2000); 
b) development and diffusion of management and clinical information systems, 
quality management, and care management practices (Alexander et al., 2003, 
Savage et al., 1997); 
c) possible clinical integration of providers into an Integrated Delivery System 
(Shortell et al., 1996). 
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Thus, it is possible to conclude that hospitals in CHS may have introduced more 
effective structures that improve process of care delivery and integration of services. 
Superior structure and process of care delivery may decrease mortality rates in CHS 
hospitals. 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported. Hospitals in CPIHS were not better quality 
performers in comparison with hospitals in CHS, which had lower mortality AM1 and 
CHF mortality rates than CPIHS hospitals. There were no statistically significant 
differences between these two types of systems in terms of Stroke and Pneumonia 
mortality (Table 12). It was hypothesized that CPIHS hospitals may have a higher level 
of physician-hospital integration than hospitals in CHS, resulting in more effective 
clinical process and integration of services. The CPIHS may also introduce financial and 
other incentive systems for their affiliated physicians, stimulating them to improve 
quality. Therefore, the CPIHS hospitals may have lower mortality rates in comparison 
with hospitals in other system types. However, having higher levels of centralization of 
physician arrangements and insurance products as in CPIHS hospitals did not lower 
inpatient mortality. In conclusion, the findings suggest that that centralization of hospital 
services at the system level as in CHS may contribute to reduction of inpatient mortality. 
Hypothesis 3, which proposed that hospitals in decentralized health systems 
(DHS) would be better quality performers (i.e., having lower mortality rates) than more 
centralized health systems under certain conditions, was not supported. DHS hospitals 
had higher mortality rates than CHS hospitals in all four IQI models. These findings 
suggest that decentralization of leadership, differentiation and divisionalization of 
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services may add administrative layers and increase bureaucratization of structures. 
Bureaucratization may create barriers in information exchanges, disable leadership to 
make and communicate decisions quickly. Bureaucratization may also remove 
accountability of clinical personnel. It is also possible that the volume of service 
offerings is low in any given hospital in DHS, due to a lack of consolidation of clinical 
departments. Thus, it is more difficult to achieve a certain level of clinical excellence in 
DHS hospitals. These may explain why hospitals in DHS had higher mortality rates than 
hospitals in CHS. 
Hypothesis 4 was that hospitals in moderately centralized health systems (MCHS) 
would be better quality providers due to their ability to take advantage of both 
centralization and differentiation strategies. It was suggested that if appropriate balance 
is achieved, the MCHS hospitals' quality performance would improve. However, 
hypothesis 4 was not supported. Quality performance of hospitals in MCHS was worse 
than in CHS hospitals and no different from other system types. Therefore, this 
balancing of two somewhat opposing strategies - centralization of leadership and 
differentiation of services - may not be effective in achieving superior quality 
performance. Porter (1 980) characterized organizations that pursue multiple and 
somewhat conflicting strategies which result in inconsistent performance as "stuck in the 
middle," which may result in inconsistent performance. In conclusion, it is possible to 
suggest that hospitals in MCHS may experience a possible misfit of conflicting structures 
and processes with their environment, which resulted in unsatisfactory quality 
performance. 
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In answering the first research question on which type of hospital-led health 
system is associated with better quality outcomes, the findings suggest that hospitals in 
Centralized Health Systems are associated with lower mortality rates as measured as 
Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQIs) for AMI, CHF, Stroke, and Pneumonia. 
Hypothesis 5 suggested that hospitals in independent hospital system (IHS) would 
produce worse quality outcomes than hospitals in all other types of health systems was 
partially supported. Hospitals in IHS were worse quality providers in comparison with 
hospitals in centralized health system (CHS). It was found that hospitals in CHS have 
lower mortality rates for AMI, CHF, Stroke and Pneumonia patients (Table 1 I). 
Although quality performance of hospitals in IHS was not statistically different from 
quality performance of hospitals in CPIHS, MCHS, and DHS, the direction (i.e., negative 
signs) of coefficient estimates for these system types were suggestive of their lower 
mortality rates in comparison with IHS hospitals (Table 11). Therefore, it is possible to 
conclude that the lack of centralization and differentiation may have contributed to the 
poor IHS hospitals' quality performance, i.e. higher mortality rates. Having low levels of 
centralization may preclude hospitals in IHS from effective decision making, 
communication of policies to their clinical and managerial staff, and coordination of 
clinical services and activities with their other system members. Having low levels of 
differentiation may preclude these hospitals from maintaining substantial infrastructure, 
physician arrangements, and resource base in their submarkets. 
In answering the second research question on which type of hospital-led health 
system is associated with worse quality outcomes (i.e., higher mortality rates), the 
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findings are partially suggestive that hospitals in Independent Hospitals Systems were 
associated with lower mortality rates as measured as Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQIs) 
for AMI, CHF, and Pneumonia. 
Patient Safety Indicator Models 
The support for Hypotheses 1-5 was not found in the PSI models (Table 21). It is 
possible to conclude that hospital-led health systems' structural characteristics did not 
affect patient safety adverse events. On one hand, patient safety improvements may 
require clinicians to pay more attention to and to be involved at a greater level in adverse 
events' prevention and management. Education and awareness of both clinicians and 
patients may reduce the rates of adverse events in system hospitals. Several interventions 
may be proposed: 
a) training of clinicians on patient safety guidelines; 
b) increasing clinicians accountability for making mistakes; 
c) introduction of the routine system checks (e.g., set reminders for clinicians to 
remove catheters, periodically turn patients with long length of stay over to 
prevent pressure ulcers, etc.) 
On the other hand, it is possible that the state of the art guidelines and protocols 
on the improvement of patient safety and reduction of adverse events are still 
underdeveloped. Patient safety is a relatively new issue for hospitals to focus on and 
there may be big differences due to reporting patterns among these hospitals. Therefore, 
hospital-led systems may not be able to promote improvements in patient safety at this 
stage and require more time for the system effect to show up. 
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Table 21 : Summary of Hypotheses Tested in the PSI models 
Implications of the Findings 
This study builds upon the previous empirical work on hospital systems and 
quality of care. The study contributes to the general body of knowledge in several ways 
described as follows: 
Rather than examining the impact of hospital systems generally on quality 
and patient safety, the impact of different types of health systems on quality 
Supported 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Hypotheses 
Centralization of structures-+ quality performance 
H 1 : Hospitals in more centralized health systems would 
have better quality performance than hospitals in DHS 
Tighter physician-hospital integration -+ quality 
performance 
H 2: Hospitals in CPIHS would have better quality 
performance than hospitals in CHS 
Decentralization to outcomes + quality performance 
H 3 : Hospitals in DHS would have better quality 
performance than hospitals in more centralized structures 
Combination of centralization and differentiation* 
quality performance 
H 4: Hospital in MCHS would have better quality than 
hospitals in other system types 
Low centralization and differentiation -+ quality 
performance 
H 5: Hospital in IHS would have worse quality than 
hospitals in other system types performance 
Expected 
Direction 
Decrease 
Mortality 
Decrease 
Mortality 
Decrease 
Mortality 
Decrease 
Mortality 
Increase 
Mortality 
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outcomes was studied. Hospital-led systems vary considerably in their 
structures and ,they have very different effects on these key outcomes. 
Whether different system types have different effect on quality is important 
for policymakers and hospital managers to know and consider; 
The conceptual model provides opposing scenarios and empirical tests 
reveal that centralization of health system's structure may decrease mortality 
rates in system hospitals; 
Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project State Inpatient Database (HCUP 
SID) quality and patient safety indicators were used as multiple quality 
signals, conveying different stories at present (i.e. there were no system 
effect in PSI models), which may be useful for future research by suggesting 
that conceptual and analytical models should be separately developed and 
specified when quality signals are measured by mortality rates and patient 
adverse events; 
JCAHO variables were proposed as measures of internal clinical process 
and integration and it was found that hospital compliance with JCAHO 
performance area for availability of patient specific information may be an 
important measure of clinical process and integration, which should be used 
in future studies along with other possible measures of clinical processes. 
Implications to Theory 
Contingency theory was used to develop ,the conceptual model. Contingency 
theory provided two opposing scenarios on how different types of hospital-led health 
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systems have evolved through either centralization or differentiation of their structures 
and services. Contingency theory was usehl and versatile in developing of empirically 
testable hypotheses. This research has confirmed that system hospitals' structural 
characteristic - centralization - may improve hospital quality performance measured by 
Inpatient Quality Indicators. Thus, providing support for Scenario 1, which stated that 
the leadership of Centralized Health Systems may pursue centralization of structure in 
order to effectively integrate their task, services, production lines at the system level and 
result in improved quality performance. 
This study has also found no system effects on hospital quality performance 
measured by Patient Safety Indicators. This finding may suggest that the centralization 
of authority may have a lesser effect on conditions (i.e., patient adverse events) that are 
yet less developed, unlike the mortality rates, in terms of correct detecting, reporting, 
monitoring, treatment, and preventing. In-hospital mortality has been studied for a long 
time; however, patient safety issues are relatively new problems, taking a "center stage" 
only after the IOM report in 1999. 
Thus, the effectiveness of centralization may be conditioned upon how well 
clinical and organizational approaches of quality improvement are defined and the end 
results (i.e. quality outcomes) are monitored. However, if there are no such conditions in 
place (as yet for patient safety issues), centralization may lack its advantages over other 
structural characteristics. 
The findings have also partially supported the proposition that health systems 
with low centralization and differentiation (i.e., Independent Hospital Systems) may be 
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less effective in managing of both internal contingencies of task interdependence and 
organizational size. Hospitals in this system type may be disadvantaged in dealing with 
their internal pressures to restructure. 
In the study, it was not possible to evaluate directly the external environment's 
and environmental shifts' effects on system structures and outcomes, because the 
proposed cross-sectional study that meant to test these effects was not viable due to data 
limitations. In the longitudinal study, the association between the systems' structures and 
quality outcomes was evaluated, holding the external environment's characteristics (e.g., 
hospital competition, managed care, and other market conditions) constant. It is possible 
to suggest that future studies should test a relationship or the fit between the external 
environment, organizational structure, and organizational performance, given data 
availability. 
Implications to Policy and Management 
Public (e.g., federal and state governments), private (e.g., employers, health plans) 
organizations, and, in some instances, consumers would probably like to know that 
centralized health systems may produce better quality performance in terms of mortality 
outcomes, so they can potentially: 
a) get better hospital value when making purchasing decisions, weighing quality 
differences against costs, or seeking care in these system hospitals; 
c) give hospital systems direct or indirect incentives to adopt such a structure; 
d) give hospital leaders information about how to structure their system to 
improve quality. 
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Similarly, health policymakers and hospital managers may draw useful 
conclusions from knowing that hospital compliance with JCAHO performance area score 
for availability of patient specific information may improve system hospitals' quality 
performance. This finding may be suggestive of the importance of continuous hospital 
investment in information systems and improvements of their clinical records. 
The study also found that system and hospital organizational characteristics were 
less dominant in the PSI models in comparison with the IQI models. On one hand, it may 
be related to the reporting issues. On the other hand, it may be related to individual 
characteristics of clinicians, such as their knowledge of and compliance with patient 
safety protocols and guidelines. Both of these issues may be addressed by improving the 
hospital information and reporting system, installing routine system checks for adverse 
events, and providing additional training and education on patient safety issues to both 
clinical personnel and consumers. Future research needs to evaluate a potential Balanced 
Budget Act (BBA) effect, changes in the hospital reporting practice, and other 
market/policy effects on patient safety adverse events and medical errors. 
Implications to Methodology 
One possible implication to methodology is as follows. It is proposed that system 
hospitals' compliance with JCAHO performance standards may be used in measuring 
internal clinical process and integration, such as a use of clinical information systems and 
clinical evidence-based practices, guidelines, protocols, and medical registries (Burns, 
1999). It is found that one proposed measure of internal clinical process and integration, 
i.e. hospitals' compliance with JCAHO performance standards for availability of patient 
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specific information, had a statistically significant and negative (i.e., decreasing) effect 
on mortality rates. This finding may be useful for measuring structure-process+outcome 
relationships and contribute to conceptual and empirical modeling in future studies. 
The results demonstrate that as hospital compliance with JCAHO requirement for 
availability of patient specific information increases, mortality rates decrease for CHF, 
Stroke, and Pneumonia patients. Adverse events for Infection due to medical care may 
also be reduced in system hospitals that were in compliance with this JCAHO 
performance area. 
Availability of Patient Specific Information may ensure that the necessary 
information about the patients care is obtained and maintained in the medical record in a 
timely manner and readily available for clinicians' use. Therefore, hospitals with greater 
compliance with JCAHO performance area for availability of patient specific information 
may have a superior system of clinical information sharing and coordinating care delivery 
that can be effectively utilized in comparison with hospitals with lesser compliance with 
this JCAHO requirement. 
However, all other JCAHO variables were not significant predictors of hospital 
quality performance in this study. On one hand, the JCAHO accreditation has been 
trying to focus their standards on the best practices and evidence-based medicine 
(Sprague, 2005). On the other hand, the JCAHO-led accreditation process has been 
criticized, because: accreditation is voluntary, it is scheduled in advance (i.e., giving 
hospitals time "to put on their best face"), JCAHO is founded by health care industry, 
JCAHO does not enforce change, and accreditors rarely deny or terminate accreditation 
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(Sprague, 2005). Therefore, some of the JCAHO measures may be more useful for 
research purposes than the other measures. At least one significant and possibly useful 
measure was found that may be associated with internal clinical process and integration 
in hospital-led systems and is helpful for focusing internal quality improvement efforts. 
This measure should be used with a set of other possible measures of clinical integration 
in future research, linking structure-process-outcomes. 
As a result, this study contributed to the general knowledge on how hospital 
system integration affects quality of care, which may be useful for the further 
development of theoretical and conceptual models, policy and managerial interventions 
to decrease in-hospital mortality and patient adverse events, and for improving 
methodology by better linking structure-process-outcomes. However, there is also need 
to identify possible limitations of this study and provide directions for future studies in 
the following sections. 
Limitations of the Study 
Taxonomy of health system is largely focused on structural rather than 
managerialloperational characteristics. Even though Alexander et al. (2003) discovered 
that there was an association between centralization of service, physician arrangements, 
and insurance products and centralized decision making in CHS, there were no data 
available in this study to directly quantify a leadership style in one or another system 
type. Thus, it was assumed that centralization of structures is also reflective of 
centralization of leadership and decision making. Also, Luke and Wholey (1 999) in their 
commentary suggested that taxonomy was not taking into consideration that multihospital 
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systems range fiom local to regional to national in their scope. However, the taxonomy 
describes different system types in terms of their geographic location/dispersion. For 
example, hospitals in Centralized Health Systems and Centralized Physician/Insurance 
Health Systems tend to be located in close geographic proximity, and hospitals in 
Decentralized Health Systems are spread over a broad geographic area (Bazzoli, et al. 
1999). The taxonomy is work in progress, and thus, future studies may need to research 
whether regionalization and systems' geographic dispersion affect organizational 
dimensions of hospital systems. 
Another potential criticism is that the taxonomy has not been reflective of changes 
in the hospital industry. Dubbs, Bazzoli, and colleagues (2004) reexamined 
organizational configuration of health systems in the classification, using the 1998 data. 
They concluded that "the 1998 cluster categories are similar to the original taxonomy, 
however, they reveal some new organizational configurations" (p. 207). They found that 
the centralized categories combined into the Centralized Health System and the 
decentralized categories split into the Decentralized and Decentralized 
Physician/Insurance Health Systems. Their findings may not have an effect on the 
current study, since the key structural dimensions remained unchanged for all system 
types and the Centralized Health Systems' structure was not affected by re-classification. 
Since the panel data were limited to only two time periods (due to a JCAHO data 
limitation), it was impossible to use lagged quality outcomes and hospital financial 
performance to address a possible feedback issue in the panel model. It was proposed to 
use the cross-sectional design using three stage estimation models with lagged quality 
198 
and financial performance measures. Also, it was also planned to evaluate which system 
type had developed "better" internal clinical process and integration in this cross- 
sectional study. We hoped to analyze how the external environments and the shifts in 
external environments may affect quality outcomes as well. 
However, the cross-sectional models were not stable and this design was not 
viable due to a large number of missing observations. It was impossible to compare and 
validate the results using both longitudinal and cross-sectional designs and control for a 
possible feedback problem, evaluate clinical processes by system type, and the external 
environment's effects on the hospital system quality performance. Future research needs 
to address these issues by collecting more data, ideally for another 3 years from 2000- 
2003. 
The IQIs and PSIS were used to flag possible quality problems; these indicators 
were also generated from the secondary data bases and may have errors inherent in 
administrative data bases (Scott, Youlden, & Coory, 2004). The ongoing debate on 
reliability and validity of claims data has not been resolved. However, the panel data 
were used; and the system hospitals' quality performance was examined using multiple 
risk-adjusted indictors, large, well-established data sets, and advanced econometric 
models that may improve reliability and validity of findings and help distinguish trends in 
hospital quality outcomes by different types of health systems. Therefore, this study has 
both strengths and weaknesses as any other empirical study. However, it is believed that 
the strengths balance out the weaknesses in this case. The future research possibilities 
and conclusion are discussed in the following section. 
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Suggestion for Future Research 
In conducting the current study, several research possibilities are discovered and 
discussed below. Several suggestions are also made that may be of value for other 
researchers. In the descriptive study, the increase in the percentage of CHS hospitals 
after 1998 was discovered. Reasons for this increase are not yet known and this trend has 
not been studied. Future research need to look at further advancement and development 
of different types of hospital-led health systems in recent years. 
It may be useful to use different conceptual and empirical approaches in studying 
hospital quality performance as measured as IQI and PSI. This study found that system 
and hospital organizational characteristics were less dominant in the PSI models in 
comparison with the IQI models. Thus, future research should evaluate individual patient 
and clinician characteristics in their association with patient safety, as well as, possible 
effects of and trends in patient safety outcomes in association with the hospital reporting 
patterns, the Balanced Budget Act (BBA), or other unobservable market or policy 
interventions. Data on leadership styles and direct measures of process of care delivery in 
different system types and their effects on quality performance were not available. A 
future study may try to collect quantitative andlor qualitative data on 
leadershiplmanagement styles and processes of care delivery by different types of 
hospital-led systems. Combining quantitative and qualitative data on leadership style and 
process of care delivery could provide more insight on how health systems' structure, 
process, and outcomes are linked together. JCAHO performance scores in particular 
areas should be evaluated further and potentially used as measures of clinical process in 
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future research. One of these measures (i.e., hospital compliance with JCAHO 
performance area for availability of patient specific information) should be used in 
studying structure-process-outcomes relationships in hospitals, as the findings suggested, 
it has significant influence on hospital mortality outcomes. 
In this study, it was impossible to directly control for system hospital referral 
practices to long-term care facilities. It is likely that hospitals in CHS have developed 
more efficient referral strategies, and thus, reduced their inpatient mortality. A future 
study could use a 30- or 90- day mortality rates or re-admission to hospitals in addition 
to in-hospital mortality outcomes. 
Another research possibility is to look at a primary care-inpatient care link in 
association with hospital quality performance. It is plausible that large centralized health 
systems may be more likely to have advanced primary care capacity andlor be capitated 
and hence have more capabilitylincentives to provide superior preventive and primary 
care services, develop ambulatory surgical and emergency centers to their population in 
comparison with other system types. Therefore, CHS may be triaging patients before 
their admission to a hospital. 
This triaging may allow hospitals concentrate their efforts, time, and resources on 
patients with the actual needs for intensive care andlor to get those in need of them the 
services required in a timely manner. Less severe patients' care may be effectively 
managed on the pre-hospital stage. Therefore, this study provides some ideas on how to 
advance future research on system hospitals, their leadership and process of care delivery, 
and integration with other health care providers in association with quality of care. 
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Conclusion 
Using Contingency theory as the conceptual framework, this study provides 
evidence for a hospital-led health system effect on quality of care. The findings suggest 
that hospitals in Centralized Health Systems were quality "champions", being able to 
decrease AMI, CHF, Stroke, and Pneumonia mortality rates in comparison with other 
hospital system types. Centralization of hospital structures may improve internal clinical 
processes by enhanced coordination of activities, communication between providers, 
timely adjustments of process of care delivery and structures to external pressures, and 
other mechanisms. 
System hospital compliance with the JCAHO performance area for availability of 
patient specific information system may have improved the process of care delivery for 
CHF, Stroke, and Pneumonia patients in system hospitals. System hospitals may have 
been continuously investing in their information and clinical record systems that resulted 
in improvements in quality of care. 
It is also concluded that hospital-led health systems' structural characteristics may 
not affect patient safety adverse events. However, a lack of hospital systems' effect on 
PSIS may be explained by a newness of the patient safety issues, specific changes in the 
hospital reporting patterns of adverse events and medical errors after the IOM report of 
1999, and possible characteristics of clinical personnel (e.g., varying levels of knowledge 
about and awareness of in-hospital adverse events and medical errors). Thus, patient 
safety issues should be further researched in order to identify the directions for quality 
improvements and adverse event prevention. 
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of psi 15 
patients) 
1 st time period 
(1995 - 1997) 
2nd time 
period (1998 - 
2000) 
HHI 
HMO 
RNs/ 
LPNs 
0.248 
0.252 
0.238 
0.270 
0.255 
0.227 
-0.093 
0.093 
age 64+ 
margin 
-0.042 
-0.107 
-0.100 
-0.037 
0.005 
-0.091 
0.180 
-0.180 
tot mds 
majteach 
0.396 
0.508 
0.313 
0.304 
0.268 
0.303 
-0.089 
0.089 
POP 
incm 
minteach 
0.097 
0.130 
0.544 
0.543 
0.490 
0.502 
-0.072 
0.072 
hhi 
1 .OOO 
0.514 
0.467 
0.430 
0.5 12 
-0.047 
0.047 
HMO 
penet 
penetration 
% of hospital's 
patient age < 
19 
1 .OOO 
-0.111 
-0.502 
0.010 1 .OOO 
0.185 
0.174 
0.158 
0.162 
- -- 
-0.008 
0.008 
age 4 9  
-0.485 
-0.446 
-0.408 
-0.463 
0.036 
-0.036 
age 19- 
64 
md(4 5 - 
54)Ipop 
1 .OOO 
-0.162 
0.276 
0.01 1 
0.058 
0.172 
POP old 
65+ 
1 .OOO 
-0.248 
-0.122 
-0.118 
-0.305 
-0.059 
0.356 
0.353 
0.238 
age 64+ 
1.000 
-0.056 
0.434 
-0.129 
-0.097 
-0.095 
-0.466 
-0.276 
0.773 
0.645 
0.51 1 
% of hospital's 
patient age 19 - 
64 
% of hospital's 
patient age 64 
+ 
per capita 
income in the 
market 
population 
over 65 in the 
market 
total 
population in 
the market 
MDs per 1000 
population 
MDs in 45-54 
age group per 
POP 
% of female 
patients in a 
hospital 
% of black 
patients in a 
hospital 
% patients 
with mortality 
risk 3 and 4 
% patients 
with severity 
risk 3 and 5 
CMI 
tot pop 
1.000 
0.023 
0.023 
0.142 
0.063 
-0.066 
-0.039 
-0.050 
age -49 
0.416 
-0.863 
-0.1 17 
-0.315 
0.150 
-0.120 
-0.114 
0.609 
0.062 
-0.730 
-0.620 
-0.564 
POP 
incm 
1.000 
-0.025 
0.045 
0.647 
0.635 
-0.217 
0.201 
-0.01 1 
-0.025 
0.059 
tot mds 
1.000 
0.962 
-0.178 
0.321 
-0.003 
0.051 
0.169 
age 19- 
64 
1 .OOO 
-0.818 
0.234 
-0.423 
0.062 
0.310 
0.300 
0.146 
0.426 
-0.560 
-0.456 
-0.278 
hhi 
-0.126 
0.064 
-0.299 
0.148 
-0.518 
-0.306 
-0.276 
-0.01 1 
-0.22 1 
-0.049 
-0.090 
-0.166 
HMO 
penet 
0.043 
0.047 
0.294 
-0.180 
0.255 
0.268 
0.236 
0.039 
0.097 
0.088 
0.065 
0.137 
Volume (num. 
of iqi 15 
patients) 
Volume (nurn. 
of iqi 16 
patients) 
Volume (nurn. 
of iqi 17 
patients) 
Volume (nurn. 
of iqi 20 
patients) 
Volume (nurn. 
of psi 03 
patients) 
Volume (nurn. 
of psi 07 
patients) 
Volume (nurn. 
of psi 12 
patients) 
Volume (nurn. 
POP old 
65+ 
0.046 
0.1 11 
0.063 
-0.023 
-0.019 
-0.130 
-0.102 
-0.074 
-0.062 
0.013 
-0.013 
tot pop 
0.006 
0.106 
0.111 
0.132 
0.060 
0.142 
0.056 
0.014 
0.089 
0.097 
-0.097 
hhi 
-0.162 
-0.260 
-0.255 
-0.250 
-0.257 
-0.293 
-0.23 1 
age 4 9  
-0.033 
-0.140 
-0.060 
-0.013 
0.03 1 
0.268 
0.110 
HMO 
penet 
0.125 
0.213 
0.207 
0.210 
0.157 
0.172 
0.155 
of psi 13 
patients) 
Volume (nurn. 
of psi 15 
patients) 
1 st time period 
(1995 - 1997) 
2nd time 
period (1998 - 
2000) 
tot mds 
0.066 
0.222 
0.211 
0.291 
0.402 
0.345 
0.352 
0.345 
0.389 
-0.069 
0.069 
-0.118 
-0.217 
0.008 
-0.008 
md(45- 
54)Ipop 
0.061 
0.195 
0.199 
0.271 
0.356 
0.320 
0.336 
0.319 
0.364 
-0.092 
0.092 
age 19- 
64 
-0.021 
-0.022 
-0.037 
0.044 
0.241 
0.363 
0.230 
0.117 
0.306 
-0.246 
0.246 
-0.181 
-0.266 
--
-0.087 
0.087 
age 64+ 
0.032 
0.101 
0.059 
-0.016 
-0.154 
-0.371 
-0.197 
--
0.114 
0.167 
-0.062 
0.062 
POP 
incm 
0.068 
0.205 
0.178 
0.239 
0.342 
--p-pp-pp 
0.288 
0.186 
0.048 
0.101 
0.061 
-0.061 
0.157 
0.276 
-0.084 
0.084 
% of female 
patients in a 
hospital 
% of black 
patients in a 
hospital 
% patients 
with mortality 
risk 3 and 4 
% patients 
with severity 
risk 3 and 5 
CMI 
Volume (nurn. 
of iqi 15 
patients) 
Volume (nurn. 
of iqi 16 
patients) 
Volume (nurn. 
ofiqi 17 
patients) 
Volume (nurn. 
of iqi 20 
patients) 
Volume (nurn. 
of psi 03 
patients) 
Volume (nurn. 
of psi 07 
patients) 
% 
female 
1 .OOO 
-0.02 1 
-0.381 
-0.374 
-0.634 
-0.229 
-0.163 
-0.155 
-0.078 
-0.245 
-0.043 
% mort 
34 
1 .OOO 
0.940 
0.553 
0.093 
0.216 
0.141 
ppppp- 
0.138 
-0.046 
-0.217 
% 
black 
1 .OOO 
-0.074 
0.024 
-0.003 
-0.033 
0.295 
0.1 13 
0.132 
0.252 
0.252 
%sever 
34 
1 .OOO 
0.604 
0.127 
0.245 
0.194 
0.187 
0.044 
-0.102 
CMI 
1.000 
0.509 
0.352 
0.417 
0.302 
0.345 
0.225 
Vol iqi 
15 
1.000 
0.674 
0.763 
0.660 
0.697 
0.719 
Vol iqi 
16 
1 .OOO 
0.844 
0.787 
0.774 
0.736 
Vol iqi 
17 
1.000 
0.825 
0.790 
0.792 
Vol iqi 
20 
1.000 
0.753 
0.784 
Vol psi 
03 
1 .OOO 
0.910 
Volume (nurn. 
ofpsi 12 
patients) 
Volume (num. 
ofpsi 13 
patients) 
Volume (num. 
of psi 15 
patients) 
1 st time period 
(1995 - 1997) 
2nd time 
period (1 998 - 
2000) 
Volume (nurn. 
of psi 07 
patients) 
Volume (nurn. 
of psi 12 
patients) 
Volume (nurn. 
ofpsi 13 
patients) 
Volume (nurn. 
of psi 15 
patients) 
1 st time period 
(1995 - 1997) 
2nd time 
period (1 998 - 
2000) 
YO 
female 
-0.165 
-0.182 
-0.205 
0.037 
-0.037 
Vol 
psi 07 
1 .OOO 
0.886 
0.746 
0.969 
-0.078 
YO 
black 
0.074 
0.028 
0.230 
-0.069 
0.069 
Vol 
psi 12 
1 .OOO 
0.929 
0.921 
-0.029 
% mort 
34 
-0.102 
-0.067 
-0.087 
-0.063 
0.063 
Vol 
psi 13 
1 .OOO 
0.798 
0.041 
% sever 
34 
0.008 
0.037 
0.016 
-0.028 
0.028 
Vol 
psi 15 
1 .OOO 
-0.098 
CMI 
0.480 
0.516 
0.363 
-0.015 
0.015 
1 st time 
1.000 
Vol iqi 
15 
0.753 
0.671 
0.742 
-0.025 
0.025 
2nd 
time 
Vol iqi 
16 
0.616 
0.507 
0.775 
-0.098 
0.098 
Vol psi 
03 
0.837 
0.748 
0.950 
-0.038 
0.038 
- 
Vol iqi 
17 
0.760 
0.642 
0.827 
-0.005 
0.005 
Vol iqi 
20 
0.698 
0.566 
0.806 
-0.137 
0.137 
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